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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the functions of the term “community” in American social and 
political rhetoric. I contend that community serves as a god-term, or expression of value and 
order, which rhetors use to motivate actions, endorse values, include/exclude persons, and 
compensate for modern losses. Informed by the philosophy of Kenneth Burke, I explore the 
general features of “rhetorics of community,” including community’s ambiguity and status as an 
automatic good, the relationship between community and modernity, the myth of communal loss, 
and the uses of community as a site of political unity and contest. I analyze the writings of John 
Humphrey Noyes, Jane Addams, and the Southern Agrarians as paradigm cases of utopian, 
progressive, and traditionalist rhetorics respectively, and I discuss how community is constructed 
in order to navigate the tension between self and society, correct for the failures of modern 
individualism, and propose competing visions of the social order.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
It is commonplace to lament the loss of community in modern life. Regardless of political 
commitments, there seems to be a shared sense that something has been lost in the age of 
technology and mass society that is best captured by the word “community.” Everywhere 
citizens are met with calls to get involved in the community and to extend the sense of 
community. Alarming pronouncements are made about the loss or decline of community, and 
optimists exhort us with hope that the internet can provide a new medium for it. It could be said 
that the “quest for community” is a persistent clamoring of the modern age: everyone wants it, 
no one seems to have it, and most think we have lost it.   
As Raymond Williams observed, with its “warmly persuasive” tone, the word community 
“seems never to be spoken of unfavourably” (A Vocabulary 66). As an idea, “community” is 
automatically accepted as an inherent good, something at once universally lauded and ever-
elusive. Against the backdrop of modern alienation and bureaucratic rationality, community’s 
connotations elicit mythic visions of a lost era of intimacy and coherence. And as a term that 
served as a rallying cry against the dehumanizing effects of industrialism, community is infused 
with nostalgic dreams of an age of innocence (Nancy, Inoperative; Lee). Accordingly, to invoke 
community is to prompt political motivation to recover it.  
Of course, in attempting to pin down precisely what this thing “community” is, the critic 
is confronted with a frustrating inconsistency: national communities, the Christian community, 
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local communities, internet communities, quilting communities, fan communities, discourse 
communities, the sense of community—it seems the only thing that can match the ubiquity of the 
word is its endless ambiguity. No one can say what community is with confidence, and those 
who attempt to restrict its definition inevitably fail to stay within the confines they construct. 
George Hillery surveyed ninety-four definitions of the term community in sociological literature 
and he concluded the only thing they shared was a common concern with people (“Definitions”)! 
Community’s indefinability, mixed with its happy-homely undertones, makes it one of 
society’s most intriguing rhetorical terms. Because of the its ambiguity, the term can unite 
individuals around a common cause without the burden of specificity, concealing disagreement 
about its own substance. In day to day interactions, community serves as a legitimizing rhetorical 
modifier, the bestower of an airy illusion of consensus, a mask over dissent, a plea for more 
moral and intimate social relations, and perhaps above all, a resource for symbolic 
transformation. An internet forum is called an online “community” to legitimize it as a site of 
social interaction. We speak of an “identity community” so that we can gloss over the vehement 
disagreement of its disparate members to form an imagined solidarity and present a unified front. 
All parties agree, it seems, that community is good and we should work toward it—but if persons 
of various political stripes endorse community as a civic-human ideal, this is largely because the 
term is vague enough to hide the contradictory political desires of citizens.1 Conservatives and 
communists agree that we need more community, but they surely do not mean the same thing. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate what kind of work gets done with the 
idea “community” as it is invoked in our general American social and political discourse. In the 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Burke defines ideology as “an aggregate of beliefs sufficiently at odds with one another to 
justify opposite kinds of conduct” (Counter-Statement, 163).  
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argot of Communication studies, we might say there is a “rhetoric of community,” although it is 
almost surely more accurate to say that there are many “rhetorics” or rhetorical uses of 
community in our contemporary discourse, and that is both semiotically interesting and 
historically significant to observe. Since we are engulfed in rhetorics of community everywhere 
from college campus to presidential speeches, press releases to cereal boxes, political marches to 
research projects, church sermons to judicial punishments, it is in our best interest to understand 
what is occurring when “community” is invoked either as the implicit or explicit basis of an 
appeal. That is to say a rhetorical approach to the discursive phenomenon of the term 
“community” asks how this term works to motivate or sanction actions, evoke or endorse certain 
values, and/or include or exclude certain people and their interests as conjoined with ours. 
This project begins with the conviction that community is primarily a moral, rather than a 
descriptive term. In other words, approaching community rhetorically suggests we not think of it 
as an actual entity, but observe its symbolic and rhetorical functions in the contexts where it 
occurs. We should ask, what does community (as term) do? What kind of work does it 
accomplish? What motives does it weave? What conflicts does is mask? In this dissertation, I 
strive to answer these questions through a series of critical analyses of historically-based 
community rhetorics in the American context. 
There is no doubt that “community” as a value and moral good is deeply embedded in 
American ideology, and has its roots in the western tradition more generally. “Community” is 
obviously ideological in that basic Althusserrian sense, in that it “calls” people into service of the 
“ideological state apparatus” (“Ideological”). One of the most curious aspects of community is 
that is an unquestioned value for both progressivist and conservative causes, and for both it 
implies an organic collective identity that falls outside of the “state apparatus.” For these reasons, 
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with “community” I argue, we are in the presence of what both liberal Kenneth Burke and 
conservative Richard Weaver call a “god-term,” one whose value and power are beyond 
question, possessing the quality of approbation and centrality whenever it is invoked (Burke, 
Grammar; Rhetoric of Religion; Weaver, Ethics). 
It is customary in contemporary ideological analysis to focus on debunking or censoring 
the tools of ideology and hegemonic culture. From my perspective, however, there is a great deal 
of good that has been done in the name of community, and there is surely a great deal of harm 
that is enabled in the name of communal identity. And while I have my own biases, my purposes 
in this rhetorical exploration flow from a curiosity about this rhetorical phenomenon. As Kenneth 
Burke remarks, criticism need not be naïve to be appreciative, and should begin with “linguistic 
skepticism,” which, “in being quizzical, supplies the surest ground for the discernment and 
appreciation of linguistic resources” (Grammar 343). 
My aim in this study is to come to an informed understanding that is at once critical and 
appreciative of the discursive role “community” plays in negotiating what it means to be modern. 
By articulating the resources of community, clarifying its ambiguity, tracing its symbolic 
linkages, observing the conflicts its masks and the bridges it builds, in sum, in witnessing its 
potential for rhetorical transformation, we may come to such an understanding. A critical 
perspective might be used to improve the rhetorical usefulness of community or to censor its 
misuses—but in either case those are arguments that need to be made about the case at hand, and 
are not conclusions to be drawn simply because we have identified that community is a rhetorical 
term deeply and curiously located in our contemporary ideology. Community is a concept critical 
to civic life and democratic theory, therefore my hope is that investigating the character and 
resources of community rhetorics might help us to understand not only language but self-social 
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relations and the historical moment in which we live. At the very least, we can be informed not 
only of how we organize language, but of how language organizes us.  
A Modern History of ‘Community’ 
‘Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone; 
All just supply, and all Relation:  
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot, 
For every man alone thinkes that he hath got 
To be a Phoenix, and that then can bee 
None of that kinde, of which he is but hee  
(Donne, 1611) 
 
A book-length study of community and its rhetorical uses should begin with a 
contextualization of the term’s history, themes, and rise to god-term status. The origin of the 
word “community” can be traced to the Latin word communitas, defined roughly as “public 
spirit,” or “sense of fellowship.” It takes its root from the older term communis, meaning “things 
held in common” (“Communis”). Communis combines two words—munus, meaning service, 
duty, or obligation, and -com, meaning association or togetherness. Taken in sum, the ancient 
communitas might be defined as the collective sharing of a common duty or service. In this 
classical conception, communitas evokes an image of public life constituted by a mutual 
obligation or debt which strengthens the unity and prosperity of human association.  
The resonance of the ancient communitas endures to the present, where it continues to 
inspire a number of contemporary writers to rethink associated life by returning to community’s 
pure and primitive form (Esposito, Communitas; Nancy, Inoperative; Turner, Ritual). Victor 
Turner understood communitas as an intense state of liminality, categorized by extreme equality 
and shared experiences of “anti-structure” wherein a segment of the population suffers in order 
to sustain society (Ritual). Roberto Esposito, meanwhile, emphasized the obligatory aspect of 
communitas, arguing community derives from a shared lack— “the totality of persons united not 
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by a ‘property’ but precisely by an obligation or a debt” (Communitas 6). Communitas for 
Esposito consists of a common obligation, given out of an overwhelming sense of gratitude.  
It is clear that in its classical root, civic obligation is at the very heart of the concept. 
Obligation is the underpinning of all subsequent uses and transformations of community, present 
even when the obligatory sense is hidden from plain view. But while etymological work 
demarcates community’s general realm in shared civic ventures and identifies obligation as its 
fundamental root, it is only in the writings of the moderns where community gains its current 
connotations and status as god-term. In the industrial era, “community” underwent a 
transformation of meaning across the Western World, reflecting the changing mores and 
lifestyles brought on by the restructuring of society. Since the term has a cognate in nearly every 
Western language, community’s modern transformation was international in scope. Its evolving 
history can be seen in the political philosophies of key enlightenment thinkers and the vernacular 
rhetoric of common citizens. We can better situate contemporary community discourse by 
recounting the key moments of this history, keeping an eye on the major themes which emerge in 
its modern construction. 
Hobbes and Rousseau 
In his influential treatise, The Inoperative Community, French Philosopher Jean-Luc 
Nancy attributes the modern consciousness of community to Jean-Jacques Rousseau because 
Rousseau was the first significant author to infer a fundamental longing for a lost communitarian 
intimacy at the heart of modern discontent (9). Italian Philosopher Roberto Esposito similarly 
suggests that Rousseau was “the first modern thinker of community as well as the first to have 
constructed a myth of community” (Esposito 54). The writings of Rousseau are then an 
appropriate place to begin. But since Rousseau came to his pivotal conclusions in part as a 
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reaction to Thomas Hobbes’ philosophy of the state, we can start with what Rousseau’s 
conception of community intended to contest. 
Thomas Hobbes has been called the “tireless adversary of community” for his defense of 
a Leviathan state which usurps affective loyalty from all other sources of affiliation (Esposito 
27). Because he understood nature as characterized by war and anarchy, Hobbes thought that 
individuals had a natural incentive to seek protection from their shared fear of death by forming 
social pacts. The modern state was created through a kind of social contract, wherein citizens 
willing gave up their natural freedoms in trade for the order and stability of political society. 
Human association in this view is formed out of fear, not natural harmony or shared visions of 
the good: “the origin of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual goodwill men 
had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other” (Hobbes, Man and Citizen 
113). It follows that the partial affiliations which compete with the state for allegiance are 
enemies of society because they deflect loyalty from the central authority. For this reason, 
Hobbes argued that older forms of association needed to be eliminated whenever possible. The 
supreme community was to be the political community formed through the social contract. 
Hobbes concludes that in order for the sovereign state to be optimally successful at eradicating 
natural human hazards, it must reign as the uppermost authority and source of allegiance—and 
that means smaller associations and divided loyalties must be stomped out.  
The political community was the only legitimate community because Hobbes was 
convinced that communities could not be formed around shared visions of good; they are only 
created through the shared fear of death, and it is this fear which makes the political community 
of the nation-state possible. If this state is to be optimally successful, then it must be the sole 
source of affection and loyalty. Otherwise, citizens would be divided and civil war would 
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inescapably ensue. It is for this reason Esposito writes of Hobbes that “the state is the 
desocialization of the communitarian bond,” because he would replace the bond of individuals 
with the supremacy of the state (28). In dissolving citizens of all their other obligations, Hobbes 
leaves society an aggregate of individuals without intermediate associations (Nisbet, Quest 130). 
Hobbes’ vision of an overarching national community rests upon a pessimistic view of 
human nature which doubted human potential to form associations out of mutual goodwill. No 
such community ever existed or could exist. The only legitimate community was that created 
through the social contract which conceded supreme power to the sovereign in order to escape 
from the brutal anarchy and disharmony of nature. 
Rousseau disagreed with Hobbes on nearly every account, forming a view of community 
that was a near perfect antithesis (with the significant exception that he too would propose a 
totalizing community). Harmonious human association founded upon the shared pursuit of 
common goods was not only possible, it was the natural state of things—but, he laments, it had 
been lost to the corrupting forces of society. Modern society for Rousseau was characterized by 
increasing isolation from the natural intimacy and union of human community because of 
artificial traditions and contrivances which put the interest of individuals at odds with those of 
the whole. Jean-Luc Nancy explains:   
Rousseau…was the first to experience the question of society as an uneasiness directed 
toward the community, and as the consciousness of a (perhaps irreparable) rupture in this 
community…This consciousness of this ordeal belongs to Rousseau, who figured a 
society that experienced or acknowledged the loss or degradation of a communitarian 
(and communicative) intimacy—a society producing, of necessity, the solitary figure, but 
one whose desire and intention was to produce citizen of a free sovereign community 
(Inoperative 9) 
 
Unlike Hobbes who viewed nature as the war of all against all, Rousseau saw it as a site 
of peace, freedom and harmony. It was only the institutions and conventions of society that 
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corrupted natural human community. Modern society pits persons against each other by 
encouraging them to seek their own commercial interest at the expense of the general interest. 
And the problem was only made worse by inadequate forms of political authority that permitted 
the powerful to dominate citizens through the apparatuses of government. 
Rousseau’s hope in this context was to recover the essential freedom of community from 
the chains of modern society. His romanticized past of human communion, captured in the 
famous dictum “man is born free but is everywhere in chains” was a myth of community.  
Esposito explains that Rousseau articulates a “myth of community that is transparent to itself, in 
which everyone communicates with the other’s own communitarian essence, without mediation, 
filter or sign to interrupt the reciprocal fusion of consciousness” (Esposito 53). In Rousseau’s 
portrayal, the communal intimacy of loyalty and reciprocity found in close affiliation had been 
replaced with modern alienation from self, nature and others. Yet he believed that community 
could be recovered through in an ultimate sharing of selves in communion through the creation 
of the General Will—the consensual sharing of identity in a political community concerned with 
the collective interest. In the General Will, all individual interests are sacrificed to the public 
good. The General Will, as political community, could guarantee individual freedom and social 
harmony because it is founded upon an intense sharing of common identity and overcomes the 
artificial constraints placed on human unity. The political community becomes a total 
community that excludes factions and has the rightful power to coerce those who do not concede 
it authority. The one community should absorb the smaller loyalties which man distract and 
undermine the universal ideal and upset the common interest. Rousseau, according to Nisbet, is 
adamant that “there is to be no bond of loyalty, no social affiliation, no interdependence save 
what is symbolized by the General Will. Society is to be an aggregate of atoms held rigidly 
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together by the sovereign will of the State alone” (Nisbet, Quest 130; 136). The result is the 
replacement of local and partial communities of obligation with an obligation and communion of 
all with all.  
Despite their severe philosophical differences, Hobbes and Rousseau come to at least one 
similar conclusion: they privilege a totalistic, dominant community at the expense of smaller, 
partial associations. Yet they diverge precisely in what creates this total community. Hobbes 
thought primitive life was characterized by anarchy, whereas Rousseau believed it was altruistic 
and harmonious. In Rousseau we see the first modern “myth” of community and an attempt at its 
recovery through the shared pursuit of collective interest. This was just the kind of community 
which Hobbes thought impossible, for he believed a political community could only be founded 
upon fear, not natural comradery. Nevertheless, their similarities in prompting a vision of a 
totalizing association obfuscates their rivaling understandings of community’s character. What 
makes Rousseau notable as “the first modern thinker of community” is his view of the natural 
harmony of all persons in the pre-modern era and the belief that genuine community had been 
corrupted by modern institutions. That community was a natural good in need of recovery came 
to be reflect the standard assumptions of the modern mind. In his nostalgic lament for the lost 
intimacy of human relations, Rousseau pit community and society as antitheses.  
Industrial Adjustments  
Rousseau’s popularity in the age of revolutions helped to solidify his communal 
presuppositions into political theory. There were other, less “academic” sources for the myth’s 
spread as well. The loss of community narrative gained traction in the social experiences of 
citizens enduring the rapid urban transformation of familiar social landscapes. Craig Calhoun 
explains that it “was in reflection on the dramatic changes wrought in the later eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries that the concept of community took the shape in which we receive it today. 
It bears, as a result, a number of connotations specific to its historical context (Calhoun, 
“Toward” 105). That historical context was the industrial revolution, where advances in 
technology, transportation, communication, and commerce radically restructured traditional 
forms of social organization. In the anxiety and dislocation which ensued, “community” served 
as a rallying cry against the perceived negative consequences of these transformations on the 
quality of human relationships. As a source of critique, community was used by “conservative 
minded” political actors who feared the moral meanings of traditional relationships were giving 
way to alienation and isolation (Calhoun, “Toward”). Raymond Plant observes:  
In this time the notion of community has been used almost universally by social and 
political philosophers to point up some drawbacks and baneful characteristics of urban 
industrial society and to point the way toward new and more humane forms of social 
relations (Plant “Community” 81) 
 
The obliteration of traditional forms of association was matched with expanding urban 
populations and removal of political power from locales to centralized authorities. Combined 
with uncertainty over new waves of immigration, the expansion of markets, radical 
individualism, and shifting social moralities, community came to inherit all the connotations of 
stability, coherence, and amity it holds today. In pointing toward an ideal of “more humane 
forms of social relations,” community was a term of hope. Against urban sprawl, community 
became associated with simple agrarian farms and autonomous local townships, implying an 
opposition between the “city and the country” (Williams, The Country). Community was 
increasingly tied to land, small townships, and locales.  
 Community as a critique of industrialism fused irretrievably with community as a 
mechanism for coping with it. Romanticized dreams of a communal past before industrialism 
could preserve otherwise threatened identities through symbolic images of stability, even as 
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citizens inevitably adjusted to the new social circumstances. These nostalgic portrayals made it 
possible to tether past and future, providing a sense of permanence in an era of change. 
Community became a Janus-faced term, looking toward the past for inspiration, while aiming for 
a reformed future. The political reactions against modern expansion in the name of community 
helped to cement the mythic consciousness of Rousseau.  
Secularization of the Religious Impulse 
 Darwinism too is a part of the story. Perhaps the key carrier of the communal ideal in the 
intervening period between Ancient Rome and the Industrial era was Christianity. Nearly every 
contemporaneous text which deals with community finds it necessary to comment upon the 
religious sources of the term. And while Nancy attributes the modern understanding of 
community to Rousseau, he writes that “the true consciousness of the loss of community is 
Christian” (Nancy, Inoperative 10). Nancy argues that Hegel, Marx, and the majority of Moderns 
were looking for something like communion, the immersion into pure immanence, the mystical 
body of Christ: “community might well be the altogether modern thought of humanity’s 
partaking of divine life: the thought of a human being penetrating into pure immanence” (Nancy, 
Inoperative 10). 
 The term community is “Christian” in at least two regards. The first can be represented 
by the practice of “communion,” the ontological sharing of all believers in Christ’s body. 
Communion, like community, is a term of perfection. It posits entry into a state of pure 
immanence and ultimate union through the sharing of a common source. In the Christian mind, 
natural communion (in God) has been “lost” through original sin and can be recovered only 
through atonement by partaking in Christ’s suffering and joining the community of believers. 
This touches upon the second sense in which community is Christian—the Christian Faith 
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stresses the inherent equality and unity of all persons, as manifest in the Christian ethic of 
brotherhood and unconditional love: “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor 
is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). In teaching the 
common citizenship and reciprocal obligation of all believers, the Christian ethic extended the 
mandate of agape love as crystallized in the golden rule to the citizens of all nations. It was 
among the earliest and most influential doctrines to propose a mandate of universal community. 
Christianity imagined a solidarity between all persons of the earth, extending the sense of 
fraternity and obligation to its highest limits.  
 While Christianity’s version of community was prevalent in the West for two thousand 
years, in the modern era, where traditional forms of association where being torn apart, the 
Christian faith began to be associated with a more land-based traditional relational ethic. In 
addition to asserting a seminal ideal of universal community, Christianity’s system of common 
beliefs and values was seen by observers as enabling a narrative coherence and relational 
intimacy which was rapidly fragmenting in other spheres. The march towards modernity was not 
only driven by industrialism and other economics forces, but by an onslaught of new ideas in the 
enlightenment tradition of secular rationality. This included advances in technology and science, 
and most menacing to traditional Christianity, Darwinian evolution. The theory of evolution 
called into question the truths of orthodox religious doctrine and its privileged position over 
social thought. With the radical individualism of market morality further loosening ideological 
constraints, the Church suffered from a crisis of authority. 
  One response was to adhere more vehemently to the truth of pre-modern orthodoxy 
(fundamentalism exemplifies this approach), while another was to try and reconcile the truth of 
scripture with the findings of secular rationality (the path taken by liberal Protestantism). As it 
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became more common to discard the pieties of the Church, there was an effort among 
philosophers and other intellectuals to save the moral “substance” of Christianity without the 
doctrinal apparatus which appeared increasingly less plausible. This “essence” of Christianity 
was “community.” Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce 
presented influential American examples of efforts to preserve the religio-communal impulse. 
James’ response was to salvage religious experience by privatizing it into the psychology of the 
individual and justifying it in terms of its social-bond benefits (Pragmatism; Varieties); Dewey 
made a distinction between religion and the religious, and then isolated community as the “true” 
element of the religious that was to be rescued from the “narrow” confines of religion’s doctrinal 
apparatus (A Common Faith; The Public); Royce “pantheized” God into a spiritual ethic of 
human loyalty wherein “universal community” became the primary moral call for a renewed 
faith (The Philosophy of Loyalty; “Idea of Universal Community”). What these responses shared 
was a common desire to preserve the community consciousness of Christianity for a new era of 
human relationships. Community henceforth took a place as a kind of “secular” or civil religion, 
a civic-spiritual ideal that might preserve the meaningful human relationships and universal-
egalitarian morality needed for democratic government to succeed.  
Sociological Standardization 
The loss of community narrative found in Rousseau, Industrial opposition, and Christian 
doctrine was solidified in the burgeoning field of sociology. Success in the natural sciences as 
well as rapid market expansion, rationalism, and perceived secularization, motivated the 
brightest academic minds of the nineteenth century to develop theories of society which could 
account for these unprecedented developments (Habermas, Philosophical Discourse). Auguste 
Comte, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, and Max Weber are but a few of the 
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foundational theorists who wrote against this historic backdrop in developing the “sciences of 
society.”2 The idea of Society in its contemporary formulation has no equivalent in classical 
civilizations; it is a thoroughly modern concept (Arendt, Human). Any “science of the social,” 
which sociology purported to be, therefore, had to depend upon an antithesis, an inverse, or 
opposite, to give it meaning. That antithesis was found in community.  
While such an opposition is noticeable in the writings of other theorists, there is no more 
remarkable statement of the contrast between community and society then that of Ferdinand 
Tönnies in Gemeinscahft und Gesellschaft. As a cornerstone text in the discipline of sociology, 
the foundation of the modern social sciences is in large part guided by Tönnies’ distinction.  
For Tönnies there are two basic forms of social organization: community (gemeinscahft) 
and society (gesellschaft). Community is the older form of association based in organic private 
relationships, especially those of the family. The intimate relationships of gemeinscahft develop 
in close relation to the land and are sustained by locality, kinship, and friendships. Towns, as 
communities, are self-sufficient unities not unlike an extended family. What allows gemeinscahft 
to flourish is “reciprocal binding sentiment,” a sense of loyalty and shared vision of the good that 
flows from the mutual recognition between members that they belong to a singular unit (52). In 
this natural harmony, feelings of tenderness and reverence glue the community together so that it 
may endure in relative peace. (42) 
For Tönnies (like Rousseau), the organic human comradery found in gemeinscahft was 
the natural condition, the one which has characterized human relationships since the beginning. 
But in the superseding modern era, this creature gesellschaft (society) had overtaken 
                                                 
2 See: August Comte, The Course on Positive Philosophy; System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on 
Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity; Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy; Capital; Emile Durkheim, Division of Labour; Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology; 
Max Weber, Nature of Social Action; Economy and Society.  
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gemeinscahft as the dominant mode, displacing community into a fragmented existence. The new 
society was capitalist, rationalist, contractual, and massive: 
Gesellschaft, an aggregate by convention and law of nature, is to be understood as a 
multitude of natural and artificial individuals, the wills, and spheres of whom are in many 
relations with and to one another, and remain nevertheless independent of one another 
and devoid of familiar relationships (Tönnies 77) 
 
In contrast to the organic harmony of communal understanding, society was imaginary, 
mechanical, transitory, superficial, and strange. In community humans were essentially united; in 
society they are essentially isolated (65). Citizens of society are bound only by contract, the 
rational abstraction which gives order to an artificial aggregate of human actors seeking their 
own individual interests (71). Intimacy is replaced by the “politeness” of entrepreneurs. Altruism 
is replaced with competition; understanding with contract; tradition with convention; unity with 
division. What remains is the individualistic pursuit of profit.  
Tönnies considered gesellschaft to be the capitalist ideal which could only be 
approximated, never fully realized. Nevertheless, in opposing community and society as 
theoretical and historical contrasts, Tönnies identified the obliteration of community by society 
as the underlying fact of modern life. The natural state of human relationships which gave 
purpose and coherence to life was lost to the mechanical alienation of the industrial era. Three 
general themes crystallize in Tönnies: the image of community as a locale, or a place-based site 
of human interaction with close relationships to the land, to tradition, and to kin; the idea of an 
imagined solidarity between individuals who identify within a singular unity; and a developing 
moral obligation toward those fellow citizens believed to belong to one’s community.  
It is hard to underestimate the influence of Tönnies formulation. He was not the first to 
propose a theory of history along these lines—his understanding of community is thoroughly 
Rousseauian, and his conception of society owes a great debt to Hobbes’ Leviathan. What makes 
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Tönnies’ gemeinscahft und gesellschaft significant is that he standardizes the “myth” of 
community into the very blood of academic and philosophical discourse. He solidified modern 
self-understanding as the crushing of communal accord by the impersonal forces of society, and 
in the practice, bestowed the dichotomy with all the prestige of a “science.” Moving forward, 
such a dichotomy was taken as common sense.  
As sociology sought an identity which could ground itself as a discipline, Tönnies gave 
urgency to the task by providing a definition of the object of inquiry and a history of the modern 
condition. It also did not hurt that the sense of peril felt toward industrialism could be alleviated 
by an account which left open the possibility for communal coherence. Thus Tönnies’ 
articulation found a welcome reception in intellectual quarters, with his ideas weaving into the 
very fabric of sociological assumptions. Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, who along with Marx 
are generally designated as the founding fathers of Sociology, directly responded to Tönnies 
work and largely assimilated his dichotomy into their seminal writings (Durkheim, Division; 
Weber, Economy). In Economy and Society, Weber operationalizes Tönnies’ distinction between 
community and society to explicate his theory of modern social stratification, although he frames 
the dichotomy as less determinate and more fluid then Tönnies. For Weber, community was 
instituted on subjective feeling and tradition while society was constituted by rational contract 
(Economy). Meanwhile Emile Durkheim, who was somewhat less charitable in his reading of 
Tönnies, nonetheless incorporated the basic distinction between organic and mechanical 
relationships into his understanding of social order (Division).  
Given its prominence among the founding figures of Sociology and its continual 
reoccurrence as a topic of inquiry, there is reason for suspecting that the discipline has largely 
internalized the rhetoric of community. A brief survey of volumes published on the topic 
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demonstrates the critical role “community” plays in its disciplinary identity.3 Certainly Sociology 
was the key academic force in standardizing and sustaining the myth of community into the 
present era. A discipline revolving around an abstraction as massive and undefinable as 
“society,” could only hope to define its object of inquiry against an abstraction that was equally 
as elusive. It was Rousseau’s lost community solidified in Tönnies gemeinscahft which made 
such a study possible. The sociological conception of community was transmuted all those 
features which, by definition, were absent from modernity. Community was a negative image, 
created not to describe an entity as much as to give meaning to its opposite. In this way, 
community enabled the study of society by providing a theory of history, an explanation of the 
vast social changes transforming Western society, and a definition of the prime object of inquiry. 
For this reason, sociology was founded in and constituted by the rhetoric of community.  
American Antecedents 
I have argued that sociology was most responsible for solidifying community’s place as 
the forerunner to society into the modern understanding of community, that Rousseau’s longing 
for lost human harmony saturates through it, and that the Christian consciousness was adapted 
into a kind of secularized civic morality. Community was understood variously as a civic 
                                                 
3 A partial etymology of community’s sociological history can demonstrate the connection: Lynd, 
Middletown, 1922; Janowitz, Community Press in an Urban Setting, 1952; Nisbet, The Social 
Philosophers, 1953; Hillery, Defintions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 1955; Arensberg, Family ad 
Community in Ireland, 1941; Frankenberg, Communities in Britain, 1969; Stacey, The Myth of 
Community Studies 1969; Scherer, Contemporary Community: Sociological Illusion or Reality, 1972; 
Bernard, The Sociology of Community, 1973; Gusfield, Community: A Critical Response, 1975; Plant. 
“Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology,” 1978; Calhoun “Community: Toward a Variable 
Conceptualization for Comparative Research, 1980; Bulmer, The Rejuvenation of Community Studies?: 
Neighbors, Networks and Policy, 1985; Cohen, The Social Construction of Community, 1985; Kingdom, 
No Such Thing as Society: Individualism and Community, 1987; Etzioni, Spirit of Community, 1993; 
Crow and Allen, Community Life: An Introduction to Local Social Relations, 1994; Bellah et. al, Habits 
of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 1985; Calhoun, “Community without 
Propinquity Revisited,” 1998; Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community, 2000; Wuthnow, Small-town America: Finding of Community, Shaping the Future, 2013.  
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obligation, a locale, and an imagined solidarity, all with mythic and spiritual overtones. Since 
the interest of this dissertation is with distinctively American discourses of community, I turn to 
the features specific to the American tradition.  
Although it shares a common heritage with other Western perspectives on community, 
the American mind put its own stamp on the concept due to its unique history. Rather than 
feudalist Europe, when American’s envision the hey-day of communal autonomy they are more 
likely to picture Puritan New England villages, Southern agrarian homesteads, small towns in 
Middle-America, Cowboy Westerns, and perhaps even Eisenhower-era suburban neighborhoods. 
Three early sources of American communal inspiration stand above the rest: The Biblical, 
Jeffersonian, and Tocquevillian traditions. 
 The first fountain of America’s distinctive communal consciousness comes from the 
Puritan ancestors. The religio-communal traditions were (and remain) stronger in America then 
the rest of the West, beginning with John Winthrop’s communitarian message in the “Model of 
Christian Charity”: 
for this end, wee must be knitt together in this worke as one man, wee must entertaine 
each other in brotherly Affeccion, wee must be willing to abridge our selves of our 
superfluities, for the supply of others necessities, wee must uphold a familiar Commerce 
together in all meekenes, gentlenes, patience and liberallity, wee must delight in eache 
other, make others Condicions our owne rejoyce together, mourne together, labour, and 
suffer together, allwayes haveing before our eyes our Commission and Community in the 
worke, our Community as members of the same body, soe shall wee keepe the unitie of 
the spirit in the bond of peace, the Lord will be our God and delight to dwell among us, 
as his owne people and will commaund a blessing upon us in all our wayes,  
(www.digitalhistory.uh.edu) 
 
The sermon is an important barometer of America’s self-consciousness as a nation set apart from 
the old world, knit together its unique spirituality and communal charity. Judging by the 
reoccurrence of the “City on a Hill” trope until present day, there is good reason for suspecting 
this image remains engraved on the American mind. The Puritans and Pioneers, no doubt 
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individualists, nevertheless emphasized the shared destiny of the all members of the community, 
purporting to look out for every person as an equal and integral member of the whole body.  
I have already noted the Christian inspiration on the modern construction of community. 
With the strong religious tradition in America from its time in the wilderness to its established 
state today, the Christian ethic of brotherly love resonates throughout the American mind, even 
amid a primarily liberal-individualist culture. Historically the thriving civic cultures of New 
England villages were intertwined with the religious institutions and the larger Christian ethic, 
especially in the era predating the American Revolution where there was little distinction 
between church authority and political authority. As they are imagined in America public 
memory, those close-knit towns were autonomous “communities” with common identities and 
reciprocal obligations founded in the Christian faith.  
 The Christian practices of the South and the Frontier diverged considerably from those 
of New England, in part because of their denominational inheritance and their social-economic 
needs. But the fact remains that the Christian consciousness of community prevailed as an 
important moral frame of reference, even as the religious impulse became “secularized” in the 
wake of Darwin, and liberal theorists endeavored to salvage the communal legacy. Community 
served increasingly not only as a spiritual ideal, but as a civic-spiritual ideal—an ultimate end 
until itself, a mystical unity and ultimate purpose that could transcend the partiality of individual 
interests. It was a spiritual ideal upon which harmonizing human organization could be built. 
 Matching the Biblical tradition as a source of American communal consciousness is 
Thomas Jefferson’s dream of an agrarian civilization. Jefferson, ever weary of strong national 
government, hoped America might become a nation of independent farmers tending to their own 
land while doubling as citizens engaged in local matters of common concern (Notes). Though 
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founded on individuals seeking their own economic self-interest, Jefferson assumed that such an 
arrangement would be naturally harmonious because of the pure morality of people of the land 
(as opposed to the licentiousness of urban folk, especially bankers). Repeated physical contact 
with other townspeople would naturally lead to the identification of common interests and the 
formation of a public will which could reconcile local disputes painlessly. Since the chief arena 
of politics was local, the primary duty of representatives to the national government (who would 
be known personally by their constituents) would be to defend those communal interests to the 
government assemblies. In Jefferson’s portrayal, the easy accommodation of interests would 
foster adequate sentiments of reciprocity so that autonomous communities would endure 
harmoniously without interference of a national authority. Individuals in their communities could 
then dedicate their life to meaningful labors and intimate friendships. 
Jefferson’s America was never realized, but his rhetoric has been unparalleled in its 
capturing of the American imagination. For a young democratic people, he provided a 
captivating image of natural fellowship found in the simplicity of small local communities. In 
locales, citizens could tend to their individual pursuits uninhibited by outside interference while 
also relishing in communal traditions and close familial relationships.  
The final strain of early America’s communal consciousness was best documented by 
Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America. As a French Aristocrat, Tocqueville’s outsider 
status gave credibility to the lavish praise he heaped upon America’s community life. As much 
as the Christian and Jeffersonian antecedents, de Tocqueville’s representation of American 
democracy persists as a definitive statement of America’s communal identity. Writing in the 
mid-nineteenth century, Tocqueville was particularly enamored with how America’s synthesis of 
three communal motifs established a lively culture of democratic engagement. These interrelated 
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motifs include social organization into locales and townships, the volunteeristic formation of 
civil associations, and a spirit of religion. Organization into small townships established long-
lasting relationships that prompted a sense of identification between townspeople. In their 
frequent interaction and relative dependency, issues which effected the entire locale could be 
handled by the citizens themselves rather than by an external body. The raising of a common 
consciousness and the clear relevance of these local matters to all parties encouraged all 
members to be involved in their community’s civic life. Rather than the formal structures of the 
state, most citizens were united in informal webs of relation through the joining of various 
voluntary associations. These associations, de Tocqueville argued, provided the backbone of 
American community life because they increased social interdependence, and thereby elicited a 
sense of solidarity and reciprocity stirring citizens to pursue projects in common. The informal 
web of relationships created through voluntary associations could supplant the formal top-down 
authorities of the state by permitting citizens to resolve local matters on their own. The thriving 
civic life in the most minute of local activities was the surest grounding for a more expanded 
democratic practice: “The more the number of these small common affairs increases, the more 
men acquire, without their even being aware of it, the capability of pursuing great affairs in 
common” (de Tocqueville, 215). 
America’s democratic magic resided in the civic spirit spawned from involvement in 
common local activities. Tocqueville thought smaller civil associations were the secret to a 
successful public life because they established a point of entry into the deliberative process. The 
frequent voluntary gatherings of the local townspeople enabled the discovery of shared interests 
and invigorated citizens with a “municipal spirit” of political participation (52). Within these 
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voluntary associations, not only could citizens contribute to a better nation, but they could find 
meaning and purpose for their own lives.  
In line with the previous account, de Tocqueville saw America’s “Spirit of Religion” as 
both the stimulant and the safeguard of its thriving community life: “The Americans combine the 
notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds, that it is impossible to make 
them conceive the one without the other” (Democracy 185). The Christian element brought about 
a respect for the equality and worth of all men and an acute sense of their ultimate responsibility 
for their fellow citizens (of course, this principle was not always extended universally or 
followed consistently). Although de Tocqueville demarcated the separate spheres of religion and 
politics in America, he contended that Christianity provided the essential mores that political 
debate and civic association needed to flourish. Religion itself, he thought, gained greater 
adherence because it was non-coercive and depended on the voluntary membership of citizens. 
In this more legitimate position, Christianity could wield its greatest taming influence upon the 
selfish passions by admonishing citizens to pursue projects in common and find their ultimate 
fulfillment in their human associations.   
In sum, de Tocqueville concluded that local community involvement stimulated citizens 
toward broader public engagement by instilling sentiments of loyalty and identification toward 
fellow townspeople. The informal webs of voluntary associations were the greatest guarantor of 
liberty and democratic engagement. The various forms of joining conferred moral worth to 
human relationships and, assisted by the spirit of religion, extended the sense of mutual 
responsibility and shared destiny without trampling on the freedoms of the individual. 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is generally considered the authoritative statement 
of American community. Harvard political philosopher Harvey Mansfield enshrined it as “at 
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once the best book ever written on democracy and the best book ever written on America.” 
Tocqueville’s description of the vitality of association-based civic life, assisted by the elegance 
of his prose, has been a source of collective inspiration ever since, especially in the field of 
Sociology where the health of contemporary civic life is continually compared to the standard he 
puts forth (Bellah et al; Putnam; Nisbet, Quest; Wuthnow). Tocqueville might be taken as a 
summative figure of the American tradition up until the twentieth century. He synthesizes the 
Biblical, Republican and Jeffersonian traditions into a coherent whole while adding his own 
imprint—that of voluntary association. Together these frames provide the mythic backdrop of 
contemporary America’s understanding of and nostalgia for community.  
Through the historical sketch, we can see how community accumulated its 
overwhelmingly positive connotations in the industrial era by invoking nostalgic visions of a 
simpler, more intimate time that was quickly fading into oblivion and offering hope that human 
relations might again be made humane. This past provides clues as to why community must 
necessarily remain a vague and mysterious concept. No one has ever truly experienced 
community because it was crafted “negatively”—community assumed the attributes that were by 
definition non-modern, as that which was opposite to society and had gone missing. Community 
was a creature created to challenge and make sense of modern industrialism. It is no surprise 
then that contemporary discourse is characterized by succeeding laments over its decline, so 
much so that “the loss of community” narrative composes its own in genre. Loss is itself 
constitutive of the idea of community.  
We can further identify a number of reoccurring themes in the modern transformation of 
community that help decipher its vague and seemingly contradictory uses in popular discourse. 
Perhaps the most prominent theme to emerge is the opposition of the modern and the pre-
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modern, represented by the notions of society and community respectively. The substantial 
efforts to explain and cope with the effects of industrialism did much to cement the dichotomy. 
Closely related to this theme is the mythic nature of community in modern thought, associated as 
it is with organic unities and intimate social ties. That a blissful community has been lost and is 
in need of recovery is an unquestioned premise of modern thought. Finally, my account has 
brought the spiritual resources of community into view, as it pertains to both the Christian 
tradition and the secular “essentializing” of its doctrine. Community’s spiritual overtones 
encourage citizens to transcend their interest, even those of their particular collective, to point 
toward an ultimate purpose in mystical unity.  
I have shown that a conception of “community” has been in steady evolution in modern, 
industrial Western society. Community draws upon several discursive threads found in religion, 
philosophy, sociology, and politics to gain its meaning and persuasive force. This history is 
offered as evidence for my thesis that “community” has become a key rhetorical device for 
navigating the travails of modern life, providing both compensations and consolations for losses 
that seem apparent with the advent of mass society; directing us toward reparative actions we 
may adopt to promote individual and collective values, as well as spiritual goods that might be 
best achieved if accomplished under the sign of “community” participation. 
Moving forward, I propose something of a “rhetorical history” of the term community, 
identifying key discourses wherein community becomes a central value—or “god term”—in 
rhetorical practices that accomplish this negotiation or management of self and society in the 
modern era of American society. I am particularly curious about the ability of “community” as a 
concept to sponsor two seemingly opposing rhetorical efforts: those who harken back to a lost 
sense of what is an essentially local and tribal sense of community lost in the modern age; and 
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those who see community as a transcendent value that can help forge meaningful political 
relationships empowering social change. These general hypotheses will form the basis of the 
criticism I will accomplish in this thesis.  
There is, in sum, considerable warrant for a rhetorical criticism that looks at historical 
moments in American community rhetoric. I aim to examine discourses that embody aspects of 
different traditions and rhetorical maneuvers in respect to the god-term “community.” My 
concern is not entirely historical, as community continues to function in our contemporary 
discourse with a mixture of these connotations—something I explore in Chapter Two. However, 
I believe community’s rhetorical uses can be best elucidated by looking at them at work in 
specific discursive and historical moments, and I therefore devote a critical chapter each to what 
I see as three distinct—albeit interacting—rhetorical uses: community as a utopian ideal; 
community as a conservative lament; and community as a progressive agency. I here explain in 
more detail the organization of my study’s subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Two: A Rhetorical Approach to Community 
This section functions as a methodology chapter and a literature review, examining the 
work already done by rhetorical scholars, and identifying how a rhetorical approach based on 
Kenneth Burke’s theories can help to identify (and reconcile) the uses of community. I mediate 
on community as a god-term and moral vocabulary, and offer a taxonomy of the five rhetorical 
“senses” that “community” has come to represent and evoke in discursive practice. I conclude 
this chapter with seven theses on the nature of community rhetoric.  
Chapter Three: John Humphrey Noyes and the Oneida Community  
 In Chapter Three I analyze John Humphrey Noyes’ and the Oneida Community as an 
example of a “communist” or “communalist” rhetoric of community. The nineteenth century was 
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home to a number of attempts to create “utopian communities” distanced from the vices of 
industrial society. These utopias aimed to salvage the virtues of communal relations from an 
increasingly complex and mechanized model of society. Noyes’ Oneida Community was among 
the most significant of these communal experiments, and provides an unabashed attempt to 
remake society upon the basis of the communal ideal. I treat the Oneida experiment as a non-
Marxist “communalist” rhetoric which constructs “community” as a set of perfect spiritual 
principles to be rationally applied to the social order in order to attain a state of social utopia. 
Noyes invokes community to transcend the division between faith and science, challenge the 
orientation of economic individualism, and correct the maladies of industrial life by 
communizing the social order. 
Chapter Four: Jane Addams and the Cosmopolitan Community  
 Chapter Four will take up Jane Addams “progressive” rhetoric of community of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Addams was a leading figure of the Progressive Era, 
where she labored for years to make society a more humanistic place. She focused especially on 
voluntary organizations and charity work to improve the lives of citizens and ameliorate 
industrial conditions. I consider Addams’ effort as a “progressive” rhetoric which conceives of 
community as a corrective to the excesses of individualism and a vehicle for democratic change. 
Addams adopts a cosmopolitan perspective that seeks to attain a single community of all 
citizens, where every member shares an identity and acts upon the joint-obligation to improve 
the welfare of the common lot.  
Chapter Five: The Southern Agrarians and the Provincial Community  
  In looking toward a traditionalist rhetoric of community, Chapter Five centers upon the 
Southern Agrarians and their manifesto I’ll Take My Stand. The Southern Agrarians were a 
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group of twelve men, many of them poets associated with Vanderbilt University, who came 
together to write against the horrors of industrial society and defend a social order founded on 
independent farmers and agrarian communities. I analyze the Agrarians as a traditionalist 
rhetoric that depicts community as an inherited tradition and way of life in need of preservation. 
The Agrarians’ vision of community is provincial, in that it emphasizes particularity, boundaries 
and the protection of identity—namely white Southern identity, the failures of which the 
Agrarians attempt to transcend and redeem by way of appeal to the region’s communal virtues.  
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
The concluding chapter will serve as a review of the major findings of the case studies 
and a discussion of the dissertation’s implications. I deliberate on my seven theses, and consider 
parallels between the specific historical illustrations and the state of contemporary community 
discourse, drawing lessons from the refined vocabulary of motives and heighted critical 
sensibility granted by this project. Finally, I mediate on community’s place in our general socio-
political discourse as a device that negotiates the meaning of modern citizenship by striving for 
better relationship between self and society.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RHETORICAL USES OF COMMUNITY 
The chapter outlines the basis of my rhetorical-critical approach to the concept of 
community, examines previous research on the topic in Rhetorical Studies, and identifies five 
basic “senses” of the term “community.” In seeking to ground my study in a rhetorical 
perspective, I first review the significant research on community in the discipline, arguing that it 
insufficiently accounts for the term’s rhetorical functions. Using the critical theories of Kenneth 
Burke, I offer an appropriate methodological approach for this dissertation project. I then discuss 
the implications of framing community as a god-term, meditating on its special persuasive place 
in the American vocabulary. Finally, I elaborate on the general “senses” of community to 
account for the wide-variety and inconsistent uses of the term in academic and vernacular 
discourse. After clarifying the general uses, designations, and patterns of community rhetoric, it 
will then be possible to engage in a grounded inquiry of particular community rhetorics.  
Communication and Rhetorical Approaches to Community 
In this dissertation, I will analyze several of these specific rhetorical cases while situating 
them in the larger American discourse of community. To begin such a project, however, it is 
necessary to (a) comment upon the major approaches to the study of community in the 
Communication discipline and (b) provide a theoretical and methodological approach compatible 
with the research questions guiding my study. I will begin, then, by reviewing the prominent 
perspectives within the domains of communication and rhetoric research, arguing ultimately for 
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their inability to explain community’s rhetorical function in social discourse. I will then construct 
an alternative approach informed by the dramatistic framework of Kenneth Burke to better 
permit a rhetorical inquiry into the subject.  
 There is a surprisingly small body of work on rhetorics of community in the discipline of 
Communication, but there are a number of attempts to employ community as an analytical tool. 
These descriptive concepts can be useful for theorizing specific problems within particular 
scholarly domains, however, they are ultimately inadequate for a large-scale analysis of the 
social patterns of community rhetoric. In fact, as I hope to show, these “neutral” analytical uses 
of community, by sterilizing the moral impulse, furtively reify community’s god-term status in 
order to bestow legitimacy upon their scholarly endeavors. There are at least four identifiable 
approaches to community in rhetoric and communication theory: as shared discourse, as 
common identity, as online forum, and as communication ethic. I will treat each in turn.  
Shared Discursive Frames 
The most common rhetorical conception of community is as a site of shared symbolic 
practice. Within the cousin-disciplines of rhetoric, technical and professional writing, 
hermeneutics, and literature, the turn toward social-constructivist philosophies impelled 
researchers to make sense of identificatory practices through the symbols which bound 
individuals together. “Community” started appearing in academic literature as a useful tool for 
demarcating patterns of discursive practice—the concepts of interpretive communities, speech 
communities, and discourse communities all emerged from this movement. In philosophy and 
literary studies, an “Interpretive community,” refers to a loosely connected network of people 
who share similar “habits of mind” and practices of sense making (Fish; Kuhn). A “speech 
community,” as it is understood in sociology and linguistics, departs from interpretive 
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communities only in that it refers to a group of people with common patterns of speech that are 
physical located. Finally, a “discourse community,” as it conceived in the study of rhetoric, 
refers roughly to a series common references, languages, codes, and other discursive activities 
which create relatively coherent collective orientations (Bizzel; Porter; Harris, 14). Although 
each of these concepts designate unique referents, they share a common theoretical conviction 
that different discursive practices create different communities (Harris 19). 
What counts as a discursive activity capable of creating community can vary with the 
specific author—the sharing of metaphors, narratives, genres, values, communal sensitives, 
moral codes, and collective memories have all been submitted as possible candidates (Campbell; 
Condit and Greer; Hart; Hogan; Miller, “Rhetoric”; Medhurst; Osborn). Research in this tradition 
attempts to identify and interpret these collective patterns in order to understand the 
“community’s” sense-making practices. 
While scholars in this tradition believe community to be constituted by discourse, it does 
not follow that they view it as unreal or merely constructed. Rather, community is treated as an 
identifiable entity suitable for examination. Consider for example Carolyn Miller’s explication of 
“rhetorical community:” 
A rhetorical community…is just such a virtual entity, a discursive projection, a rhetorical 
construct. It is the community as invoked, represented, presupposed, or developed in 
rhetorical discourse. It is constituted by attributions of characteristic joint rhetorical 
actions, genres of interaction, ways of getting things done, including reproducing 
itself…rhetorical communities ‘exist’ in human memories and in their specific 
instantiations in words (Miller, “The Cultural Basis of Genre” 73) 
 
To treat community as an “entity,” is to create a useful scheme for conceptualizing 
collective patterns of membership through shared languages and interpretive orientations. 
Conceived as such, there is a hermeneutic mandate to illuminate the inner workings of these 
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various discursive frames so that there might be greater recognition and collaboration between 
communities.   
 This first rhetorical approach has an undeniable appeal, for it operationalizes recent work 
in social construction and, by foregrounding rhetorical practice, mobilizes disciplinary resources. 
To frame community as constituted by rhetoric is to put the integral social activity of forming 
unities squarely within the domain of disciplinary research. However, it must be admitted by 
even the most enthusiastic partisan of this tradition that to a certain extent it is the researcher’s 
very identifying of commonalities that itself creates the community being studied. These 
discursive communities are not objects out there to simply be discovered; they are called forth by 
the scholars (in their role as rhetors) from the fragments of discourse for the strategic purpose of 
academic explanation. 
Without diminishing the independent merit of this growing tradition of scholarship, 
viewing community as shared discursive practice does little to shed light on the term’s ascent to 
god-term status, nor to explain the rhetorical function of the word in everyday discourse, nor to 
illuminate the moral sense-making practices of communitarian vocabularies. Its utility is 
restricted to matters of interpretation as it pertains to different discursive patterns. Community as 
shared discourse is a rhetorical theory of what community is (or could be), not a rhetorical 
criticism of what community does. In fact, from our perspective, we are able to see the academic 
employment of community as a purely descriptive concept in such literature as a way of 
sneaking in the charisma of the term and its role as a legitimizer while concealing that very. As 
Joseph Harris points out, the word community invokes what it describes, so to speak of an 
academic writing community is to plea for one to exist without admitting one is doing the 
pleading (13). Far from explaining rhetorics of community, this scholarly tradition partakes in 
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them with all their resonance and ambiguity. Discursive community is a useful concept as far as 
it goes, but we must look elsewhere for a perspective sufficient to tackling the term’s ubiquitous, 
moral, and contested character.  
Identity  
A second, and in some ways similar, manner rhetoricians have approached community is 
through categories of identity. Rhetorical community as shared identity foregrounds questions of 
collective solidarity as formed through the common possession of an attribute, experience, or 
value. It differs from discursive frames, however, in the tendency of the critic to “impose” 
community on persons who share a “sociological” characteristic. From this perspective, it is the 
sharing of a value or experience rather than a discursive pattern that creates community.  
For example, the book Rhetoric and Community: Studies in Unity and Fragmentation, 
frequently puts forth a view of community as shared identity. The work is broken down into 
sections on “race and gender” communities, “war” communities, and “artistic and scientific” 
communities. While we might think of a community of persons based off their shared experience 
as a disadvantaged identity, it is not a community in the sense of having a shared discourse or a 
kind of relationship at all with other members. The person is “born” into the community and may 
not even consider themselves a part of it. It is for this reason it is a “taxonomical” view of 
community, because it defines community through a schema for the purposes of study, whether 
or not the individuals adhere to the name of that community, or know they are participating in it. 
An identity-based community does not rely upon interaction with the fellow community, 
and is not simply “imagined” in the same sense that Benedict Anderson had in mind when he 
spoke of a “deep horizontal comradeship” with others of similar traditions (7). Instead, the 
identity-community can be imagined either by the author writing about them or by the public 
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vocabulary which has made it commonplace to speak of that particular collective as a 
community, a practice especially common for referring to historically disadvantaged identities. 
The scholarly advantage of this tradition is that it aligns with important identity markers and 
practices of sense making in society writ large, and helps to understand the shared experiences 
and legitimate solidarities formed through these identities.  
Yet while it makes a connection between vernacular and academic uses of community, 
the shared identity perspective cannot do much to explain community’s overall social function. It 
seems that in its social usage, this is not really a description but a rhetorical maneuver, a way of 
putting a certain grouping of persons in a positive light. The identity community draws upon the 
cultural capital of “community” as an ultimate term to eulogize a particular identity marker—
taking a mass of people who share a common attribute and fostering a sense of solidarity which 
masks the wide variety of incompatible individual commitments within that human aggregate. It 
is probably for this reason that we often hear of the Christian community or Black community, 
but no one would ever think to speak of a “White supremacist community.” The contrast 
between that which we disdain (white supremacy) and that which we cherish (community) 
creates an incongruity which is uncomfortable, if telling. This hints that the application of 
“community” to an identity marker entails either a positive view of that collective, or an 
acknowledgment of their history of shared suffering. Community eulogizes or praises its object.  
In its academic application, the identity-based community invoked is not one which 
necessarily “exists,” but is a taxonomical creation of the researcher for the purpose of analysis 
(See, Harre, “Philosophy”). This is not to disqualify merits of identity communities, but to show 
it leaves something to be desired for analyzing social rhetorics of community, especially since to 
speak of an identity community is to call one into existence with the endorsement of the term’s 
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prestige. We are hitting upon the rhetoric of community in practice in the invitation to form 
collective identifications, but we need to keep looking for our critical perspective.  
Online Forum  
There are also those rhetoricians and communication scholars, who could make a third 
category of internet enthusiasts, that put forth “online communities” as an analytical concept 
(Harris; Lyon; Rheingold, Virtual Community; Selfe and Selfe; Zappen, Gurak & Doheny-
Farina). The nucleus of this perspective is that, unlike those who think of community as shared 
values or shared rhetorical practice, a community really is best understood as a public forum 
(Zappen et. al). As such, there is little need for considerations of physical proximity or shared 
discursive frames because the true essence of community exists in the common meeting places 
where sustained social interaction occurs. With this criterion in mind, some scholars assert that 
the internet nurtures “online communities,” which can complement (or replace) other forms of 
community. Because community is believed to be about mutual engagement not agreement, 
researchers in this tradition dedicate their scholarly attention to analyzing the site of online 
emergence and the practices which constitute community in it.  
The internet community perspective intentionally competes with the shared discursive 
practice model. A number of critics have vehemently disputed the net-enthusiasts eagerness to 
label their object a community, making the validity of this application something of a contested 
terrain. (Calhoun “Without Propinquity”; Harris). Craig Calhoun in particular, motivated by his 
Marxists commitments, has voiced skepticism over of these claims to community, preferring to 
dub such forums “online networks,” because they lack essential considerations of social 
structure, place, face-to-face interaction, and reciprocal obligation (“Without Propinquity”). 
Joseph Harris takes an even more antithetical position, commenting dismissively “a forum is not 
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a community” (15). Whether net-enthusiasts have a legitimate claim to the label is not the point; 
what is more important is the question of why both sides of this debate so strongly desire to take 
command of the term community and apply it to their cause. Our thesis would be that it is 
contested terrain because community, with its social eminence, brings legitimacy to their areas of 
study. I am therefore fully on the side of those critics who see the label “internet-communities” 
as an attempt to validate research into a new technology. Like both the shared discourse and 
shared identity perspectives, online community scholarship does not simply investigate rhetorics 
of community, it participates in them. 
Communication Ethic 
 In the final tradition of communication ethics, community is understood as a moral ideal 
to be striven for in human relations. A state of community is achieved when relationships are 
characterized by a sense mutual obligation, interdependence, acceptance, equality and respect 
(Arnett; Buber; Butchart). Community becomes the ethical standard through which social 
behavior is to be evaluated and remade. It is beginning, end and means; one is in a community 
and attempts interact with others in concordance with ethical demands of community to achieve 
an ultimate state of community. In this way, community is constantly negotiated, sustained and 
remade. Against the other views, community is not a place, nor a forum, nor shared discursive 
patterns, but a relational quality. Rhetorics which make the threshold of “community” must meet 
these standards of reciprocity and respect, and are sometimes also referred to as invitation, love, 
and friendship (Foss and Griffin; Radwan; Brockriede; Corder; Jasinski).  
 This view of community as ethic carries over to rhetorical theory, where the term is 
similarly seen as an act of union, merger, and identification (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives; Graff 
and Winn; McKerrow; Perelman and Olbrehcts-Tyteca; VanderHaagen). In Chaïm Perelman and 
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Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric, “communion” refers to the argumentative act of 
building solidarity through communal adherence to shared values (New Rhetoric). Richard Graff 
and Wendy Winn affirm that “communion is the source of fore-agreements that bind a 
community; it is the reservoir of those shared values from which are derived the norms of 
reasonableness” (65). Sara VanderHaagen similarly stresses ethical community as the 
negotiation of collective identity within a stable tradition. Even Kenneth Burke’s chief rhetorical 
concept “identification” implies an idea of community in the merging of identities into a state of 
“communion” (Rhetoric of Motives).4  
More than any other tradition, community as human ethic makes clear the moral loading 
of the term. Nonetheless, like the other scholarly frames, it does not directly have much to say 
about rhetorics of community. In fact, it is the clearest participant in that tradition, to be 
commended for making plain the moral genius of the term. Yet community ethics, like the other 
three perspectives, enacts the rhetoric of community without a thorough critical examination of 
the larger social rhetoric giving the traditions their force. 
The four approaches to community in rhetoric and communication differ in numerous 
ways which may be incompatible. Nonetheless, what they do share is a romanticized view of 
people in some form of union. While each tradition accomplishes commendable work within 
their disciplinary domains, they fall short in reflecting upon their own positon within the larger 
American social discourse and connect it to their scholarly practice. By trying to operationalize 
community as a descriptive concept, they treat it as a thing created by discourse, and not as a 
social discourse itself. But community is both, and the focus in this dissertation is with the latter, 
the idea of community as it permeates our public language and everyday talk.  
                                                 
4 Burke writes presciently: “I never think of ‘communication’ without thinking of its ultimate perfection, 
named in such words as ‘community’ and ‘communion” (“Definition of Man”). 
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Unfortunately, there is little rhetorical work to be found addressing this macro-discourse, 
with the notable exception of Ronald Lee, who’s essay examines the competition between small-
town myths of local community and urban myths of the national community in American 
political rhetoric. Lacking a precedent in communication research from which to embark on an 
inquiry into American rhetorics of community, my study must proceed through an alternative 
framework able to account for the larger public discourse and its transformation in each 
historical incident. Such a methodology would conceptualize community’s position as a god-
term and a moral vocabulary, while providing the mechanisms of critique for a book length 
analysis of the social functions of community rhetoric. I believe such a theoretical apparatus can 
be found in the work of Kenneth Burke, whose conceptual framework I turn to now. 
 A Burkean Approach 
 Writing from the early to mid-twentieth century, language theorist Kenneth Burke was a 
thinker of remarkably broad scope. His thought does not abide by disciplinary boundaries, as it 
broaches matters of rhetoric, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, aesthetics, sociology, and 
literary criticism. What holds Burke’s wide-ranging body of work together is his conception of 
man as the symbol-using animal (“Definition of Man”). For Burke, the essential human attribute 
is the ability to wield symbols to form perceptions of the world and cooperate with other 
humans. Since language is the chief source of the symbolic in human life, it received the bulk of 
his scholarly attention. Burke thought that language, as “symbolic action,” accomplished real 
work, both psychological and material, so that any attempt to explain human action must take 
into account the role of language in directing human understanding.  
 In working out his philosophy of dramatism to account for this symbolic nature, Burke 
developed several theoretical instruments and conceptual tools for the analysis of language as it 
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occurred in social discourse which can help situate “community’s” special place in the American 
lexicon. The central insight I take from Kenneth Burke is that the symbolic process of “naming” 
determines our understanding of the world and the way we act in relation to it. The available 
vocabulary, the public grammar, provides the available resources for interpreting human 
experience. “Community,” in our case, indicates one way of naming which weights the world in 
a particular way and calls forth a specific set of responses consistent with the genius of the term; 
it is a god-term, or expression of order and value beyond question, from which all else is to be 
judged and organized. As a god-term, community is a terminological naming that is eulogistic, 
ambiguous, question-begging, and moral—every naming “smuggles in” an ethical evaluation 
which calls for particular actions associated with the naming (Burke, Religion). But community 
indicates more than a god-term—it is the best representative term for important vocabularies of 
motive within the larger American Orientation. Community is a god-term which indicates 
immersion into “communitarian” languages and practices of sense-making. 
 I have employed several Burkean resources in the prior paragraph to explain my position, 
but they require more careful definition. The broadest, most encompassing schematic term is 
orientation. An orientation is a “general view of reality,” or accumulation of bundled judgments 
gained from past experience which form expectancies as to how things were, are and ought to be 
(Burke, Permanence 4; 14). A developed orientation is a serviceable concoction of prejudices 
and terminological attributions which one uses to make sense of the world. They are 
experimental networks of “mutually sustained values and judgements” that provide the resources 
for naming and acting (Permanence 23). When Burke speaks of an orientation, he has in mind 
the most general worldview of an individual, however, in my framing, I understand orientation in 
a more outward, extended sense of a collective orientation. Burke gestures to this extended sense 
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when he speaks of a “public grammar” and “public orientation” (Attitudes 341).5 It is reasonable 
to speak of a larger modern “American Orientation,” composed of numerous competing 
vocabularies which slice up reality according to different prejudices. 
Within the encompassing orientation, there are several subdivisions or strains of 
attribution which Burke calls motives (Permanence 19; Grammar). Motives, for Burke, are 
verbal constructs put forth to conceptualize, reduce, and make sense of the world through the 
process of naming. By attributing motives, a situation is framed in a “loaded” or “weighted” way 
that implicitly embodies a theory of the world, a program of action, and a moral evaluation. The 
verbalization of motive serves as a shorthand way to identify and reduce human situations into 
accepted schemas. To put it slightly differently, a motive is a shorthand term which charts human 
behavior by “drawing the lines of battle” for what a person should be for and against (Attitudes 
172; 20; 4). A motive is a name which is already embedded with an implied response, a program 
of action for how to respond to the situation. It is helpful to think of motives as more or less 
coherent vocabularies available for making sense of the world. A different motive (naming) 
would call forth a different response. And for Burke, every attribution of motive is “a 
fragmentary part of this larger orientation,” so that there can be competing motives within the 
same orientation (Permanence 25). For example, the innocuous citizen contemplating civic 
affairs, or the devious statesperson hoping to bamboozle the masses, can choose between a 
“vocabulary of virtue” or a “vocabulary of realism.” Virtue and realism are two different 
                                                 
5 The idea of a collective orientation is not opposed to Burke’s focus on individual orientation because 
there is an obvious interplay between the public grammar and the individual grammar: “Any given 
situation derives is character from the entire framework of interpretation by which we judge it…We 
discern situational patterns by means of the particular vocabulary of the cultural group into which we are 
born” (Permanence 35); “the mind, being formed by language, is formed by a public grammar” (Attitudes 
341). 
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motives, two ways of naming the situation with different implications for the adoption of 
attitudes and programs of action. 
We might think of community as a motive in so far as it names the situation, and through 
the naming, calls forth a particular inclination to the world. But it would be more true to say that 
there are innumerable community motives which are spun out by specific rhetors in specific 
circumstances. As a macro-discourse, community has a moral weighting and common set of 
symbolic linkages that are recognizable (these are pieties), however, particular motives are 
crafted from this terminological reservoir in order to meet the needs of rhetors in their specific 
historic circumstances. For this reason, it might be better to speak of community as a 
motivational vocabulary. I earlier referenced Habits of the Heart by Bellah et al. to help frame 
the position of community based motives. The authors of Habits argue that there are two 
languages of Americans: the primary language of individualism, and the secondary, somewhat 
subordinated vocabulary of collectivism (ix). Seen through Burkean equipment, we might say 
that these constitute two competing vocabularies within the larger American orientation, and 
each encourage the crafting of motives through those competing vocabularies. What Bellah et. al 
call the subordinated language of collectivism may overlap substantially with community 
motives, though they should not be taken as synonymous. In this case, community, as a god-term 
would sum up the orientational subdivision, the realm of community motives.  
The resources of community motives can be traced by following the symbolic linkages or 
clusters typically associated with the term. These are the pieties of community. Burke defines 
piety as “the sense of what properly goes with what” (Permanence 74). Every human, qua 
human, has a need for order and internal coherence. Piety is related to order in the sense that 
common symbolic linkages fit our experiences into a unified whole so that we know what 
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belongs together—hence Burke calls piety a “system builder” which sustains and transforms 
orientations (Permanence 74; see also, Rhetoric of Motives). To use another metaphor, pieties are 
the “social recipes” that prescribe what is to be done in accordance with the selected name or 
motive; one feels a need to enact the various pious associations of the particular vocabulary (PC 
74). We are pious in our talk about community in the sense that there is an established set of 
tropes and terms that “naturally” arise when we discuss the topic. We know from our experience 
that to talk of community is also to talk of loss and liberation, loyalty and solidarity, family and 
friendship, obligation and civic duty, neighborhoods, New England Villages and Midwestern 
Towns, etc… In forming moral vocabularies, the pieties serve as public grammars which orient 
us to the world. Inspecting these grammars can go far in revealing the function and power of 
“community” over the modern mind. At the least, it can allow us to flesh out the term’s general 
character. By paying attention to “what goes with what” within community languages, (that is, 
identifying the common linkages and social recipes it constructs), we may begin to understand 
the rhetorical functions and social implications of community in American life. 
It may also be useful to think of community as a piety of “identification,” a rhetorical 
guide to unification that brings persons together and points them in a common valuative direction 
(Burke, Rhetoric of Motives). Community, as a call for identification, suggests the binding of a 
“common identity” that makes citizens viable and functional as a group. What is contested about 
community is the basis and meaning of this identification itself, including how and through what 
“we” are to be identified, and how that enables “us” to act upon or redress society.  
To summarize, the Burkean concepts of orientation, motive, god-term and piety help to 
situate community in contemporary discourse and open a space of inquiry into its rhetorical 
function. Within the American Orientation, community is a god-term which presents a special 
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opportunity for the spinning of motives with a pious vocabulary in competition with more 
individualist and economic ways of framing. Community, as a god-term or ideal through which 
we are impelled to remake the world, provides fodder for the weaving motives; but is also a site 
of contest about the nature of how persons are grouped and identified. By tracking the common 
linkages of community language, we can begin understanding the rhetorical implications of this 
public vocabulary. 
So, what exactly does this framework allow the critic to do? A Burkean perspective 
highlights the interplay between the macro-American discourse and the particular instances of 
community rhetorics by connecting the general tropes with case-specific motives. If there are 
common “pious” ways of speaking about community, every specific instance simultaneously 
draws upon and alters the social formula for the particular purposes at hand. That is, community 
is a terminological device employed for purposes of rhetorical transformation.  
By naming the situation, community also renames the situation, calling forth a 
corresponding new perspective toward the object of discussion. Community, as rhetorical device, 
transforms an orientation by establishing a new set of attitudes and moral loadings. When there is 
a perceived failure in the moral and social order, “community” is submitted as the terminological 
fix. Community becomes both compensator and corrective to the perceived failures of the 
modern world.  
This is why no blanket praise or condemnation of community rhetorics can be offered 
from the onset. Community provides a privileged set of linguistic resources for rhetorical action, 
but any definitive judgement of its utility or moral worth must rest upon the in-depth 
examination of specific cases. With a Burkean perspective, we can only say that community is an 
available god-term and motivational vocabulary with certain weightings and tropes that are 
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deployed for purposes of social correction and rhetorical transformation. The specific ends to 
which community is put, and the evaluation of its merits, will depend on the case being 
observed.  
Research Questions  
 With Burkean theoretical tools we gain a point of entry for an extended investigation into 
the rhetorical functions of community by examining representative manifestations of community 
rhetorics. Since every conceptual framework has its limitations in the form of the questions it can 
and cannot ask, it is worth briefly commenting on what kinds of question these particular tools 
allow me to pursue. At the most general level, I desire to understand what is happening in 
appeals to community and what such appeals might reveal about how Americans make sense of 
modern life. Burke’s critical framework balances the macro-micro tension inherent in such an 
inquiry by directing equal attention to the clusters, webs of words, and thematic patterns 
constituting the macro discourse of community, while also looking to the peculiarities and 
symbolic transformations of each particular enactment. There are common ways of talking about 
community, but every instance is unique because rhetors creatively manipulate the discursive 
inheritance to meet their specific historical exigencies. Every mention of community is localized 
but transcends that context by partaking in the larger discourse; and by partaking in that larger 
discourse, it transforms it. To put it another way, every instance of community rhetoric draws 
upon the pieties of the term while fitting them to suit the particular purposes of the rhetor in 
action. By borrowing from the general, they transcend their particularity. 
  Community provides a rich resource for the crafting of motives, so much can be learned 
about the discourse of community by observing concrete manifestation of these rhetorics in their 
historical locations. Therefore, I will look intently at case studies and theorize abductively 
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toward the larger social implications of community. In these case studies, with Burke’s 
conceptual framework in mind, I will be guided by the following research questions: What does 
community (as term) do? Discursively, what kind of work does it accomplish? What kind of 
motives does community weave? What kind of conflicts does it mask? How do the most 
influential rhetorics of community navigate the tension between self and society, and in so doing, 
give order and meaning to modern life? In what ways does community serve as a site of contest 
and unification between rivaling worldviews? What does community reveal about the ways 
Americans discursively situate the present to develop their outlooks toward the world? In sum, 
what does the public grammar of community reveal about the modern orientation and its 
potential for rhetorical transformation? 
 To begin answering these questions it is first necessary to inquire into community’s 
function as both a god-term and moral vocabulary, with the aim of discerning the general 
characteristics of community rhetorics in relation to modern sense-making. After understanding 
community’s rhetorical patterns and inclinations, we can identify the socio-political work it 
accomplishes as well as its most important points of contention within the American lexicon. 
Then it will be possible to engage in case studies of particular cases that capture the different 
philosophies and rhetorical moves of community rhetorics.  
Community as God-term 
With its ubiquity, ambiguity, and status as an unequivocal good, there is warrant for 
asserting that community has become a god-term, or a terminological expression which provides 
order, value and universality to human relations (Burke, Religion). God-terms are names which 
express a culture’s highest aspirations; they are the ultimate links in the hierarchy of value which 
spur citizens to action (Weaver, Ethics). As a god-term, we are inclined to accept efforts to be 
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part of, work on behalf of, sacrifice for, or advance the existence of community as an 
automatically positive ethical act. God-terms present an image of what we value and who we 
want to be, and so we work to remake the world in its image.  
Yet while community is among society’s most celebrated conceptions, it is 
simultaneously in competition with the general values of modernity. Liberalism, or the 
philosophy of self-interested individuals, has traditionally been framed in popular and academic 
inquiry as anemic to community. Unlike freedom or equality, community has been an outlier in 
liberal thought—an idea peripherally present, but in a marginal and vague way; something 
assumed to occur naturally, even in its subordination to individual priority. How could 
community be said to be a god-term in an age which defines itself against it?  
Community bears two key dissimilarities with other contemporary god-terms: first, 
unlike expressions such as freedom, equality, diversity and progress, community masquerades as 
a descriptive concept rather than (or in addition to) a moral ideal. Both sociological and 
rhetorical scholars often try to operationalize community into an analytical tool, and political 
actors likewise view community as an actually existing entity, whether as a neighborhood or 
identity group (Calhoun; Hart; Plant, “Toward”). Second, unlike these other god-terms, 
community does not mesh as naturally with the individualist paradigm. Whether through the 
mythic narrative of the loss of community, or the Western tendency to dichotomize community 
in opposition to individualist society, community’s relationship with liberalism is at best 
tortured. Community, as god-term, may be an unequivocal good in the modern lexicon, but it 
nonetheless seems to present a challenge to modern prejudices. 
We might understand community’s rhetorical potency by again looking to its history. 
Community as it is used today, we have seen, is a remnant from the advent of the industrial era, 
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where it was employed as a rallying cry against the advances of industrialism (Calhoun, 
“Community Without”; Plant). While community bears a Latin etymology and can trace its root 
to the classical societies of Greece and Rome, in its particularly modern conception, community 
was crafted to bear connotations of simple agrarian societies of close intimacy to challenge the 
dominant modern view which equated industrial development with progress. The contemporary 
American lament for community, then, is part of the larger Western-tradition which posits a 
rudimentary longing for communal intimacy at the heart of the modern psyche (Nancy, 
Inoperative). To be modern, so we have learned, is to be bereft of community. In the modernist 
transformation—that is, in the rapid expansion of industrialism, urbanization, capitalism, secular 
rationality, liberalism and radical individualism—something integral to human comradery was 
said to be left behind; that simple association and fraternity found in the family, friendship, and 
close neighborly ties was replaced by the anxiety and alienation of the modern state and the 
persona of the cold-calculating individual. This is the myth of community, foundational to 
modern thought and peddled by Rousseau and Tönnies, which has infused the West with a tropic 
vision of a lost communal past to be recovered. The loss of community is a key rhetorical device 
and philosophical assumption for making sense of the world that has embedded itself in the 
modern terminological DNA. 
The prevalent myth of organic community and its consequent loss obfuscates the fact that 
community could never actually manifest because it is a term of perfection. Community is a 
utopia, a literal no-where (Nancy, Being). Our contemporary language testifies to this fact in our 
felt need to preface community with the qualifier “sense of,” such as when someone says “this 
communication department has a sense of community,” or “we no longer have a sense of 
community around here.” Why preface with “sense”? Why not just say community? The answer 
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is revealing: to say “sense of” is to indicate an inherent lack—if we have a “sense” of something, 
that means we do not actually have that thing. We are indicating rather that we have something 
like community or what we expect it to be, but it is still in a deficient, bastardized form. “Sense 
of” bespeaks an abstract value or ideal that we work for, not actualize. I suggest the reason we 
speak of community as a sense is because it is a spiritual phenomenon, a myth, an impossibility, 
a non-manifestable image of perfection that implicitly recognizes we “do things in the name of” 
community, including sacrifice for it—and there is no better definition of a god-term than a word 
which people are willing to die.6 Therefore, every enactment of community must be something 
less than community; we want community but do not believe we could ever have it. Community 
may in fact be nothing other than a sense.  
As Giogorio Agamben writes, “Every lament is always a lament for language, just as all 
praise is principally praise of the name” (Agamben 59). We do not cry for community but the 
word community itself, with all its connections, linkages and emotional resonance. When we 
lament the loss of community, we are not bewailing the loss of a Gemeinscahft to Gesellschaft in 
the transformation of the West, but making sense of our condition through the terminological 
equipment available. The myth of the lost golden age of community—the integral backdrop of 
all of modern thought—is a constitutive fiction which reveals the ongoing negotiation of what it 
means to be modern. In this way, community (and not communism) is the “specter” haunting 
modern society—something longed for and remembered, always absent yet always present.  
That community is perfection and therefore unattainable does not mean that the lament 
over its absence is irrelevant or merely reactionary; rather these myths are revelations, ruptures 
of the modern mind, with implications for how we make sense of our existence. Myths are 
                                                 
6 In the language of Kenneth Burke, community is an imagination, a utopic ideal, that inspires us but 
immediately loses its ethereal flavor once it is “bureaucratized” (Attitudes, 225). 
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always caricatures, but they are telling caricatures—what they tell us is that visions of 
community, far from being an actually achieved past, are fictitious backdrops, based on real 
human occurrences, designed to give meaning to the present liberal age. In this case, the myth of 
community was crafted as a counter-image to modern industrialism.  
Yet while it is common for contemporary discourse to portray community as lost, it 
should be said that there is not one uncontested universal myth of community loss, or better, that 
the myth is framed in disparate ways to accent diverging value orientations and understandings 
of modernity. Simply put, there are different ways of telling this narrative, with different moral 
evaluations inherent in each tale. There are at least two poles on the mythic continuum: at times 
the communal past is portrayed as an era of warm and intimate social relations characterized by 
purpose and unity, and at times it is portrayed as a crude and repressive era from which society 
was liberated so individuals could pursue their own course. These two ways of constructing the 
communal myth might be labeled “traditionalist” and “progressive” respectively (See Lee). 
There may well be two different “teloi” or timelines for this—progressives proceeding from self-
enclosed to greater community, conservatives falling from a grace toward atomism. Yet these 
labels imply a more oppositional character than is wanted; rather than flatly antagonistic frames, 
the narratives of the liberation from and loss of community are both always present. This is not 
contradiction. The warm and neighborly conservative image of loss and the provincial image of 
progressive liberation constitute two ends of the modern discursive dialectic. They are 
interchangeable myths which shadow all invocations of community, and rhetors oscillate 
between the two poles as needed to suit their particular purposes. To put it another way, both loss 
and liberation are constitutive of the idea of community—citizens simultaneously rely upon both 
because both are enmeshed in the modern grammar.   
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Nevertheless, the emphasis on one mythic pole has considerable influence on the 
historical, philosophical, political and moral standpoints one assumes. The adoption of a 
particular mythic frame will inculcate a language reflecting that assumed historical backdrop. 
Vocabularies associated with the narrative of liberation from a repressive past will tend toward a 
celebration of individual freedom, autonomy, mobility and self-determination (Lee, Sources; 
Taylor). This is the language of liberalism: enlightened self-interest, individualism, progress, 
diversity and tolerance. This narrative does not denounce community and throw it to the wind, 
but neither does it advocate a simple return to primitive communities. Instead, such a rhetoric 
will tend to assume the natural harmony of interests while calling for “new forms of 
community,” to assist in rounding out the more essential life of the individual whom nonetheless 
needs some form of communal attachment to live a meaningful life (Bellah et al; Dewey, Public; 
Putnam). At the other mythic pole, vocabularies associated with the narrative of the loss of 
community will tend toward a denunciation of those very modern values as atomistic, alienating 
or destructive and seek to recover the more primitive sources of unity (Nisbet, Social; Ransom; 
Weaver, Ideas). Although not necessarily put in a frame of decadence, such a vocabulary will 
reflect terms of loss and nostalgia, and include programs for communal recovery. 
The difference between these two is a matter of degree, and again, both will be present in 
any appeal to community. Each of the privileged mythic backdrops spin out certain webs of 
words or pious vocabularies in accordance with the particular mythic frame. A mythic backdrop 
of the liberation from community as progress probably constitutes the dominant discursive 
frame, and the pieties spun out by such an assumption create the familiar vocabulary of 
American liberalism. The framework of Robert Bellah et al. in Habits of the Hearts is useful for 
identifying these pious vocabularies. In their study of American civic life, Bellah et. al argue that 
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there are two languages of Americans: the primary language of individualism, and the secondary, 
somewhat subordinated vocabulary of collectivism. The first language, that of individualism, 
foregrounds matters of utility and self-expression, individual rights and enlightened self-interest, 
individual freedom and self-reliance. The familiar therapeutic, expressive, and managerial 
vocabularies take place within this frame (Macintyre; Taylor, Modern). Competing with this first 
language of Americans is the subordinated language of collectivity which draws upon the 
Biblical and Civic Republican traditions. The Biblical tradition stresses the intrinsic value of all 
persons and their obligation to respect and care for the neighbor, while the Civic Republican 
tradition foregrounds matters of common cause, moral purpose, consensus and concern for the 
welfare of others (Bellah et al, X). These two critical vocabularies align with the two ends of 
mythical backdrop of community; in stressing liberation from repression and ignorance, the 
“progressive” myth churns out the language of individualism. In stressing the loss of close 
meaningful human ties, the “traditionalist” myth weaves the language of community. These two 
are in dialectical relation, voicing the tension between modern individualist society and the ideal 
of community—although we are unsure of what exactly constitutes this relation. Is community a 
competitor, a complement or a corrective to modernity? Is it merely the therapeutic plea of a 
lonely people or a happy-feel-good verbal cover for the brutal ambition of bourgeois 
individualism? 
While there are no easy answers, it is clear that rhetorics of community are inherently 
normative discourses concerned with discovering the ideal ordering of the modern organism. In 
general, the god-term of community has historically helped various groups negotiate or realign 
three basic tensions brought on by modern life—self and society, spiritual and material, past and 
future—and in rhetorical usage, “community” may be said to have accumulated the legacy of 
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these “motives” or “pieties” (Payne). While community does have certain linkages or common 
ways of being spoken about, what Kenneth Burke calls pieties, its specific composition will 
depend on the historical location and persuasive designs of the rhetoricians drawing upon 
community as a resource. Only a more thorough investigation into specific grounded illustrations 
of “communitarian” rhetoric can bring to light the dialectical constitution of community in the 
modern imagination. To advance our understanding of community’s rhetorical function, then it is 
necessary to identify both its universal themes and its variants in specific domains of rhetorical 
practice. I attempt to do that in the following section through a taxonomy of the primary 
designations to which community refers.  
The Senses of Community 
In addition to serving as a god-term, community consists of a moral vocabulary and set of 
“pious” connections that are employed in social and political discourse. Community, because it 
is so ambiguous, has not one but several referents, and they constitute the specific resources 
available to rhetors to use for their specific purposes. To illuminate this vocabulary, I draw upon 
community’s modern history and my wide reading of contemporary literature to flesh out 
community’s general or “macro” character in American discourse by identifying its key features 
through a taxonomic schematization. In my earlier review of the term’s history, I demonstrated 
how the American understanding of community is shaded by the peculiarities of its history as it 
is portrayed in our Christian, Jeffersonian, and de Tocquevillian past. The contemporary 
discursive resources of community reflect the moral call of Christianity, the imagery of 
Jefferson’s agrarian locales, and enthusiasm of Tocqueville’s voluntary associations, as well as 
the larger trends of the West stemming from industrialism. With these themes in mind, we can 
with some confidence submit a preliminary taxonomy of community’s essential “senses.” By 
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sense, I mean the most common and fundamental ways community is understood and employed 
in modern social discourse. These “essential senses” can clear up the most significant symbolic 
resources of the term, pointing to the pieties available within the public grammar which we 
might use to identify and analyze concrete rhetorical practices of community rhetorics. 
 In identifying the key resources available to contemporary rhetors, it is possible to 
analyze how specific rhetorics of community draw upon and transform the term for their 
strategic purposes. Of course, much has changed since the time of de Tocqueville, and so too has 
our understanding of community. Economic depression, wars of unprecedented scale, vast 
advancements in transportation and communication technologies, the fury of nationalisms, the 
rise and fall of communism, the spread of identity politics and shifting social moralities have all 
forced the continual reconceptualization of community. But the rhetors facing these 
circumstances had to draw upon community’s terminological prestige as found in the “five 
essential senses” in order to advance their specific programs of action. They are the symbolic 
resources within the American orientation which rhetor’s employ to spin motives in concordance 
with the specific problems arising in their era.  
Although each sense of community is related, and ultimately collapses into the others, 
separating them for the purpose of analysis can shed light on the internal associations of 
community and permit the selection of situated rhetorical events which illuminate how those 
pieties function in American discourse. The five essential senses are: community as obligation, 
as locale, as voluntary association, as imagined solidarity, and as civic spiritual ideal. Each of 
these senses are mutually reinforcing and benefit from the charismatic capital of the term. I will 
explain each in more detail, then show its relevance and implications for analyzing specific 
historically situated cases. 
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Community as Obligation 
 In our review of the ancient understanding of the term, we saw that an obligation to one’s 
fellow citizens lay at the heart of community. In his etymology, Esposito defined community as 
“the totality of persons united not by a ‘property’ but precisely by an obligation or a debt” 
(Communitas 6). The Christian tradition also emphasized the individual’s duty to their fellow 
humans. And in the industrial era, community’s moral nature reflected not only nostalgia for a 
simpler era of small-town living, but a concern with the anti-social implications of self-seeking 
individualism (Calhoun, “Community Without”; Lee; Nisbet, Quest). Obligation is probably the 
most frequently invoked sense of community and it has to be taken as the concept’s core, present 
in every invocation whether or not it is the explicit base of appeal. Craig Calhoun is right when 
he observes, “Moral obligations are essentially the stuff of community” (“Toward” 112). 
 We can see this sense of community proliferate throughout contemporary discourse. In 
Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his associates plead for citizens to heed the moral call of 
community in political action by acknowledging their obligation to others and pursuing projects 
which accent their shared destiny. Similarly, for Amitai Etzioni and his brand of political 
communitarians, the principle of community counters the self-seeking obsession with rights by 
drawing attention to our civic responsibilities (Spirit; New Communitarian; Rights). In the 
domain of Philosophy, the communitarian philosophers critique the individualistic assumptions 
of Rawlsian liberalism through this sense of community as virtuous obligation, such as when 
Alasdair Macintyre calls for civic-friendships based upon “shared conception[s] of the 
community’s good,” or Charles Taylor cautions against the deleterious effects of instrumental 
reason on “any strong commitment to community…with its sense of duty and allegiance.” 
(Macintyre 232; Taylor, Ethics 34).  
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 There is a strong precedent for this understanding of community in the domain of Roman 
(and American) civic republicanism, with the concept of virtue privileging an ethic of common 
concern, shared destiny and mutual respect (Hariman).When we speak of community as 
obligation we are bringing to the forefront our inherently connected nature and our shared 
destiny in order to plead for a sacrificial program of action; we inherently owe something to the 
community and therefore ought to sacrifice our time and interests to the greater good. Obligation 
is the most obviously “moral” of all the “senses.” 
Community as Locale 
A second common way of understanding community is as a locale or sub-set of the 
social. This meaning is often revealed when someone speaks of a neighborhood or municipal as a 
community. Community in this sense generally expresses a culturally defined way of life within 
a relatively autonomous social unit. It is the place-based sense of community. Most frequently, 
appeals to locale will reference communal traditions, family relationships, and local politics with 
nostalgic overtones alluding to agrarian homesteads, Midwestern towns, and New England 
Villages. In contemporary discourse, we might also hear an appeal to the Tampa community or 
the campus community. Neither of these quite fits the bill for being closely-knit neighborhoods 
of domestic residence (Tampa would certainly be much larger than some of the other local type 
communities that are invoked), but they would still qualify as “locales” because they pin 
community as place-based phenomenon where people continuously interact and “do life 
together.”  
 While community as locale is employed by all political parties, it has a special resonance 
amongst traditionalist conservatives and those of similar philosophies who express an deferential 
attitude toward the past. Edmund Burke perhaps expresses this sentiment best when he dictates, 
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“To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first 
principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we 
proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind” (E. Burke, 135). Close attachment to 
one’s place of belonging—their local community—enables the continuity of tradition, a 
connection with ancestors and family, and a stable sense of identity. Locale also bears a 
connotation of people who are in tune with the seasons of nature and have meaningful 
relationship with their land. In the American imagination, Jeffersonian agrarianism and the rural 
South more generally, provide the strongest image of land-based locales. 
 The conservative minded also have an affinity toward community as locale because the 
perceived organic association of smaller-units provides an ordered and autonomous alternative to 
overbearing government centralization. Although not intrinsically a part the states-rights/small 
government argument, locale can certainly be used this way. But lest we grant conservatism the 
domain too exclusively, we also hear an awful lot from the political left on empowering local 
communities as part of their democratic platitudes about the common people and the 
preservation of regional distinctiveness. Like all sense of community, locale transcends partisan 
affiliation.  
Community as Voluntary Association  
 The idea of community as voluntary association is a distinctive American one, traceable 
to Alexis de Tocqueville’s portrayal of our civic genius. Tocqueville argued that extensive 
participation of citizens spurred by a spirit of volunteerism provides American’s with its greatest 
source of social solidarity and political training. In the contemporary sociological tradition, 
voluntary association is the dominant mode for understanding American community. Yet the 
idea of associative joinigs as the substance of community has not always been considered 
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legitimate. For example, in his distinction between gemeinscahft and gesellschaft, Ferdinand 
Tönnies juxtaposed the natural relationships of the community against the voluntary associations 
that characterized society (Community). Making a similar point, Max Weber claimed that 
community was based off “feeling” while association on rationality (Economy). In more 
contemporary work, Craig Calhoun argued that voluntary associations dilute community because 
volunteerism undermines the autonomy of communal authority. Nonetheless, understanding 
community as voluntary association plays an essential role in the American tradition and cannot 
be written off so simply.  
Alexis de Tocqueville famously called Americans the “great joiners” and argued that 
these associations protected America’s civic culture. Drawing upon Tocqueville for inspiration, 
Robert Bellah and his associates demonstrate the close correlation between organizational 
affiliation, individual happiness, and civic collaboration (Habits). In the same way, Robert 
Putnam in Bowling Alone, and Robert Wuthnow in Small Town America, make the case that the 
community as constituted through the voluntary joining of various associations provide the 
backbone of modern American democracy.  
 Community as voluntary association and locale need not be seen as mutually exclusively. 
Instead, it is better to frame them as different emphases (or references) within the idea of 
community with integrated implications. Even if community and association are contradictory in 
some uses, that only demonstrates the powerful ambiguity of community as a rhetorical term, 
and its malleability to serve different purposes. When speakers invoke the voluntary association 
sense of community, they are emphasizing forms of joining, such churches, PTAs, internet 
communities, self-help groups, and the like to celebrate public participation. This sense of 
community is integral to a certain kind of liberalism which, in fearing bureaucratic rationality 
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and rule by elites, believes that the voluntary engagement of citizens can develop the political 
consciousness to sustain democratic deliberation. This sense might be taken as the category par 
excellence of liberal volunteerism. 
Community as Imagined Solidarity  
Community as imagined solidarity takes up the matter of identification and unity. Do we 
as citizens feel as though we belong to the same community? Do we identify with others or do 
we consider them outsiders and strangers? By imagined solidarity, I mean community as it is 
used to plea for inclusion, affiliation, and unity. It foregrounds the idea that we share a common 
identity and are bound in responsibility and destiny. It is plays upon the inkling that ultimately 
we are all of the same kind. When we speak of an American community or Christian community, 
we have this imagined solidarity in mind. It is community as an invitation to identification.  
It is important to note that community as imagined solidarity does not depend upon any 
interpersonal interactions or mutual familiarity. When it is used this way, community is meant 
only to indicate the symbolic sense that we belong to the same group and are therefore somehow 
united. We might say that they share a sense of community and solidarity even though they have 
no idea who their fellow members are. It does not matter because they are believed to belong to 
the same community. They imagine this solidarity.  
This fourth sense accomplishes significant boundary work—who “we are” as a 
community and who “we are not” (Cohen). If you are imagined to be in the community, then you 
are given some leeway to dissent or wander without leaving the fold because you are still “one of 
us.” At the end, if you are one of us, you are still owed decency and respect. There is no purer 
statement of imagined solidarity then the humble phrase: “my people.” 
 59 
I take my inspiration for the label imagined solidarity from Benedict Anderson’s 
influential book on nationalism, Imagined Communities, where he argues that common 
vernacular languages, cultural traditions, and other collective symbols created a common identity 
and “deep horizontal comradeship” which served as the basis for emerging national 
consciousness (7). People who never met nonetheless considered themselves part of the same 
national community and therefore bound to each other in a significant way. For better or for 
worse, they were one people, and they took pride in that communion. We are interested most, 
however, in rhetorical appeals to community which try to create this sense of imagined solidarity 
by strategically invoking the term. From a rhetorical perspective, all communities are imagined, 
created by language to construct people as in either a division or unity. These imaginings can be 
contested and controversial. Nationalism is but one example, albeit a powerful one. The political 
left tends to decry imagined solidarity as ‘provincial’ if the imagining is too narrow or “fascist” 
if the imagining is exclusively national. Yet the left is often the greatest promoter of imagined 
solidarity, such as when someone pleads for a “World Community” or “community of nations,” 
or when Martin Luther King called for “community over chaos” to guide race relations (King Jr., 
Where). It is in this manner Richard Rorty admonishes his readers to “extend the sense of 
community” to its absolute largest limits (Philosophy). 
There is clearly some cross-over between community as obligation and as imagined 
solidarity, in so far as those who are deemed to be “one of us” are entitled to certain 
accommodations and privileges that those outside are not. Community as imagined solidarity 
therefore is distinctly moral in that it pleads for loyalty, inclusion and identification. If a rhetor 
can convince you to include certain persons in your community, then you are bound to them for 
better and for worst, impelled by allegiance to look out for their welfare. Rhetorically, to label 
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something a community is to call that community into existence. Whether it is the Black 
community, or an academic discourse community, the very naming is designed to constitute a 
solitary unit, bringing forth those sentiments of belonging, loyalty and obligation. The imagined 
solidarity resources of community, in dealing with the raising of common consciousness and the 
mutual pledging of lives, takes on a mystic tinge. This comes, at least in part, from the Christian 
inspiration of universal community, both in the form of obligation and ontological imminence. 
We take these communities to be unequivocally good, not just for their utility, but on their own 
terms. Community is an end unto itself, and this bring us to our final and least tangible category. 
Community as Civic-Spiritual Ideal  
 Concealed behind every other “sense” of community is the term’s spiritual resonance. It 
does not matter whether we are speaking of a neighborhood or a voluntary association; every 
appeal to community is tinged by spiritual overtones. This touches deeper than community’s 
status as a “god-term,” although that certainly is a part of it. Likewise, the Christian inspiration 
behind community, and the intentional efforts to salvage the unity principle out of it through a 
secularization of the religious impulse, does something to explain the spiritual reverberation. But 
its mystical tenor also comes from the foundational role that community plays in the American 
political consciousness as both the site and the substance of democracy. Community is a spiritual 
ideal and it is a democratic ideal, and these two thigs are not quite separable. It is impossible then 
to apply this sense of community as civic-spiritual in any “scientific” way, because this category 
is the charismatic aspect of the term. Community as a spiritual-democratic ideal seems to imply 
an equality of persons, a common vision of the good, an ever-growing sense of loyalty and 
inclusion, an entire set of motives counter to an excessive individualism. It points the way to a 
better possible future of human relations. In its civic-spiritual manifestation, it takes its spirit 
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from John Dewey’s claim that “regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other 
principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself” (Public 148). Community is 
the ‘stuff’ of democracy that can never be attained but which continually calls forth a more 
harmonizing, fraternal and hopeful attitude. It challenges us to appreciate our differences while 
acknowledging our mutual dependence, our shared destiny, our compassion, and our obligation 
to look out for our brothers and sisters. Community as democratic, and even human ideal, 
foregrounds our inherent togetherness. It is a source of renewal and spring of hope for a better 
world.  
Perhaps “community as civic-spiritual ideal” shares too much with the “obligation,” and 
“imagined solidarity” categories, so it would be better to label this elusive nature of community a 
religious or mystic ideal. But I call it civic-spiritual to echo Robert Bellah’s idea of Civil 
Religion, a concept which blurs the line between a country’s religious discourse and political 
orientation. Civil religion is a kind of nationalistic non-denominational social faith where 
religious discourse infuses political rhetoric and vice verses. In this role as secular moral ethic, 
community grants justification, hope, meaning, and unity to democratic politics.  
There is the ‘non-political’ emphasis of this equation too (the spiritual side of the civic-
spiritual). To be spiritual, it must necessarily transcend circumstantial political concerns. The 
distinctive feature of this category it that community is considered as an end—not merely a 
material end, but a spiritual one. Communion is humans finding final fulfillment in the unity of 
all beings, for which reason we might say that even in its Western Monotheistic roots, 
community has a strong “pantheistic” impulse. It is pantheistic in that it stresses the ultimate 
singularity of every life, the final resting union of all with all in peace and union. Community in 
this sense is pure purpose and utopia.  
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The Impurity of the Senses of Community 
I have suggested five common ways community is employed in modern discourse: as 
civic obligation, as locale, as voluntary association, as imagined solidarity, and as civic-spiritual 
ideal. This schematization helps to clarify the distinct references and rhetorical resources of 
community, but we must admit that almost any employment of the term “community” will 
invoke several of these meanings at the same time. Each category is impure, in that it bleeds over 
and ultimately collapses into the other categories. For example, the phrase “community service” 
simultaneously draws upon the idea of locale (one’s particular community) and one’s obligation 
to the fellow inhabitants (the act of service). In this usage, community stands in as a sacrificial 
and purifying motive, where individuals can purge their guilt by fulfilling their duty to the 
community. To take another example, in their research on citizen participation, sociologists 
assume that the most meaningful and enduring forms of association will occur in locales and be 
assisted by a civic spirit. This would primarily be the voluntary association category, but it 
would imply both the locale and civic-spiritual categories as well. Or in a final example, an 
appeal to the spirit of community in civil rights rhetoric might refer primarily to the imagined 
solidarity sense of community. But in so far as this was played out through participation in 
organizations, and in so far as the rhetor portrayed these solidarities as ultimate spiritual unions, 
she would also be drawing upon the voluntary association and civic-spiritual categories. 
It must be concluded that no absolute line can be drawn between the various senses of 
community. Nevertheless, the categorical impurity does not undermine the taxonomy’s utility. 
The blending of referents is a defining feature of community’s ambiguity and god-term allure. 
The most successful rhetorics will play upon each of community’s resources simultaneously. The 
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interplay of the senses creates the potential for rhetorical transformation; in the slippages and 
inconsistencies, there the magic happens.  
 Although the five senses of community cannot be ascribed to as mutually exclusive 
categories, they nevertheless afford a strong sense of what is happening in discourses about 
community. Together, obligation, locale, voluntary association, imagined solidarity, and civic-
spiritual ideal clarify community’s discursive resources and provide a critical tool and reference 
through which to identify the processes whereby community is symbolically transformed. As the 
most general and readily available tropes of community, the five categories enable rhetors to 
weave specific motives for their particular purposes. 
The Contested Nature of Community  
 We have made it our point this far to flesh out the general character of community 
discourse. Since the purpose of this dissertation is to come to an understanding of “community” 
that is at once critical and appreciative, it was first necessary to gain a comprehension of the 
general tendencies and potentialities of community as a discursive phenomenon before 
undertaking any effort to look at more grounded examples or generating conclusions about the 
implications of community on modern American life. Nonetheless, a comprehensive inquiry into 
rhetorics of community must involve two levels of investigation: the general or macro patterns of 
community discourse and the historically contingent, specific transformations of those patterns in 
every particular enactment. The five senses—obligation, locale, voluntary association, imagined 
solidarity, and civic-spiritual ideal—establish an outline of the motivational vocabulary or public 
grammar of community discourse and a history of its transformations at the macro level; 
however, any general understanding community discourse is inadequate on its own because it 
cannot take into account the full potentiality of the concept as is it confiscated for historically 
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located purposes. As a too exclusively macro discussion of community discourse inhibits a fuller 
understanding of the critical work the concept accomplishes in practice, a rounded view of the 
subject must be found by grounding analysis in particular cases of American “community 
rhetoric” that are especially influential and revealing.  
 I have argued that “community” accomplishes significant dialectical work in the modern 
lexicon, especially in navigating the tension between self and society. This dialectic, however, is 
not worked out in one universally consistent way by all parties. My discussion of the general 
discourse may unintentionally indicate that there exists a relatively coherent singular rhetoric of 
community, or that community is a largely uncontested concept. Nothing could be farther from 
the truth. Community is a universally lauded, question-begging god-term, but that does not 
diminish the degree to which community is appropriated for rivaling political programs with 
competing histories. Community is a masker of difference, and it is important to take these 
substantial divergences into account to appreciate the wide-ranging dialectical work it 
accomplishes.  
The five senses, in addition to clarifying the different referents and patterns of 
community discourse, reveals how “community” conceals opposing philosophies, worldviews, 
and political programs under the same heading. It is an obvious observation, but when different 
people use community as the basis of appeal, the term do not mean the same thing. Community 
is essentially contested, and any adequate survey of community rhetorics must address this 
factitious nature.  
The nexus of contestation with community centers upon the idea of “common identity” 
and “identification.” If to label something a community is to bring it into existence, then such 
appeals invite common identification with a conception of who we are, how we unite, and what 
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obligations we inherit or actions we must take. Community concerns itself with what David 
Payne has called the three topoi of identity—past-future, spiritual-material, self-society—
whereby rhetors position and anchor identity between competing or complementary polarities in 
the elaboration of larger discursive worlds (Coping). “Identifications” help persons to bridge, 
conjoin, or navigate these inherent tensions of identity; common symbols of value and power, 
such as community, therefore supply transformative ideas which unifies past-future, spiritual-
material, and self-society. Rhetorics of community invite identification with composed and 
enacted group identities that are seen as valuable, powerful, or resolving. As community is 
invoked in ambiguous ways, what it posits are contested meanings and interpretations of group 
identity with divergent moral, valuative, and normative implications.   
There are at least three visions of community that stand paramount, which may be labeled 
“communalist,” “progressive,” and “traditionalist” respectively. These are of course political 
headings, but they are meant primarily to designate distinct ways of splicing and conceptualizing 
community that is not necessarily restricted to political commitments. Any one person can and 
likely does invoke each vision at different times for different purposes, and each 
conceptualization comes with a corresponding set of rhetorical moves appropriate for the 
elements of community it accents. For example, a “communist” vision of community might take 
up community as a moral principle to be rationally applied to the social order, and the 
corresponding rhetorical move would be one of living up to the good of community. For 
progressives, community might be a means for attaining democratic change, emphasizing 
participation and engagement through voluntary association and imagined solidarity. The 
matching rhetorical maneuver would be one of making the world a better place by getting 
involved and mobilizing for a positive change. Meanwhile a traditionalist vision may conceive of 
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community as a natural and ordered way of life, founded in locale or tradition, with a consequent 
rhetorical emphasis on preserving identity and conserving an inherited good.    
I submit that these three visions of community correspond to integral ways that 
community is constructed, negotiated, and contested in American discourse. They represent not 
only seminal rhetorical tropes, but paradigms and political presumptions about the social order. 
Discourses of community are in the business of working out the ideal relation between self and 
society, and community functions as the rhetorical fix that sets the order right again. Therefore, 
by analyzing these contending discursive claims, something very practical might be revealed 
about the biases and prejudices underlying American society’s most prevalent communal motifs. 
Such analyses of communalist, progressive, and traditionalist rhetorics of community might 
shine light on their areas of convergence and divergence, with suggestive implications on how 
modern attempt to navigate the relations between past and future, spiritual and material, self and 
society. They might also reveal the utility of “community” as a device for rhetorical 
transformation, one that possesses certain symbolic inclinations or rhetorical moves depending 
on the particular “linguistic recipe” used to construct community.   
In the following three chapters, therefore, I conduct three historical-critical case studies 
of community rhetorics representing each of the contending political programs, analyzing the 
communalism of John Humphrey Noyes, the progressivism of Jane Addams, and the 
traditionalism of the Southern Agrarians. I pay special attention to how their competing 
constructions of community lead them to particular vocabularies and philosophies, and how they 
enact rhetorical transformations that purport to correct the social order. 
 I choose to go historical, rather than contemporary for a number of reasons. Both the 
history and research on community have identified its ascent into a god-term as a result of the 
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industrial era, where it was used by rhetoricians of various stripes to make sense of modern 
conditions and contest the economic, social, and political changes occurring throughout the 
world. The age of industrialism, therefore, offers perhaps the most fruitful instances where 
various actors attempted to work out what community meant and how it might be utilized to 
navigate modern identity. In turning historical, I do not aim to assert strict continuity or causality 
with contemporary rhetorics of community. Rather, these case studies can permit the critic to 
more thoroughly work out a vocabulary motives in order to refine our critical sensibilities.  
Nevertheless, my interest in community rhetorics is not purely historical, and this project 
proceeds out of an acute awareness of the current state of American discourse and a curiosity 
over the role “community” plays in it. An inquiry and demonstration of the philosophies, 
vocabularies, and rhetorical moves of historical cases might aid in our critical capacity to 
evaluate modern day phenomenon, and it should not take much imagination to apply our lessons 
to the present. To put it another way, this dissertation aims to comment on community as a 
discourse of both historical interest and contemporary implication.  
Burke tells us that symbolic acts are “strategies for encompassing a situation.” The uses 
of community as god-term, I argue, are ways of encompassing situations or dislocations brought 
on by modern life: (1) tensions between self or self-interestedness and society or social-interest 
(2) tensions between spiritual and material values, or conflict of a multiplicity in spiritual 
values/goals (3) tensions between past and future, or the need for a shared platform of social 
change, with piety toward “community” offering identification and transcendent value sufficient, 
with spiritual/integrative rewards, to compel reformation (Payne). Admittedly, these functions 
are not entirely distinct, but they do identify the specific ways the “community” can intervene in 
the conduct of self/social relations and in ameliorating the vicissitudes of modern life.  
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Further, in the discourse of these select groups, one might see that the concepts and 
pieties of “community” is itself the site of conflict or struggle. While it may be insufficient to 
propose a historical evolution of the term community in and through these prominent reformist 
movements, one cat at least ponder the rough outlines of a “genealogy” of the idea of community 
in these rhetorical uses, as interesting in the divergences or variations and ambiguities the term 
helps to mask or bridge as the continuities which might otherwise appear somewhat coincidental. 
Either way, we can rest the analysis on observing the pragmatic use of the god-term community 
in rhetoric that addresses these ills—and possible solutions—in modern American society and 
rhetorics of its reform.  
In the act of criticism, the critic cannot know what will be found until he or she is 
actually immersed in the texts. Yet, it is customary for the critic to offer hypotheses for their 
study based upon their observations in the research and general socio-political discourse. With 
this in mind, I submit the following seven preliminary theses about community rhetoric to be 
explored in the succeeding chapters: 
1. Community serves as a god-term in American discourse, providing an ideal for ordering 
lives, evaluating actions, and justifying behavior. It is a term that transcends partisan 
divides, with a “spiritual” moral core of individual sacrifice for the collective good. 
2. Community is compensatory to modernity. Long framed as antithetical to modernity, 
community is offered by rhetors as a lost ideal, a corrective, and a source of social 
improvement. In each case, community is meant to compensate for the deficiencies of 
modern life.   
3. The central rhetorical work community accomplishes is in navigating the self-society 
dialectic. Community foregrounds concerns with the ideal ordering of society and the 
 69 
proper relation of the individual with the collective. Rhetorics of community promise to 
rebalance, reorder, or realign the social order to fix the imbalance which as arose. 
Community in this regard is a stabilizing force. 
4. Community weaves a historical vision of past and future to provide a sense of order that 
contextualizes the present. These histories and ideals are not necessarily the same across 
groups (as I will show in progressive and conservative uses), but in each case it presents a 
mythic background and a future goal which allows citizens to situate themselves in a 
meaningful historical moment.  
5. Utopian community rhetorics will tend to take community as an abstraction, a set of 
ideals or moral principles to be rationally applied to the social order. It focuses on 
institutions as the purveyors of motives, believing justice and harmony to be the natural 
state of human affairs that has been lost to corrupt systems. It therefore seeks to remove 
unethical institutions and replace them with alternatives in rational accordance with 
community virtues. Such a conception of community seeks the purification of human 
motives as its end. It seeks to correct the individualistic and capitalist assumptions which 
encourage socially harmful behavior by replacing it with a morality that takes sacrifice 
and submission to the collective good as the ultimate aim. For the utopian communalist, 
community is the ideal to be strive for, a future-oriented program that takes the principles 
of the past and seeks to hold modern society accountable for fulfilling them. 
6. Progressive rhetorics of community will tend to be “future” oriented and view 
community as a vehicle of democratic change. Rhetorics of community in this tradition 
most frequently compensate for the “excessive individualism” which they seek to 
counter. The emphasis is upon creating new forms of community that adjust and reform 
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society to make it better align with more ideal forms of human interaction. There is as 
strong hint of universality and “extension” of the sense of community to an ever-growing 
number of people. Progressives fluctuate between a myth of loss and liberation, and they 
display an especially strong predilection toward the categories of voluntary association, 
obligation, and imagined solidarity. 
7. Traditionalist rhetorics of community will tend to be “past” oriented in that they seek to 
preserve the positive historic elements of social relationships. Rhetorics of community in 
this tradition most frequently advocate for community as the home of the individual, the 
place where citizens find their ultimate freedom and most enduring relationships. The 
emphasis is upon order, organic relations, autonomy, and tradition. They sometimes 
display tribalistic tendencies. There is a strong defense of partial associations, 
particularity and the provincial or parochial ideals of community. Traditionalists are more 
likely to emphasize a myth of communal loss, and they display an especially strong 
predilection toward the categories of locale, association, and obligation. 
Three analytical chapters will help to determine the relative merit of these seven theses. If this 
project is successful in its aim, then it will arrive at a critical appreciation of community’s 
rhetorical genius, an appreciation that possesses an enhanced terminology of motives and refined 
critical sensibility so that it will is possible to interpret, evaluate, and improve the reception and 
propagation of our symbolic resources today.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
JOHN NOYES AND THE ONEIDA: COMMUNITY AS TRANSCENDENCE  
In the introduction of this inquiry into the rhetorical uses of “community,” I noted the 
automatic, positive, and nearly unquestioned value that the concept of community evokes in 
American culture. In a political culture where communism or socialism are widely discarded, 
“community” as a positive value and a worthy goal is embraced by traditionalist and progressive 
alike, as we will see in Chapters Five and Six. Whereas there are important differences in how 
these groups believe community is derived and can be achieved, the term itself operates as a 
spiritualized value, one worthy of preservation, pursuit, and sacrifice, and one capable of 
resolving conflicts, tempering self-interest, and even redeeming transgressions against others—
as when we sentence people to “community service” to somehow compensate for their offenses.  
Scholars of rhetoric have variously called such concepts “transcendent terms,” “ultimate 
terms,” or “god-terms.” Such terms and their attendant associations, however vague and even 
contradictory, seem to evoke an unquestioned good, or priority—one seldom has to defend the 
value of such ideas, and they appear to generate consensus and motivation whenever invoked. In 
coining the idea of a god-term, Kenneth Burke observed that in such an expression we can “posit 
a world…seeing all as emanations, near and far, of its light” (Grammar 105). Richard Weaver 
adopted Burke’s language, suggesting that the “capacity to demand sacrifice is the surest 
indicator” of the presence of a god-term (Ethics 214). Payne suggests that god-terms have the 
rhetorical capability of ascribing universality, order, and value to those things they are alleged to 
 72 
sponsor in their “emanation” or “light” (Coping 137). In common and ordinary usage, 
community does seem to compel such connotations: work on its behalf has a salvational quality 
that needs no defense, it promises a moral orderliness and positive outcome to our efforts to 
transcend the limits of self-interest and strife. 
Kenneth Burke writes that when we encounter such a reduction and “simplicity,” we 
must “ask ourselves what complexities are subsumed beneath it.” Such a “purity of motive,” he 
writes, cannot “prevail” in “actuality,” but only “in principle” (Grammar 105)  Yet, rhetorically, 
we find the pragmatic necessity of finding such guiding principles, those that promise 
cooperation, agreement, and positive results, in our projects to reform and redeem society. 
In Chapter Two, I sought to sketch in general ways the history of the term community:  
Clearly it has been a focal point of sociological studies—in many ways a god-term and core 
value for sociologists—and this suggests a usage and history more broad than Nineteenth century 
American culture. In part, the virtue of community does have to do with the sociology of 
developing America, as local, regional, ethnic, and religious social groupings were preserved in 
the relatively isolated small villages and towns of our settlement. To a great extent, the lament 
for the loss of community and desire for return is based on the autonomy and commonalities of 
these groups. I argue that part of the positive, spiritualized, connotation of community comes 
from religious history, keeping in mind many groups in developing America sought precisely 
this kind of autonomy and isolation to restrict and preserve religious practice—and many of 
these sectarian communities, specifically Amish and Mennonite, persist today. 
I would contend that the rhetorical legacy of the god-term “community” is coterminous 
with American history and spiritual thought, and we find it in Emerson and the New England 
Transcendentalist movement, as well as explicitly in pragmatist Josiah Royce at the end of the 
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nineteenth century, and implicitly traces of it in Deweyan notions of democracy. In addition to 
the hundreds of ethnic and religious communities formed in the settlement of the American 
frontier, an especially evident and dramatic rhetorical focus on community can be found in the 
Nineteenth Century experiments with utopian and socialist communities. In general, these 
utopias defended and justified their endeavors by way of reference to the moral mandates of 
community, and for this reason, provide particularly rich, if radical, cases of rhetoric that directs 
citizens to re-order their lives in accordance with community as god-term. While there were over 
forty utopian communes developed between 1820 and 1890, none is more well-known and 
revealing of the transcendent powers of “community” than the Oneida Community of New York, 
initiated in 1840 and prospering until 1880.  
John Humphrey Noyes was a Christian pastor and social philosopher who developed and 
promoted a millennialist theology called “Perfectionism.” For Noyes, living in accordance with 
community meant that individuals could aspire to live perfect lives. Noyes was also a student of 
evolution and an enthusiast for enlightenment values. He believed the conflicts of faith, science, 
technology, and progress could be transcended or reconciled by living as a separate community 
with individuals devoted to and sacrificing for the perfection of relations within the association. 
Noyes’ conception of the ideal community, and his address of the contemporaneous problems of 
society and spirt, are symptomatic of the “pieties” about community at play in the Nineteenth 
Century American culture, and are a milestone in the rhetorical uses of community to both 
preserve traditional values and align individuals with progress—thus embodying and 
transcending both the conservative and progressive values of community that lived on into the 
Twentieth Century. In this way, the Oneida might be taken as a “representative anecdote” of the 
rhetorical legacy of community as god-term in American political rhetoric. 
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Faith and Science in the Utopian Community Movement  
 In the Nineteenth Century world of dramatic industrial change, thousands of Americans 
decided to join utopian communities in hopes of discovering a more meaningful and humanistic 
form of life. Dissatisfied with the larger social order and economic orientation of modernism, 
citizens increasingly considered the possibility of creating “perfect” societies founded on 
alterative institutions. In this effort, “community” provided a guiding template and source of 
inspiration for remaking the social world based upon moral principles.  
 A defining feature of the utopian community movement, and of John Noyes’ rhetoric in 
particular, was its fusion of the rivaling orientations of faith and science through the cause of 
community. To compensate for the malaise of industrialism by imagining a social order 
characterized by a more equal and participatory system of organization, the utopic experiments 
drew upon both religious and secular orientations, as represented by two driving forces of the 
community movement: The Enlightenment advances of scientific rationality and the 
restorationism of the Second Great Awakening. In the rhetoric of John Noyes, the division of 
faith and science was symbolically transformed into a unity through the god-term community, 
supplying a transcendent value from which to reorganize the material order.    
 From the dawn of the Enlightenment, Western civilization harbored a growing and 
uneasy relationship between scientific rationality and Christian doctrine. Scientific rationality 
was founded on the skepticism of inherited authority, while religious dogma largely relied upon 
it. Although it was commonly held that the revelations of religion and the findings of science 
were complementary, that view became increasingly fraught with the advent of Darwinian 
evolution. Darwin’s thesis on the origin of species conflicted with what was generally upheld as 
a literal interpretation of Scripture. The growing antagonism between the claims of science and 
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the claims of faith led to a symbolic conflict of authority between two ways of knowing; 
religious authority was increasingly undermined and delegitimized as rationalistic 
presuppositions gained greater adherence. 
This crisis or failure of worldview, where the claims of one orientation increasingly 
conflicted the claims of the other, was the rhetorical scene in which John Humphrey Noyes’ 
created his Perfectionist utopia, the Oneida Community. In “community,” Noyes found a 
unifying term for Faith and Science, a principle from which to criticize industrial society and to 
reorganize human affairs. His conception of community was a peculiar hybrid of Enlightenment 
rationality and Christian theology that supplied a spiritual value to guide the material order.  
Scientific Rationality and the American Enlightenment  
 One major source of inspiration for John Noyes and the utopian community movement 
was the influence of scientific and Enlightenment rationality on American social thought. 
Proponents of Enlightenment thinking adopted a predilection for rationalism, skepticism of 
religious authority, emphasis on scientific method, conviction that men were essentially good, 
and belief in the myth of social and material progress. Its rationalist tendencies meant that, for a 
growing number, the chief source of authority was reason itself, not tradition or religious belief. 
The merit of existing institutions and inherited beliefs were to be measured by their consistency 
with abstract principles and weighed according to the available scientific evidence. 
 The Enlightenment extended its lessons to the nature of human relationships and social 
institutions. Social organizations were no longer self-justifying, but had to be vindicated by 
appeal to reason, principle, and consequence. In so far as the institutions of industrialism failed 
to attain such justification, it was thought that they should be eliminated and replaced with 
rationally-defensible alternatives. The undeniable material achievements of science created an 
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optimism for reform and experimentation, and served as evidence that an enlightened population 
could harness the power of reason to reconstruct a more perfect society. Since the Enlightenment 
taught that men were essentially good, but had been corrupted by irrational and immoral 
institutions, it was believed that by replacing existing institutions with rational democratic 
alternatives, civilization could recover the natural state of peace and harmony characterizing 
early human communities. 
In this context, the Enlightenment provided a series of attitudes favorable to experiments 
with utopic communes: a desire to reclaim human harmony, confidence in the ability of citizens 
to rationally devise a superior social organization by redesigning institutions, and, for the more 
secularly-inclined utopias, a hope to live free from the infections of religious dogma. The secular 
drive toward community, however, was paralleled in the Christian movement that came to be 
known as the Second Great Awakening.   
Restorationism and the Second Great Awakening  
A second stimulus of John Noyes and the utopian community movement was the moral 
and theological justification received from the “restorationism” of the Second Great Awakening. 
Restorationism was a form of evangelical primitivism which taught that Christians could usher in 
the Millennium or Kingdom of God by returning to the pure and primitive model of the church 
and working to remake society in that image. The theology of restorationism can be understood 
as a rejection of the complexities of modern life and a call for simplicity, working to reclaim 
instead a minimalism of human needs and seeking intimate human relationships of sympathy and 
obligation. Communes, in this context, promised a way of returning to life’s basic necessities. 
 Disputing the skeptical rationalism of the Enlightenment, the Second Great Awakening 
embraced a kind of romanticism that glorified the past and nature. The sentimentalized past, 
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where humans lived in close association with each other and nature—unlike the mechanical, 
unnatural, and divided state of modern society—held within it the program of remedy for the 
present. Such nostalgia was not pessimistic or reactionary; rather the backward-glance was used 
as an impetus for social change, pointing out the deficiencies of industrial lifestyles and calling 
for reform. The Awakening preached a doctrine of millennialism, where engaging in good works 
and social restructuring was praised for progressing the world closer toward Christ’s perfect 
reign on Earth. The Awakening thus raised an awareness of contemporaneous problems of 
slavery, poverty, greed, and women’s subordination—all of which were denounced for falling 
short of the Christian-communal ideal. Religious sources of inspiration, in sum, held a strong 
utopic impulse and back-to-basics message which found neat expression in the movement to 
found communes of like-minded believers.  
 As it stood, the religious and secular perspectives were in a rivaling relation: where the 
Enlightenment questioned the authority of belief and tradition, the Awakening relied upon it; 
where the Enlightenment rejected much of the past as corrupted by blindness, the Awakening 
sought to recover the past’s virtue of simplicity. Faith and science invoked different sources of 
authority and conflicting standards of evidence. 
 Nevertheless, John Noyes and likeminded thinkers took the two and reconceived of them 
as a unity by emphasizing their essential similarities and compatibility in the cause of 
community. Both the Enlightenment and Second Great Awakening, he showed, were favorable to 
social experimentation with communes because they emphasized the virtues of simplicity and 
lost human community; both contained a strong utopic impulse founded on the belief that moral 
effort and reform could progress society toward a near perfect state; and both were optimistic 
that the antidote for Nineteenth Century social ills was a return to the natural harmony of the 
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human race by remaking social institutions in accordance with moral principles. When grouped 
together, Noyes used the Enlightenment and the Awakening to endorse a rhetorical vision of the 
material social order that was infused with and organized according to a transcendent value—the 
value of community. Community, as the unifier of orientations, enlisted secular and religious 
rationalities in the common pursuit of an improved society aligned with abstract and “spiritual” 
principles. Christian theology provided the picture of communal perfection; scientific rationalism 
provided the means for attaining it.   
Unifying Faith and Science through Community  
 Noyes’ first rhetorical move was thus to posit community as the highest moral striving of 
human life, to be aimed for at both the individual and social level. He drew upon a particular 
variant of Christian theology to develop his conception of community, turning to science as the 
vehicle for making the ideal of a reality. Noyes not only rhetorically unifies faith and science, but 
also attains a vision of community that rebukes the “selfish” values of industrialism and calls for 
a platform of communalized social change. He accomplished this through a rhetorical appeal to 
the Christian ideals of “Perfectionist” theology and the rational principles of scientific inquiry.  
Community as Christian Ideal  
Noyes’ decision to found the Oneida Community spawned first from his Christian 
convictions and Perfectionist theology which submitted “Community” to be the highest Christian 
virtue. Perfectionism was a diffuse constellation of ideas held together only by the overriding 
conviction that Christ’s resurrection made human perfection a possibility. It was a controversial 
belief system founded on a “heretical” doctrine: true Christians must become perfect. 
 Underlying Noyes’ theology was the belief that the Second Coming of Christ had already 
taken place during the sack of the Temple of Jerusalem in 70 AD. This provision meant the 
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millennium of Jesus’ reign of peace and harmony was imminent, awaiting only the labors of 
faithful Christians to bring it into existence by an “immediate and totally cessation from sin.” 
Noyes took Christ’s exhortation, “Be you perfect, even as my Father in heaven is perfect,” 
literally. What this meant in practical terms was that Noyes, like other millennialists, believed 
that Christians could usher in the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth through the moral reformation of 
social life. It was the duty of citizens to make both the individual and the society perfect.  
For Noyes, community as found in the Garden of Eden, the Pentecostal Church, and the 
Kingdom of Heaven was the model for “perfection” in human relations. In the original state of 
human affairs, there was perfect order, justice, unity, equality, and intimacy among all people. 
With the Fall of Man, that true community had been lost. However, with Christ’s death and 
resurrection, individuals could again be purified and reinstall a true community. The theological 
image of this renewed community, for Noyes, was revealed with the primitive Church at the 
moment of Pentecost:  
All the believers were together, and had all things in common; and sold their possessions 
and goods, and parted them to all, as every man had need.’—‘The multitude of them that 
believed were of one heart and of one soul; neither said any of them that aught of the 
things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things in common.’ Acts 2: 44, 
45, and 4:32. Here is unity like that of the Father and Son: ‘All mine thine, and all thine 
mine (Bible Communism 28) 
 
In Noyes’ view, the selflessness displayed in the Pentecostal Community of Saints offered the 
ultimate portrait of an ethically superior society to be sought after in human affairs—one 
characterized by unity, equality, and the sharing of all things. Community was a people pledged 
together and living by a system of communism. Perfect citizens shared all possessions and 
owned nothing. Thus the communism of Pentecost presented a perennial challenge to the 
Church. The Pentecostal Community, he argued, should not be seen as a one-time historical 
event, but as the organizational principle of society:  
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Pentecostal community of interests was its final and permanent condition in the 
heavens…The seed of heavenly unity fell into the earth, and was buried for a time, but in 
the harvest at the Second Coming it was reproduced, and became the universal and 
eternal principle of the church (Bible Communism 29) 
 
As the eternal principle of the Church, the Pentecostal Community beckoned believers to put 
behind the selfishness of the world and implement a higher standard in their societies. Unlike the 
capitalist framework preceding in America, this social order would function through a voluntary 
communism of property. Like the Pentecostal Community, modern citizens must give up all they 
have for the good of the body, sacrificing their own interests for the collective good.  
For this reason, Noyes proclaimed that it was the responsibility of citizens to reclaim 
ethical social relations by installing a perfect of communion of saints on Earth, and he labeled 
this program “Bible Communism.” As a non-Marxist communist enterprise, Noyes lacked a 
conception of class warfare and an emphasis upon the Nation-state. Rather, Bible Communism 
grew out of the positive “Pentecostal” motive of Christian equality and community, and might be 
better labeled voluntary “communalism.” In his program, communism was the Christian 
response to social ills, for it represented the triumph of holiness over sin. By forming a loving 
Community of Believers where each individual subordinated their own interests to the interests 
of the body, selfishness could be abolished. 
In summation, for Noyesian rhetoric, Christianity supplied the spiritual values of ethical 
behavior, with “community” being the rhetorical template or set of principles to which individual 
and social relations should aim. Yet, Noyes decided that any hope of achieving such a 
community was dependent upon the promise of scientific rationality. Science was the 
indispensable counterpart of and mechanism for Christian Community.  
Scientific Rationality as the Vehicle for Attaining Community  
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The second impetus behind the creation of the Oneida Community was Noyes’ adherence 
to the rationalist presuppositions of Enlightenment science. Noyes’ vision of Christian 
Community emphasized the points of convergence with the Enlightenment myth, such as the 
natural goodness of man, the corrupting influence of institutions on human character, vigor for 
experiment and reform, and optimism towards the ability of human mind to attain a more perfect 
morality. Both orientations believed the world had fallen from its organic harmony, but that 
perfect community could once again be achieved. Yet Noyes took this common ground further 
by demanding the Christian pursuit of community enlist scientific rigor. While Perfectionist 
theology proffered the communal ideal, scientific rationality provided the means of attaining it. 
 For Noyes, society had no excuse for persisting in disorder and injustice. Tradition and 
convention was not an adequate justification for social institutions because they were blind, 
irrational, and unscientific. The achievements of science were evidence that human rationality 
could now create for itself any society it saw fit, so long as it embraced an enlightened spirit of 
experimentation and reform. It was science which offered the best path forward for improving 
the human lot and attaining Christian Community. Therefore, in Noyes’ rhetoric there was no 
discrepancy between the rationalities, but rather a “conjunction of faith and science” working 
together to bring forth a perfect human harmony: 
many things indicate to me that we are the body in which God designs to bring science and 
religion together and solder them into one…I should advise, therefore, that the spiritually 
minded look favorably towards science, and that the scientifics look favorably towards faith, 
and see if God will not bring the hearts of these long-separated classes together  
(Noyes, Auto 119)  
 
What was separated, for Noyes, is united in community—science becomes the “handmaid of 
faith” (Noyes, Auto 168). The findings of Darwin, Lyell, Tyndall and the Positivists were 
contributions to the faith, and to ignore them would be to neglect one’s Christian duties (Noyes, 
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in Parker, Yankee Saint 262). Christians must be scientists seeking to rationally improve their 
world, and bring social processes under the control of human reason. The Oneida Community 
was designed to be such a scientific experiment in Christian communism.  
To be truly scientific, Noyes argued, there must be complete logical consistency in the 
application of community principles to the social order. This meant any institution of modern 
society which fell short of the Christian ideal must be eliminated and replaced with rationally-
planned communist alternatives. Decisions about the social order must be scientifically directed 
so as to attain institutions which breed desirable human motives. Since perfect persons required 
perfect institutions, it was only through the scientific and rational design of the social order that 
true community could be reclaimed.  
In summary, I submit that Noyes’ accomplished the rhetorical bridging of science and 
faith from enemies to allies, uniting them around the ideal of perfect community—community 
was the Christian principle of ethical action, and scientific rationality was the indispensable 
means for attaining it. In a corrupt society, community was the transcendent spiritual value over 
the material organism, promising a purified individual morality and a utopic social relation. 
Noyes’ reconciliation of faith and science into a god-term of order and value enabled his 
second rhetorical move: that of reorienting the world away from the materialistic motives of 
economic man—which Noyes called “selfishness”—and toward the communist moral values of 
“Community.” That rhetorical endeavor is the subject of the following section.  
Reorienting Society toward Community 
 With a synthesis of scientific and religious rationalities, Noyes aimed to reorient 
American society away from the materialistic values of individualism and economic liberalism 
and toward those of “community.” For Noyes, the dominant orientation of modern society was 
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one of self-interestedness, where individuals were encouraged to seek their own benefit above 
the welfare of others. In contrast, Noyes sought a purified socially-directed morality of sacrifice 
and submission to others that lived up to the ordering spiritual principles of community. He 
therefore constructed a dichotomy between the two competing perspectives, which might be 
called “selfish” motives and “community” motives, with Noyes advocating the latter as the only 
ethical system of human action. If “community” was the god-term of John Noyes and the 
Oneida, then “selfishness” was the devil-term—a short-hand expression of repulsion representing 
the social evils to be set right through the adoption of community values. As he hoped to 
rhetorically refashion social values, the actions of community formed the realm of sanctioned 
motives, while those of selfishness were condemned as moral failures. 
 For Noyes, selfishness was the defining feature of the modern world, and represented an 
altar of increasing individualism or “fall” from communal grace. The selfish motives were 
entrenched not only in philosophy and rhetoric, but also in the institutions of industrial society, 
and these exerted a corrupting influence on human character. Therefore, his mission was one of 
contesting the moral failures of the modern world and purifying the social order by removing the 
sources of “selfishness” and replacing them motives in rational accordance with the ideals of 
Christian and scientific community. 
To understand Noyes’ life-work as rhetorician and architect of the Oneida, it is integral that 
this re-orientation through the stark opposition of “selfishness’ and “community” be expounded. 
Accordingly, in this section, I explore Noyes’ attempt to reorient society away from the 
materialistic values of individualistic liberalism and to those of community by constructing a 
dichotomy between “selfish” and “community” motives. In so doing, Noyes embraced a 
rationalist and communist conception of community that called for the material restructuring of 
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social life along communist principles and the inward mortification of selfishness to the 
sacrificial principles of community. I here work to illuminate the conflict of motives as they were 
constituted in Noyes’ dialectic, demonstrating how it formed a critique of industrial-capitalist 
values and advocated a communist conception of community as the only system in which real 
moral values could be secured. Because Noyes’ rhetoric started from rationalist presumptions, 
his exposition of selfish and community motives became his premises for evaluating, reorienting, 
and redesigning a superior individual morality and social order.  
The Selfish-Society Motive  
 The modern industrial world with which Noyes was concerned possessed an orientation 
that privileged individualism, economic growth, self-sufficiency, and private property. The 
corresponding value system it endorsed was one promoting action that bettered the lot of 
entrepreneurs, capitalists, and private individual citizens. Rather than foregrounding questions of 
social benefit and welfare, the orientation of enlightened self-interest supposed that in seeking 
the best for the self, the entire society would benefit. Yet for Noyes, this position was a farce, 
and what the philosophy of economic liberalism really amounted to was an endorsement of 
selfish motives that put individual interests above that of all citizens.  
For Noyes, “selfishness” was essentially the desire to possess, to be preeminent, to 
control exclusively. Selfishness was founded in the spirit of ownership or property, for both are 
motivated by a desire to possess and control something exclusively for one’s own gratification. 
To act selfishly is to emphasize I and mine to the neglect of we and ours. When acted upon, 
selfish motives incite individuals to gather and hoard possessions for their own exclusive use 
when they could be used to meet the genuine needs of others. It ignores the heavenly mandate to 
“love the brother as thyself,” and instead seeks to advance the interest of the individual. 
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Selfishness is the opposite of love, fellowship, and brotherhood, because it views others as 
objects of manipulation and control.  
The orientation of economic industrialism and the prevailing motives of modern 
“society,” for Noyes, were outgrowths of “selfishness” which had been institutionalized into the 
fabric of the social order. Private property was the most prominent example of such moral 
transgressions, but it was not the only social evil implicated by the devil-term. Specifically, 
Noyesian rhetoric identified four social manifestations of selfishness in violation of the perfect 
principles of community. They were private property, “special love,” love of preeminence, and 
isolation. Any action associated with such transgressions were cause for opprobrium and reproof. 
By reviewing each of these four evils, Noyes’ view of Society and the devil-term “selfishness” 
takes on a more concrete character, and we can begin to understand how “community” functions 
as the rhetorical corrective to modern moral failings. 
Private Property  
The first incarnation of selfishness was found in the dominion of private property and the 
spirit of ownership. Noyes connected the exclusiveness of property with self-aggrandizement, 
egoism, disregard for one’s fellows, and rejection of God’s authority. In the industrial world, he 
argued, economic relations discouraged empathy for the suffering while exacerbating the 
financial gap between rich and poor. Rather than looking out for the needs of others, private 
property encouraged individuals to hoard for their own gratification. For Noyes, the spirit of 
property refused to acknowledge God’s ultimate ownership of all earthly things, instead 
instructing the person to believe that they are the rightful owners with the authority to do 
whatever they want without consideration for the welfare of others. In this way, private property 
exerted a corrupting influence on an individual’s character, because it taught citizens to view all 
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things of the world, including other people, as objects to be possessed and dominated. The first 
mark of selfish motives was therefore the idea that a person ever had an exclusive right to the 
ownership of anything or anyone. In so far as society was organized around such an idea, it was 
operating on a plane of immorality.  
Special Love and Exclusion  
The second manifestation of selfishness in society was a phenomenon Noyes labeled 
“Special Love.” Noyes defined Special Love as the intimate and exclusive attachments which 
develop between two people, usually two romantic lovers or a parent and a child, that take on 
characteristics of the spirit of ownership. The problem with “special love” was that these 
individual attachments were by their nature exclusionary, meaning they prohibit a wider love of 
all humanity and bestow unwarranted privileges on the special lover. 
Since the partner in a special love relationship is treated with the same sense of 
possession characterizing private property, Noyes argued that these relationships do not exhibit 
genuine love at all, but become another avenue for the sinful love of self. For example, in 
Marriage, the partner—especially the women—is controlled as if she was owned by the husband. 
Noyes claimed that this made Marriage more akin to Slavery than to love. A parent’s jealous 
attachment to their biological children functions much the same way, as the child is viewed as 
the possession of the parent rather than as a free and equal being. The unreasonable preference 
for the advantage of one’s own child over the good of other children may appear altruistic, but it 
is really a way of puffing up the parent’s ego. Noyes thus decided that “Special Love,” as it had 
been institutionalized in marriage and parenting, inserted the property-motive into the family and 
inhibited the development of a more universal love. Truly ethical human relations required 
feelings of attachment that were not characterized by such possessive, self-serving interests.  
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Love of Preeminence and Inequality 
A third way selfishness gets expressed in society is through what Noyes’ called the “Love 
of Preeminence.” While property is accumulated through the selfish desire to possess and 
control, the love of preeminence is the kindred desire to be the greatest, best, or foremost 
amongst comrades. It could be found in those “monstrous swellings of egoism,” excited by 
“envy, jealousy, and strife,” that deny human equality and assert the superiority of the self 
(Circular July 19, 1869). For Noyes, this form of selfishness was primarily a spiritual problem 
exacerbated by the competitive nature of society (Circular, February 25, 1867). The lust for 
preeminence was nothing but self-adulation and elevation of personal interests above those of the 
Community and the common good. Love of preeminence, like private property, violated pure 
human motives because it was predicated upon human inequality. By desiring to attain acclaim, 
praise, and preeminence, individuals were showing themselves to be motivated not by altruism, 
but by the egoistic belief that they were superior to their fellows.  
Isolation and Division  
 Finally, the selfish motive found expression in the social inclination towards isolation 
and division. Noyes asserted that citizens were born with an obligation to serve their fellows, and 
that true freedom could only be found in the unity of human association. Nevertheless, the 
predominate tendency of society was to withdraw and separate the self from its obligations to its 
fellow citizens. For Noyes, such isolation was not only personally unfulfilling, but was a lazy 
and neglectful form of self-aggrandizement. Individuals who tried to withdraw from their social 
commitments abused the shallow “liberty of independence” and forfeited the superior “liberty of 
union” (in Parker, Yankee Saint 234). Such a person cries, “Hands off, leave me alone” and “I 
want to do as I please without interference” (in Parker, Yankee Saint 234). This attitude of 
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isolation, for Noyes, was clear evidence that a person is held captive by the selfish motive: 
“Isolation and opposition of thought and will, instead of being the appropriate results of divine 
illumination, are the surest proofs that the society in which they appear, as a whole or in part, is 
guided by self and the devil” (Berean). Isolation neglects the human obligations to one’s fellows 
inherent in ethical behavior. In this way, isolation was a form of selfish division that separated 
people who should be united in love.  
 Taken together, private property, special love, love of preeminence, and isolation might 
be understood as Society’s constitutive sins encapsulated by the Devil-term “Selfishness.” Such 
terms of the industrial orientation espoused values of exclusion, inequality, and division; they 
represented an undesirable and corrupted system of motives to be contested, eliminated, and 
purified by the perfect principles of community. In constructing the discourse of economic 
liberalism in such an unflattering way, Noyes aimed to reorient his auditors away from the 
materialistic motives of economic man and towards the transcendent community motives of 
sacrifice. In contrast to the corruption of society by the selfish-property motive, Noyes pointed to 
an alternative sacrificial ordering of values which could restore the proper moral relation 
between self and society. That alternative order was founded on community, which represented 
the state of Godliness, scientific progress, morality, and human perfection. 
The Community Motive 
 As Noyes addressed the essentially “selfish” values of industrial capitalism in the most 
rhetorically disparaging way possible, so his rhetoric cast community in the most redemptive 
fashion he could. Accepting community and its transformative powers meant constant vigilance 
against the inherent selfishness of modern life, and adopting a set of practices that countered and 
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nullify the selfish motive. Five key terms represented the moral and behavioral reorientation to 
the value of community and the social harmony and ethical being it promised the individual. 
 Keeping in mind the template of Christian practice at the base of Noyes’ program, one is 
reminded of Richard Weaver’s position that “the capacity to demand sacrifice” is the surest 
indicator of the “god-term” at work” (Ethics 214)  “Selfishness” becomes an “original sin” of 
sorts, in so far as its temptations and motivations are given to the modern individual, and insofar 
as these motives separate us from the ideal community and its redemptive power. Looking at 
Oneidan practice to vanquish this core motive, and to conform to the idea, one can see that the 
individual is called upon to be in a state of perpetual self-sacrifice on behalf of the community 
idea. I call this the “community motive,” and while the Oneidan practice is extreme, we can find 
variations on this sacrificial motive in other kinds and degrees as regards the god-term 
community in contemporary society. 
 This state of perpetual self-sacrifice, a symbolic slaying of the “selfish motive” within 
oneself, is precisely what Kenneth Burke calls “mortification” in his analysis of The Rhetoric of 
Religion (188). It is not so much that one purges oneself of bad motives and emerges purified, 
but that social order depends on one’s perpetual state of “mortifying” or encountering barriers 
that one “seeks not to cross.” In this way, as Weaver styled it, our lives and practices are a 
constant reminder of the value and redemptive power of the god-term, community. Through 
active, and constant, participation in its making, this ideal is asserted and kept at the forefront of 
our motivations. We move toward the ideal, as it were, but never really hope to achieve it 
entirely, as this pursuit itself perpetuates the value and the practices that embody it and orient us 
toward “perfection” of the communal motive.  
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 In the case of each of Noyes’ five moral aspirations of the ideal community, we find the 
individuals suspended in this state of perpetual mortification or sacrifice. To endorse community 
meant to reject the dominant values and institutions of the modern world and embrace an other-
oriented motive composed of unity, love, family, improvement, and communism. These five 
terms represented the moral aspirations of Noyes’ reorientation toward community, that, if 
followed, promised to attain a more favorable social pact of human harmony, characterized by 
ethical action and social relations.  
Unity (as Consensus) 
 The first value endorsed by community was that of unity, which was a corrective to the 
industrial tendencies toward isolation and division. To be united, for Noyes, meant to be 
likeminded, sharing in belief, doctrine, and purpose. He called for his followers to live as a 
singular whole, acting in concert because every branch of the doctrine of holiness 
[perfectionism] tends to unity” (Berean 461). The kind of unity Noyes had in mind was totalizing 
and doctrinaire, because it was founded on a consensus of Faith that allowed the religious body 
to subsume all other loyalties. Like much of his perfectionist program, Noyes’ vision of unity 
took the Kingdom of God as its model. He writes: 
when that kingdom comes, a principle of unity will appear which will draw them all into one 
organization, or sweep them away with the besom of destruction…It is eminently ridiculous 
to suppose that the kingdom of God will be composed of a multitude of denominations, 
differing in doctrine, and antagonistical in action (Berean 443; 445) 
 
In the perfect community, the division of the world would come to an end. All persons will be 
cleaved together in word and spirit, pledged in one encompassing association. For this reason, 
Noyes pleaded with citizens to strive for a complete unity of agreement, one that pushed all 
partial loyalties to the wayside and overcame division by flattening ideological difference into a 
common mission. That is, in unity, Noyes was advocating the value of complete consensus.  
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The consensus he envisioned was not of a coercive nature, but one internally compelled 
by participation in a common faith. Noyes believed Christianity naturally inclined believers 
toward a unity of heart and mind, so that “faith” and “unity” were essentially synonymous. The 
act of Faith, Noyes explains, is “an act of union. It joins the life of the believer to the life of 
Christ. It draws a man out of his individuality, and merges self in fellowship with another. It is 
directly opposed to isolation” (Berean 461). Faith, as a natural unifier, brings the individual out 
of isolation, blending with others and God. It was through faith that the many could become one, 
learning to speak with a singular voice. In Noyesian rhetoric, therefore, the Community principle 
of unity beckoned citizens to rise above the doctrinal division of society and strive for consensus 
in all matters. Whenever there was an instance of division or unity, ethical action always fell on 
the side of the latter.  
Love (as Holiness) 
 A second value endorsed in the reorientation toward community was love. For Noyes, the 
world was run on a motive of self-love, but community motives operated on a higher plane of 
love—love not of the self, but of God and his people. Like unity, love calls for bringing together 
a separated people through spiritual harmony. Love of this sort comes through holiness, the 
ability to identify and care for one another as the self.  
When a person has been made holy, they are necessarily brought into union with God and 
his people. This is the holiness “love-principle.” Noyes explains: 
the love-principle of holiness looks, not merely toward God, but toward men. It is the 
love of God shed abroad in the heart; and as God loves men, so whoever has God’s love 
in his heart, loves men. Holiness, then, is an attracting, harmonizing principle. Its 
tendency is to make all who possess it, one in heart; and unity of heart is the earnest of 
unity of mind and action. Persons who are in love with each other, easily learn to think 
alike (Berean 461-462) 
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The holiness love-principle builds upon the mandate for unity, and in fact provides the means of 
attaining it. Holiness serves as a natural attractor and harmonizer that brings persons to love 
each other and “think alike.” It functions as through a common love object, whereby the mutual 
love of a “higher being” breeds love for the entire body, and this results in harmony and unity, 
understood as ideological consensus.  
By describing love in this way, Noyes was asserting a normative claim about the kinds of 
relations that should predominate among citizens. Universal agreement is the ideal of any 
community, and to attain such consensus, there must be active participation in communal 
decision making through a deliberative body where members can converse and arrive at 
agreement. Because love and holiness abounds in true community, the achievement of 
consensus, he supposes, should not be difficult. For this reason, dissent must taken as a moral 
failure, a sign of division and a symptom of selfishness. Disagreement indicates a transgression 
on behalf of the dissident who has not yet come to think as the body does. They must, by 
definition, be lacking in holiness. But, community, motivated by true love, attains “the intimate 
union, mutual assistance and subordination, of the members of Christ” (Berean 463). By 
equating love and unity with ideological consensus, Noyes’ rhetoric indicated that any 
expression of dissent was subject to condemnation as an exhibition of selfish motives on behalf 
of the dissatisfied party. Community Motives implicitly sanctioned conformity, and called on 
citizens to forsake their own preferences in the name of communal accord.    
Family (as Intimacy, Obligation, and Equality)  
 Upon this base of unity and love displayed through consensus, Community Motives 
enlisted also the values of family. The image of family, as an intimately pledged unit dedicated to 
mutual care and assistance, provided an apt analogy of the kind of social relationships Noyes 
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associated with Community values. As a source of inspiration for Community motives, the 
family analogy drew attention to a kind of enduring human relationships where individuals feel a 
sense of obligation and compassion to care for one another. That is, ethical social relationships 
should belong to the same category of familial commitments. Noyes, however, was critical of the 
family as it had come to be enacted in society, and he argued that community motives invoke an 
alternative vision of the familial ideal. He aimed to achieve an understanding of family that 
tapped into the reservoir of familial affections but was free from the jealousy, exclusiveness, and 
property-orientation of monogamous marriage. A community vision of family instead 
emphasized the freedom of every member, with all sharing everything in common, but none 
possessing another as their own.  
 For Noyes, community implied not only the intimate obligations of family, but those of a 
family of equals. All citizens in a community should be on an equal plane, holding an equal say 
and possessing and equal share of resources. To be in the realm of Community Motives meant to 
break down class, power, gender, and economic distinctions in favor of an acceptance of the 
mutual standing of all persons. Any violation of the principle of equality was likely to be a moral 
failure that involved some encroaching of human selfishness.  
Improvement (as Progress, Submission, and Purification) 
Along with unity, love, and family, community values involved the constant pursuit of 
improvement—so much so that he called improvement the “animating principle” of community. 
Improvement, like progress, entailed the constant pursuit of betterment on both the individual 
and collective level, and as a source of motives, it encouraged the submission of the individual 
will to the interests of the greater good. Improvement was a future-oriented, sacrificial ethic that 
sought to make the individual better suited for life in a larger body. 
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 On the individual level, improvement represented the constant drive to purify the person 
of the vestiges of selfishness, to in every area make the self a better instrument of community. It 
meant challenging complacency and habit, and working toward becoming a well-rounded holy 
person attuned to the interests of others. And above all, improvement meant submitting to the 
demands and needs of the body, seeking consensus and conformity with the collective will, even 
if it temporary inconvenienced one’s personal preferences, mortifying the self by dying to 
selfishness and being redeemed through the internalization of community motives.  
 On the collective level, community endorsed improvement as the purification of society 
through constant experimentation and planning to make the world a more harmonious, just, and 
united place. To operate in the realm of Community Motives meant to labor and sacrifice with 
optimism to usher in a perfect social order of complete communism. Any policy that promised to 
better, improve, or progress the prospects of communism was given approval and 
commendation, even if it required major restructuring or disruption of inherited ways of being.  
Communism (as Selflessness and Sharing) 
 The final moral aspiration implied by appeals to community motives was that of 
communism. For Noyes, private property and ownership were the cornerstones of the industrial 
orientation and the clearest social manifestations of the selfish motive. In order to attain true 
community, the selfishness of property must be replaced with the selflessness and sharing of 
communism. His was not an ordinary communism founded on class warfare or economic 
injustice in the Marxist sense. Rather, Noyes specified that community itself was the 
organizational principle for devising a scheme of shared property ownership: “the Oneida 
Association cannot properly be said to stand on any ordinary platform of communism. Their 
doctrine is that of Community” (Bible Communism 10-12). Communism was embraced by 
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Noyes only because he saw it as the natural, rational extension of Christian Community and 
Scientific principles when applied to the social domain. In contrast to the prevailing perspective, 
to be a moral individual meant to contest “vulgar” capitalism and embrace an ethical economic 
social order free from exclusive possessions and run on a principle of joint-communal 
ownership. Community required motives of selflessness and sharing, where persons voluntarily 
gave what they had for the good of all.  
When taken in sum, Noyes constructed community as a series of sacrificial, other-
oriented principles in direct contrast to the selfish motive. Community entailed acting in 
accordance with communism, unity, family, singularity, equality, improvement, fellowship, 
holiness, faith, obligation, sharing, selflessness and love. The crux of Community Motives was 
the voluntary submission of the individual to the collective interest, a kind of mortification, 
symbolic slaying or dying of the self so that the community may live. Ethical action was a 
sacrifice that redeemed the individual and the world from self-interested transgressions. The 
selfish motive of society, meanwhile acted upon private property, ownership, exclusion, egoism, 
inequality, isolation, division, and self-love. The opposition of these two moralities formed the 
crux of Noyes’ political, social, and rhetorical program; the dualism was his method of 
criticizing industrial society, and offering an alternative image of human relationships founded in 
the synthesis of Christian virtues and scientific progress. To act with the approval of community 
meant to reach the pinnacle of behavior, to conquer the self and be purified of sinfulness and 
ownership by submitting the collective interests. 
In establishing this dialectic, Noyes aimed to rhetorically re-orient the world away from 
the materialistic motives of industrialism and economic liberalism and towards the spiritual, 
transcendent motives of community.  
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By so doing, Noyes articulated a series of first principles and moral aspirations from 
which to begin rationally rethinking the social institutions which did not bring forth ideal human 
experience. That is, Noyes embraced a communist conception of community which demanded 
the restructuring of social life. Community provided a template or guide from which to remake 
society and discover the proper relation between the self and society.   
The Communalization of Social Life  
 Having constructed a dualism between selfishness and community, Noyes’ final 
rhetorical move was to appeal to a shared platform of social change that rearranged social 
conditions so that community motives could attained. It was Noyes’ conviction that for a person 
to live by a particular morality, the institutions of society needed to reflect that morality. True 
values could only be secured in a social order rationally designed to attain them, where the 
systems and arrangements pushed citizens along the path of moral action. The program of social 
change Noyes endorsed, therefore, was one of “communalization.” Accordingly, in this section, I 
illustrate how Noyes employed “community” to provide a shared platform of social change 
whereby social institutions were “communalized” or reorganized to live up to the communal 
ideal. By rationally reconstructing social institutions, Noyes aimed to discipline and eradicate the 
material motives of self-interest and replace them with purified community motives.  
In founding the Oneida settlement with a small group of like-minded persons, Noyes 
assumed the role of rational architect, designing a social order free from selfishness and 
predicated on the doctrine of community. In that effort, he identified five primary institutional 
domains needing purification through communalization: property, labor, marriage, parenting, 
and reproduction. We are not so much interested in the institutions, but their justification for 
revealing the role of the god-term community in providing order through rational application. To 
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examine that effort, I analyze Noyes’ specific institutional policies and the community principles 
that justified them in light of his dualism of motives. 
The Communalization of Property  
The first method by which Noyes “communalized” the Oneida was through instituting a 
complete communism of property. A society predicated on community, he argued, must abolish 
private property and establish a system of shared possessions with a common purse. For Noyes, 
the “vulgar” capitalism of society was inimical to the values of community for two reasons. First, 
it was irrational and unscientific because it distributed resources randomly, without recourse to 
the ideal of community or standards of fairness and need (Bible Communism 10). Capitalism 
rewarded the strong at the expense of the weak, denying the poor an adequate living and morally 
corrupting the rich in their acquisition of their wealth. For Noyes, free markets violated the 
Christian sensibilities of justice and ignored the ever increasing-power of human rationality.  
Second, capitalism and private property were inimical to community because they 
perpetuated the false assumption of individual ownership. For Noyes, God was the only true 
owner of possessions, so that “man can never in reality have absolute and exclusive ownership of 
lands, goods, or even of himself, or his productions, but only subordinate, joint-ownership with 
God” (Bible Communism 11). By claiming to be an exclusive owner of any object, the individual 
set the self in the place of God and above one’s fellows. In both cases, private property corrupted 
human morality and bred selfish motives that sought the good of the individual while ignoring oo 
harming the plight of others.  
Since no person should be an exclusive owner, Noyes advocated the Oneida embrace a 
communalized policy of “joint-ownership” in concordance with the metaphor of family and the 
model of the early Church at Pentecost where “all valuables, whether persons or things, are 
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family property; and that all the labors of the family are directed, judged and rewarded in the 
distribution of enjoyments” (Bible Communism 10-12). In specifically reconstructing the 
institution of property to live up to the communal ideal, Noyes designed a system for the Oneida 
where, upon entering the community, all incoming members were required to submit their 
possessions to collective ownership, where it was overseen by a small group of community 
elders. There would be, strictly speaking, no exclusive possessions for any individual. Instead, all 
was owned by the community as a whole, and they would decide together, with one voice, how 
to spend, invest, or expend the resources. This meant in practice that individuals were 
subordinated to communal discretion, but in turn individuals had all their needs met and were 
entitled to the same resources as every other member.  
In sum, the rational application of principals led Noyes to uproot the institution of private 
property and replace it with a system of communal ownership. The hope was that by taking away 
the possessive-ownership element of society, he could mold human behavior in accordance with 
virtues of sharing, equality, love, and submission. This remedy for ousting the “selfish” motive 
was simple enough, but it did not resolve all aspects of the economic problem. The fact was that 
even in the absence of individual property, the community required a system of labor also needed 
to be communized if the whole economic problem was to be resolved. 
The Communalization of Labor 
Even as communists against the exclusiveness of private property, Noyes and the Oneida 
had a genuine appreciate for the benefits of labor and free trade. In fact, their embrace of the 
Yankee spirit of pragmatism and economic inventiveness was one reason the settlement 
flourished for over three decades. In his discourse about the work and community, Noyes 
portrayed labor as a natural aspect of human life which bettered the moral lives of individuals 
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and united persons together in a common cause. Yet, he lamented, with the lonely, liminal, and 
fragmented state of workers in society, labor had been robbed of its natural enjoyment and turned 
into a source of misery. Only through the application of policies of community could labor be 
restored to its edifying functions. In surveying the possibility of a communalized labor force, 
Noyes developed three policies: it should be done voluntarily on behalf of the common good, it 
should involve the rotation of occupations, and it should enable the comradery of the sexes.  
The first principle of communalized labor was that it should be done voluntarily out of a 
pure heart with good will toward the family. All members of the community were expected to 
work and contribute, but none were to be forced into it. Noyes argued that since the communism 
of property eliminated precarity from the laboring process, citizens were free to work out of the 
positive motivation to improve the self and contribute to the good of the whole: 
They [Community members] must find a good power they can yield themselves to, and 
instead of working for themselves, go to work for somebody else…. Persons cannot join 
the Community until they see it in such a light that they can give themselves to it wholly, 
and say: ‘Here I am person and property, and you can do just what you choose with me. 
If I can serve the interests of the truth better standing outside, I am content to do so. I 
have such entire confidence in the Community that I can put all my interests into its 
hands and go to work for it.’ That would be what I should call joining the Community. 
And by such a course a person would get out of selfishness (Daily Journal) 
 
Labor, in this projection, becomes a sacrificial, submissive motive by which the individual 
overcomes their selfishness by serving the greater cause of their fellows. The community takes 
priority over the individual, and the individual finds their place and purified morality by 
submitting to common good.  
This ties into second aspect of a communalized labor order: the rotation of occupations. 
In addition to the domestic responsibilities required to maintain the settlement, the Oneida 
housed a number of industries that created a wide variety of jobs in need of different kinds of 
skills and expertise. Rather than develop stationary experts, Noyes suggested the frequent 
 100 
rotation of jobs and responsibilities among the citizenry because it preserved the freshness of 
work and it enabled each person to feel invested in all aspects of community life. In this way, 
communalized labor promised to overcome selfishness by working altruistically for the good of 
the whole, while allowing persons to gain new skills and expanded their moral imagination.  
 Finally, alongside volunteerism and occupational rotation, Noyes endeavored to 
communalize labor through the co-laboring of the sexes. Community women were not 
designated to domestic duties or exempted from particular jobs. Rather, the principle of 
community, Noyes argued, meant “the equality of the sexes,” and therefore women should be 
given full opportunity to participate in every part of Oneida business life. With men and women 
laboring side by side, the selfishness of division would give way to the unity of all persons. 
 Through volunteerism, occupational rotation, and comradery of the sexes, Noyes 
rationally reorganized labor to uproot selfishness and establish Community Motives whereby 
persons worked together in unity for the good of the whole. However, in order to completely 
eliminate the selfish motive, communism in the economic realm needed to be match by 
communism in the relational realm. The principles of Community should be rationally extended 
to every aspect of social life in the association, including the romantic and familial relations.  
The Communalization of Marriage  
 The third area of social life to be disciplined and remade according to the transcendent 
template of community was traditional marriage. While marriage had become a pillar of Western 
society, in the ideal state of human relationships it would be abolished. Marriage, for Noyes, was 
founded in private property and exclusion, and therefore fueled selfish motives while violating 
the community principles of freedom, equality, and sharing: 
It is plain that the fundamental principle of monogamy and polygamy is the same; to 
with, the ownership of woman by man. The monogamist claims one woman as his wife—
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the polygamists, two or a dozen; but the essential thing, the bond of relationship 
constituting marriage, in both cases is the same, namely, a claim of ownership  
(Bible Communism 84) 
 
For Noyes, marriage was essentially a form of slavery. Women were taken as property and 
treated as little more than “propagative drudges,” while “men refuse to look upon women as 
equals, and refuse to regard their feelings and impressions” (Circular, Jan. 29, 1866). Noyes 
proclaimed that the violation of women’s freedom and equality was incompatible with the values 
of community, and therefore, “marriage must give way to communism” (Bible Communism 27). 
That is, the marriage institution needed to be replaced with a communalized alternative that lived 
up to the ideals of community and enabled the equality of women. 
In response, Noyes’ endorsed a redesigned institution he called “Complex Marriage.” In 
Complex Marriage, every member was considered “wedded” to ever other member; all members 
were considered to be one family, literally married and free to enjoy legitimate sexual 
relationships with any other person under the marriage covenant (with certain rules and 
regulations). This alternative arrangement, Noyes argued, rendered jealousy and exclusiveness 
moot because there were no strictures that prevented any person from engaging with any other. 
Marriage, as shared among all members, was void of the property relation: men and women all 
belonged to each other in a state of freedom, equality, and unity.  
For Noyes, the communization of marriage, even more so than the communization of 
property and labor, was the glue holding the Oneida together, because it was the best “furnisher 
of motives” that “opens the way for Association” along the communal ideal (Bible Communism 
57). As the complete sharing of the marriage covenant and the sexual relation stood in the face of 
jealousy and possessiveness, it taught the members to accept, even embrace, the sharing of loved 
ones with others. If communized marriage could break the fierce possessiveness of romance, 
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then it could break all forms of envy, ownership, and selfishness from the association. Sex 
therefore became the purveyor of motives bringing a person out of selfishness and into a love of 
others.  
The effort to communize love and sex was so important that Noyes adamantly opposed 
any exception for those still desiring a traditional marriage. Even just one exclusive relationship 
could keep alive the selfish motive and undue the entire community project. He explains:  
Love, in the exclusive form, has jealousy for its complement; and jealousy brings on 
strife and division. Association, therefore, if it retains one-love exclusiveness, contains 
the seeds of dissolution; and those seeds will be hastened to their harvest by the warmth 
of associative life (Bible Communism 58) 
 
For Noyes, just as communized marriage furnishes the motives of unity, so exclusive marriage 
spreads the seeds of division. A breach in principles opens the way for the dissolution of 
Community, making it imperative that the communalization of love be totalized. Noyes’ 
rationalism could tolerate no inconsistency in application of communist principles.  
 Complex Marriage, in sum, was Noyes’ rationalist program from uprooting an institution 
rooted in selfishness and replacing it with one founded in then genuine freedom and equality of 
community. As a shared platform of social change aiming to cultivate communal mores and 
motives, the communalization of marriage should also be extended to parenting.  
Communization of Children  
             A fourth domain in need of communalization was that of child-rearing and parenting. 
Perhaps even more than in romantic relationships, the exclusive “special love” between parents 
and children was the most difficult manifestation of selfishness to uproot, with efforts to prohibit 
it often leading to resentment. For as in exclusive marriage, the child-parent bond was essentially 
a form of property, where the “love” of the child was really but a form of egoistic self-love. This 
familial ‘representation’ of love undermined the universal and equal love necessitated by 
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community, and therefore the children must to be communalized, even if it was responsible for 
“one of the hardest knots of discord” (Circular, November 5, 1863). 
Noyes espoused the view that “the child is best brought up in an open Community 
element, and not in a closed circle of family relatives” (Circular, January 29, 1863). The familial 
circle was too closed, exclusive, and property-laden to permit moral growth along the principles 
of communism. Rather, it was better that no children “belonged” to any set of parents, and were 
raised as if all Community elders were their parents. Conversely, it was the responsibility of 
Community members to raise all the children together as like one extended family. The hope was 
that the hearts of citizens would be drawn to all children equally, a universal love without the 
hierarchy of exclusive attachments or irrational preferences. 
To achieve this goal, Noyes implemented a policy of communal nursery where children 
of roughly the same age were placed under the supervision of a set of appointed guardians tasked 
with tending to the children. Members of a child’s cohort were educated in the principles of 
community and liberal learning appropriate for their age. It was decided that children would 
know who their parents were, and parents were encouraged to develop warm relationships with 
their kin; however, this relationship was not permitted to become a source of exclusiveness or 
jealousy. To ensure this, primary responsibility for childcare fell on the Community Guardians. 
Simultaneously, parents were highly encouraged to invest in the lives of children who were not 
their biological heirs, because caring for other children “communizes the hearts” of the involved 
parties (Circular, August 6, 1866). That is, by taking a responsibility for and interest in other 
Community children, Noyes believed the exclusive attachment between parent and kin could be 
severed for a more inclusive love, extending the sense of service and loyalty to its completion.  
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Alongside the physical institution of a communal nursery, Noyes’ efforts toward the 
communization of children were taken into the symbolic realm as well. One such idea was a 
ceremony for the naming of children meant to acknowledge the submission of the parents to the 
supremacy of communal guidance: 
We had a christening at the meeting last night. A baby was named—that is, the name 
selected by the parents was submitted to the appropriation of the Community. When a 
new baby comes, we have this little form of acknowledgment of Community 
ownership—the name is offered for general acceptance; or for objection, if such there 
should be one (Circular, August 7, 1865) 
 
By requiring the approval of names by the entire Community, Noyes prioritized the Association 
over individual attachments, so that parents may be refined from their “selfish” affections 
through submission to the will of the whole. Sacrifice to the general will was the pinnacle of 
community morals, the most praiseworthy of all human actions. If parents could submit their 
authority over children to the judgment whole body, even to the point of naming, then the 
purification of hearts was well on its way to achieving the perfect state of human morality. That 
sacrifice reached its highest demands with Noyes’ final effort remake society through the 
communalization of human reproduction. 
The Communalization of Reproduction  
 For a true transformation of society into a community, Noyes believed communalization 
must be radically extended to the realm of reproduction, which he aimed to remake through Male 
Continence and Stirpiculture. With the communalization of marriage, Noyes portrayed sex as an 
integral part of Community life, to be enjoyed freely and without shame. That being said, free 
love came with responsibilities toward the Community and the partner. On this account, Noyes 
held sex liable to oversight and regulation to guarantee the principles of community were not 
violated. The most important of these was the practice of Male Continence.  
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Male Continence 
If free sexual communion was the ultimate furnisher of Community Motives, it would 
have been impossible without a system of self-control that respected all members while 
preventing disease and pregnancy. Male Continence was such a system. In attempting to 
preserve the “social” and “unifying” elements of sex while avoiding its “expensive” 
consequences, Noyes distinguished between the “amative” and “propagative” functions of 
intercourse (Male Continence). The “amative function” was the true purpose of sex, he argued, 
because as “an act of communion” it increased the affective bonds between persons. The amative 
elements of sex were an act of “social magnetism,” useful for tightening the Community (Bible 
Communism 47). Meanwhile, the “propagative function,” involving the discharge of semen, was 
the “expensive” department. Rather than the climax of the sexual act, the propagative discharge 
“is really the sequel and termination of it” (Bible Communism 47). In essence, Noyes’ principle 
of Male Continence was that the amative and unifying functions of sex should be freely enjoyed 
within the Community, but that men should refrain from the propagative discharge.  
 For Noyes, Male Continence employed rational and scientific means to achieve the 
religious principles of community as a sexual impetus toward moral behavior. By preventing 
pregnancy and disease, Male Continence embraced a “scientific” method for achieving the unity, 
love, and intimacy of the non-exclusive sexual relation. It enabled Complex Marriage to function 
in the real world, so that communalization of love was more than just a moral ideal, but an 
achievable reality in human affairs; and on this account, Male Continence guaranteed that selfish 
impulses would not invade the Community.  
 Along this line, Male Continence, as a policy that required men refrain from the 
propagative discharge, also allowed women to reclaim their place as equal and free members of 
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the Community. Without a method for controlling pregnancy, women would be exposed to even 
greater injustices in Complex Marriage, and make a mockery of the supposed superior morality 
of community. But through Male Continence, Noyes asserted, women could be free regain their 
autonomy as equals of men.  
 The principle of communal equality when extended into sexual communion also meant 
that women were to be free to reject the advances of any and every member for any reason 
whatsoever, and were never to bear children for any reason besides their own conscious decision 
(though this principle became murkier during Noyes’ “Stirpiculture” eugenics experiment). Male 
Continence, Noyes boasted, was the only system which could make this ideal a reality: 
It is certainly to the credit of Bible Communism that it guarantees a woman the 
possession of her own person; that it holds that it is her undoubted right to choose when 
and how often she shall bear children. This right is inviolable in the Community, and it is 
only upon the freest consultation that children are begotten (Circular, August 12, 1872) 
 
The right to belong to the self and not be owned by another—to enjoy individual freedom within 
unity—was a sacrosanct right of women as Community members. When women were given the 
same rights and privileges of men, the communion of all members would be elevated to its 
highest limits. Yet, Noyes conversely preached that the needs and dictates of the Community 
trumped that will of any one individual, including in matters of reproduction. Because of the 
communalization of children, parents must sacrifice their preferences for the good of the whole. 
And Noyes’ most radical belief was that the purification of society by community values 
required improvement of the human condition through eugenics.  
Stirpiculture 
Noyes touted the community’s practice of “Male Continence” as a scientific discovery 
destined to revolutionize human sexuality and make rationally planned propagation a possibility, 
and added to the communization of children, he believed that for the first time, scientific 
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breeding could be executed so as to “improve” the human race toward a state of perfection never 
yet realized. Accordingly, the Oneida began an experiment with eugenics called “Stirpiculture.”  
For centuries, Noyes argued, humans had made use of their intelligence to advance the 
“inferior” races of animals by mating the best of the species, yet in human affairs, “man leaves 
the infinitely higher question of his own propagation to the control of chance, ignorance, and 
blind passion” (Circular, March 27, 1865). Noyes was dismayed that the very “place where 
science should rule most of all is ruled by the least science…Yet human breeding should be one 
of the foremost questions of the age” (Circular March 27, 1865). Reproduction and the 
advancement of human race was left to blind human passion instead of human reason. Noyes 
believed such randomness was wrong and stupid, for it was the responsibility of the Community 
to bring science to bare on a matter as critical as the perpetuation of the human race. The 
spiritual mandate guiding the Oneida’s formation—to improve, purify, and remake society upon 
the perfect basis of community—found its culminating moment in Stirpiculture. Noyes argued 
that rationally planned eugenics, in supplement to the creation of communist institutions, could 
usher in an era of human perfection, a communist utopia populated with advanced intellectual 
and moral creatures. Darwinian science could be used to make the ideals of Christianity a social 
reality by selecting persons with dispositions amenable to community values for reproduction. 
To conduct his experiment, Noyes had forty-three Community women sign the following 
contract pledging their loyalty to the principles of Scientific breeding with the oversight of 
Community members:  
1. That we do not belong to ourselves in any respect, but that we do belong first to God, 
and second to Mr. Noyes as God’s true representative. 
2. That we have no rights or personal feelings in regard to child-bearing which shall in 
the least degree oppose or embarrass him in his choice of scientific combinations. 
3. That we will put aside all envy, childishness and self-seeking, and rejoice with those 
who are chosen candidates; that we will, if necessary, become martyrs to science, and 
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cheerfully resign all desire to become mothers, if for any reason Mr. Noyes deem us unfit 
material for propagation. Above all, we offer ourselves as ‘living sacrifices’ to God and 
true Communism (Noyes, Reprinted in Parker, A Yankee Saint 257) 
 
The Community men likewise signed a similar contract confessing obedience to cause of 
Stirpiculture. Stirpiculture meant acting in deference to the Communal ideals of the Christian 
faith attained through scientific means. For Noyes, the pledge was the definitive statement of 
submission, the hallmark moral achievement of a people operating under the plane of 
Community Motives. While the Community was the only place of true freedom, that freedom 
was never to do as one pleases; it was the freedom of association, where one voluntary sought 
the good of the whole, and in the case of Stirpiculture, the progress of the human race. Moral 
self-actualization was the conquering of selfishness through purified motives of sacrifice on 
behalf of the Community. Therefore, the Stirpiculture contract, by announcing the lack of self-
ownership, the willingness to become martyrs to scientific progress, and the refusal to revert to 
envy if the will to became parents was not granted, was a statement of Noyes’ communist 
morality par excellence, for it was the complete submission of individual preference to the idea 
of community itself. It was the final step in fully communalizing social life.  
A Communalist Conception of Community  
Stirpiculture represented the same rationalist-rhetorical presumptions underlying Noyes’ 
entire system of communalization—property, labor, marriage, and parenting. In each instance, 
the dichotomy of Selfish and Community Motives provided a criterion by which to criticize and 
recreate the social world so that ethical human relationships and behavior could flourish. When 
taken in sum, the program of communalization was the culmination of Noyes’ entire rhetoric of 
community—after bridging faith and science from a division into a unity and reorienting society 
away from materialistic values and toward the transcendent values of community, his 
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penultimate move was to rationally apply that value system through a platform of social change 
where sacrifice to community was the guiding template for communalizing the institutions of the 
social order. Utopic communism or communalism, was a rationalist attempt to purify the world 
through consistent adherence to the template of community, creating corresponding institutions 
that would breed humans with moral motives. Each institution was designed so as to make the 
ethic of self-sacrifice for the collective good a more attainable social reality, a material order 
reflecting spiritual virtues.  
In the end, what Noyes articulated and endorsed amounted to a “communist” conception 
of community as an abstraction or set of guiding principles to be rationally applied to the social 
order. His conception of community focuses on institutions as the purveyors of motives, 
attributing harmony be the natural state of human affairs that has been lost to corrupt systems. It 
therefore seeks to remove unethical institutions and replace them with alternatives in rational 
accordance with community virtues. Such a conception of community is utopic, and essentially 
religious, for it seeks the purification of human motives as its end, contending that such radical 
reconstruction can attain a near perfect state of human relations because institutions determine 
behavior. Accordingly, community seeks to correct individualistic and economic assumptions by 
replacing them with a morality that takes sacrifice and submission to the collective good as the 
ultimate aim. Community was the ideal to be striven for and the mandate that society be held 
accountable for living up to it.  
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter we have seen that John Humphrey Noyes reconciled the values 
of religion and science through the ideal of community, founding the Oneida to redeem the world 
from the “selfishness” of the economic orientation by way of rhetorical reorientation. Noyes’ 
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rhetorical program involved three essential moves: first, the reconciliation of faith and science 
through the idea of community, where community supplied the spiritual and transcendent values 
over the material social order; second, the reorientation away from the values of industrialism 
and toward those of community through the creation of a dichotomy between Selfish and 
Community Motives, whereby ethical action was based upon the sacrificial principle; and third, a 
platform of social change to “communalize” the social order by rationally applying the principles 
of community to construct moral institutions. 
As a term of theology and political theory, community brought the Enlightenment’s 
scientific advances and the Second Great Awakening’s ethic of Christian communion together 
into an agenda where faith and science were allies in a great cause of moral purification. Noyes’ 
transformed their antagonism of orientation into a mutually collaborative enterprise, where 
community represented the ethical pronouncements of faith and rationalism provided the means 
for attaining it. For whatever their rivalry in social discourse, Noyes overcame their division by 
endorsing a common utopic future where the remnants of human selfishness gave way to a world 
of harmony and justice. Community thereafter supplied a transcendent or “spiritual” value to rein 
over the material order, and this value was essentially an endorsement of redemption through 
sacrifice and submission to the needs of others.  
There are three general lines of conclusion which can be drawn from the Oneida case: in 
it one may see evidence of the religious history and use of community and the extent to which 
that history influences our sense and value of community; the communalist idealization of 
community as a particular case of the rhetorical and social uses of community as the expression 
and healing of self-social relations; and the rhetorical functions of community as a god-term. 
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 The first set of conclusions concern the general character of the religious history and 
reliance on community. The Biblical or Christian ideal of community, as captured by Noyes in 
his particular historical moment of nineteenth century America, represents a moral aspiration to 
be pursued by society and internalized by the individual. The crux of Christian community is a 
morality of individual submission and sacrifice on behalf of the collective good. “Community” 
represents the attempt to supplant exclusion and self-interestedness with an other-oriented ethic 
of care, sharing, and obligation. It was this sacrificial mentality, characterized by a sense of 
responsibility and concern for the welfare of the whole, that constituted the moral end of Noyes’ 
Christian program, and should be taken as the heart of the religious sense of community.  
While Noyes’ radical “perfectionist” version of the Christian faith is certainly outside the 
American religious mainstream, his rhetoric serves as a particularly apt illustration of the 
purifying and redemptive functions of “community” in religious discourse. The Christian 
tradition, in specific, is especially concerned with the ideal configuration of the individual and 
social ethical orders, and therefore takes a suggestive interest in community’s relation to guilt, 
redemption, and the purification of motives.  
“Purification”, as Kenneth Burke explains, is the symbolic process whereby we purge 
ourselves of guilt that originates in the nature of language itself (Rhetoric of Religion). In 
creating a discrepancy between the “perfection” of our symbols and the imperfection of human 
action, language elicits a sense of failure or “guilt” in need of redemption. Burke offers that this 
sense of guilt and responsibility/motivation for repair is not a “natural” response to transgression, 
but is part of a cycle or sequence of linguistic and social training set forth in religious symbolism 
“in the very authorship of [people’s] motives” (Rhetoric of Religion v). When such guilt is felt 
by the signaling of social attrition, there are two strategies available for its mitigation: 
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“mortification,” or the internalization of blame, and “victimage,” or “scapegoating,” the 
externalization of blame.  
 As evidenced by Noyes’ rhetoric, the gap between the disorder of the selfish motive and 
the Christian “law” of sacrificial morality created a sense of guilt to be purified at the altar of 
community. As with the larger program of Christian religion, this sense of error is socialized in 
the abstract social contract of this community, and reinforced verbally, symbolically, and 
behaviorally in daily practice. “Selfishness” represented a kind of “original sin” or a “fall” from 
communal grace to be righted by a behavioral and moral reorientation. While Noyes’ 
“communist” inclinations used “victimage” to attribute the blame on the institutions of “society,” 
his religious inclinations focused on individual redemption by “mortification,” demanding that 
individuals pursue perfection by submitting their possessions, preferences, and volition to the 
good of the community.  
Put another way, Christian rationality demands a kind of “mortification,” or “deliberate 
disciplinary slaying” of unruly motives (Burke, Rhetoric of Religion 190). The religious 
invocation of community places the self in a state of perpetual sacrifice to others—and in the 
occasion of the Oneida, submission to Noyes’ leadership. Individuals were called to internalize 
perfection and live by an active and constant pursuit of selfless sacrifice on behalf of 
“community,” exorcising sinful motives and keeping community at the forefront of motivation.  
 There is clearly a sacrificial and salvational quality to such appeals, and this is a key 
element of community’s function as god-term; in fact, the sacrificial impulse may be taken as the 
core of the community, in both its religious and secular variants. We have stated that a god-term 
is a privileged expression providing order, value and universality to action, and that the surest 
indicator that are in the presence of god-term is the expression’s ability to compel sacrifice. 
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Community, clearly served such a role for John Noyes and the utopian community movement. 
What is unique about this particular term is that community compels sacrifice for a higher good, 
but that community itself is a term of sacrifice on behalf of others. Service to community 
represents the process whereby our guilts are shirked and we attain a state of moral virtuosity, 
redemption and self-actualization, such as when a person is restored from their sins against 
society by “community service,” or when a famous figure is praised not for their great 
accumulation of wealth, but for “giving back to the community.” I contend that it is in the 
redeeming power of community as a sacrificial ethic that religious and secular perspectives 
converge. Community’s sacrificial and salvational overtones is perhaps the greatest legacy of 
John Noyes, the utopian community movement, and the Nineteenth century attempt to grapple 
with the tides of modern industrialism and secularization. 
It is in this vein that we can comment on a second line of implication, dealing with the 
“communist” or “communalist” perspective of community. The ordering function of a god-term 
is nowhere more evident than in the communist and socialist urges to make the social order “live 
up to” the principles of the communal ideal. It must be emphasized that Noyes’ variant of 
communism was notably different from the European variants, although I would submit that the 
traditions share a great deal in common, as they both developed from the confluence of the 
West’s Christianized moral inheritance and modern society’s ascendant sociological rationality. 
In fact, both Noyes’ “Bible Communism” and European communist perspectives might be 
understood as driven to find an institutional arrangement that enables and reflects community’s 
ethic of individual submission to the collective interest. This theme is itself the subject of 
countless works of philosophy and literature in late twentieth Century America that offers 
dramatized critiques of communist ideology. 
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Noyes’ communism, at least, embraced a rationalist vision which called on society to live 
up to community precepts. If community was the term of order and value, then citizens must 
accordingly labor to make society over in that image. This rationalist rhetorical posturing should 
be taken as the communist’s demand for consistency between a society’s professed principles 
and its actual organization, seeking to hold citizens accountable for the qualitative discrepancy 
between the spiritual and material orders. Accordingly, the solution for resetting the moral 
balance is to realign “spiritual” virtues with material practices. That is, for the relation between 
the self and the society to be moral and sustainable, the immaterial principles of community must 
be reflected in the material institutions and practices of citizens. In this communalist orientation, 
community becomes the template or guide from which material conditions are to be evaluated 
and remade. If institutions fail to align with the values of community and justice, they are to be 
reconstructed upon the guide of the communal ideal.  
In so far as Noyes’ rhetoric reflects larger socialist and communist inclinations, it 
identifies the centrality of the reformation of institutions as the primary method for attaining a 
moral populace in the image of community. Such a perspective presupposes a particular variant 
of what Kenneth Burke called the “scene-agent ratio,” where changes to the “scene” or the 
context determines the action of the “agent” or individual. Put in the context of the communist 
attempts to attain a just society, this means that institutions largely determine human motives, 
and therefore by purifying institutions, human motives can likewise be purified. The advocate of 
the communist image of community accordingly considers how the social arrangement of 
relationships might be redesigned so as to make the world a more ethical place where individuals 
can live according to a higher, collectivist moral code. It seeks to make amends for the failings of 
the economic order and discover the structural conditions under which ethical action is possible. 
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Communism, from this angle, is essentially “utopic” or “religious” in the sense that it possesses a 
kindred desire to redeem a world fallen to the “selfishness” of individualism, and seeks civic 
adherence to an ethic of individual sacrifice to the collective good. 
 These conclusions, I believe, can be extended to other types of socialisms as well—not 
only those of the American utopian movement, but also those stemming from European roots. 
Noyes’ application of the god-term community reveals a kind of template of the communist 
philosophy that, like the religious perspective, has at its end the purification of human motives—
the removal of the “sin” of selfishness to the redeeming power of communal harmony and 
justice. As discursive ideal in communist rhetoric, community does the work of convicting 
society of its sins and demanding it live up to higher values. Noyes’s perspective probably 
displays a more individualistic “mortifying” impulse then the self-proclaimed “secular” roots of 
Marxist socialism, but both are concerned with establishing an ethic of the common good 
through constructing an alternative valuation of institutions.  
This radical communalist perspective, it must be stated, differs remarkably from more 
progressive and traditionalist ideals of community, which will be the subject of the following 
two analytical chapters. And while Noyes’ communism is in significant ways outside the 
“mainstream” in contemporary religious and political discourse, the sacrificial and spiritual 
impulses of community as a god-term endure today, and in a way that transcends partisan 
divides. Amid Noyes’ own historical moment, salvational appeals to community were being 
made by a vast array of thinkers and experimental communes such as New Harmony, 
Brookfarm, the Shakers, the Rappites, the Owenites, and the Fourier socialists. Similarly, more 
“philosophical” minded thinkers also turned to the “spiritualized” possibilities of community for 
enhancing the secular culture, among them Ralph Waldo Emerson’s transcendentalism, Mary 
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Baker Eddy’s Christian Science, Josiah Royce’ Benevolent Community, William James’ theory 
of religious experience, and John Dewey’s call for new forms of community amenable to a 
democratic people. Such cooptation of the religious resources set up “community” as a kind of 
civic-spiritual value beckoning citizens to temper their self-interestedness and pursue a more 
“socially-minded” ethic by “sacrificing” for the good of others. I would submit that we can place 
the more recent appeals of the communitarian sociologists such as Robert Bellah, Amatai 
Etzioni, and Robert Wuthnow as continuations of this civic-spiritual legacy of the utopian 
movement.  
Even off-the-cuff remarks about community contain an element of the term’s salvational, 
purifying, and redeeming power. Community’s dictate of sacrifice and service to others involves 
a rhetorical convergence of spiritual and secular, religious and sociological, conservative and 
liberal perspectives. For all parties, community remains an unequivocal good, an ethic directed 
toward the needs of others, a redemptive force from selfishness, and a call for a higher morality 
of voluntary acquiescence to the greater good with a salvational quality that transforms the 
failures of the modern world into a source of profit.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
JANE ADDAMS AND THE COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNITY  
Jane Addams has been called America’s first female public philosopher and the Mother 
of Social Work. In the popular polls of her time (1860-1935), Addams was consistently voted the 
greatest woman in America, and in 1931 she was awarded the Noble Peace Prize, the first 
American woman to be so honored. As a close friend to some of history’s most famous 
philosophers such as John Dewey, William James and George Herbert Mead, Addams played a 
central role in developing and populizing pragmatist political principles. While her contributions 
to pragmatist philosophy were significant, Daniel Levine argues that “it was in her role as 
publicist and persuader that Jane Addams made her greatest contribution to American life” (86). 
Addams was not only a key architect of progressive social philosophy, but the most successful 
practitioner of those principles in the civic arena, leaving a lasting influence on how Americans 
conceived of the nature of modern social problems and their appropriate remedy.   
This chapter ventures to look at Addams’ work holistically from the vantage point of her 
role as rhetorician, where her mission was one of reorienting the American public on the proper 
relationship between individuals and their society. I contend that the concept of community is the 
adhesive which holds her progressive rhetoric together, creating a means of attaining social 
change and an ultimate end of justice, peace and harmony. Addams’ lifework can serve as an 
exemplar of some of the rhetorical maneuvers and possibilities characteristic of a “progressive” 
rhetoric of community. In what follows, I contextualize Addams’ rhetoric as a response to the 
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industrialization and urbanization of American life that aims to set right the social order by 
finding forms of human relations and civic associations appropriate to the new scene of action. 
Her rhetoric embodies a cosmopolitan philosophy that seeks to create world community based on 
the value and virtue of local communities as they are presumed to function, with the goals of 
social amelioration, experiment, obligation, fellowship, and justice. 
The Modern City and its Discontents 
 Jane Addams’ rhetoric of community began as a response to the mass migration of 
workers from rural to urban spaces throughout late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
America. The arrival of the Modern City, spurred by the industrialization of labor, marked a new 
epoch in the American social landscape, with unprecedented changes to the lived experiences of 
citizens. Inherited presumptions about the agrarian character of American democracy and the 
nature of civic relationships were confronted with the harsh new realities of congregated, non-
landowning, low-wage, industrial workers. As immigration, urbanization, and mechanization 
challenged the character of American identity, “progressive” thinkers such as Addams began 
reimagining possibilities for social relationships and democratic identity. 
Guiding Jane Addams’ mission was the conviction that the greatest problems facing early 
twentieth century America were problems of maladjustment, that ideology and policy had not yet 
caught up to the demands of urban life. For Addams, the restructuring of American society had 
created a new scene of action, the Modern City, where classic individualist assumptions about 
democracy lacked the ability to resolve the issues of isolation, chaos, and poverty among 
working-class citizens. What was needed, she believed, was a re-orientation of democratic 
theory through a new kind of social ethic that matched the particular struggles of industrial, 
urban peoples. Adjustment and reform was the order of the day.  
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The point of departure for this analysis is Addams’ assessment of the American city, for 
her sizing up of the difficulties of the modern scene held within it the remedy of community. 
Addams minced no words in judging the dreary state of industrial life:  
The social organism has broken down through large districts of our great cities. Many of 
the people living there are very poor, the majority of them without leisure or energy for 
anything but the gin of subsistence. They move often from one wretched lodging to 
another. They live for the moment side by side, many of them without knowledge of each 
other, without fellowship, without local tradition of public spirit, without social 
organization of any kind (Centennial Reader 11) 
 
As evidenced above, the language Addams selected to depict they city was overwhelmingly 
negative, consistently portraying it as “broken-down,” “impoverished,” “wretched,” and without 
meaningfully human association. Elsewhere, Addams flatly admitted that “affairs for the most 
part are going badly in these great new centres” (Centennial Reader 115). The problems she 
identified were many. For one, economic precarity appeared an endemic condition of city life, 
with workers so concerned for basic subsistence that little else was of concern. In addition, the 
spatial beauty and rootedness of the country had been replaced by the machine, so that there was 
little in the way of sanitation, leisure, or escape from the drudgery of labor. The city lacked local 
tradition or public spirit, being more prone to isolation than fellowship. There was also stark 
division between the rich and poor, overstimulation of youth, insufficient education, and a 
disintegration of the family. Such a setting, for Addams, was inimical to meaningful human 
relationships, and prevented the development of a robust civic culture capable of resolving the 
issues inherent to urban democracy.  
Beneath these complaints, Addams’ critique of the industrialized city focused on the 
paradox of increased human proximity and lessened familiarity, of conglomeration without 
community. Of the many inadequacies of urban life, the lack of meaningful associations was 
perhaps most perilous for the democratic future. Addams’ was especially concerned that 
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industrialism and urbanization meant the breakdown of the deep human relationships which 
sustained democratic culture and government, and with it, the possibility of order and justice. 
Such “isolation,” besides damaging citizens’ physical and mental health, prevented them from 
coming together and organizing for the improvement of their common condition.  
The problem, as Addams saw it, was that the kinds of relationships and organizations in 
the country had been worked out over centuries, but that the industrial city, as an unprecedented 
phenomenon, still lacked forms of association appropriate for its particular setting. She did not, 
however, lament the urban condition in order to call for a return to the past. For all its failings, 
the modern city offered a grand opportunity for developing a universal sense of cosmopolitan 
community. One could not simply import old methods and assumptions into new realities. 
Rather, Addams’ wanted experimental adjustments in accordance with the new realities of 
modern life, believing it was the duty of citizens to find innovative ways of building civic 
community that were compatible with the city. That is, the modern world demanded its own 
philosophy of relationships—a philosophy Addams would come to call “the social ethic.” 
The Individual, Familial, and Social Ethics 
The social ethic was perhaps Addams’ main contribution to twentieth century social 
theory. Although amorphous and at times difficult to pin down, the social ethic is best situated in 
Addams’ differentiation between the kinds of relationships characterizing rural and urban life. 
The distinction between the “natural community” of the country and the fragmenting 
relationships of the city was a central assumption of Addams’ humanitarian call to action, 
forming the foundation for her efforts at progressive reform. The city, for Addams, by its 
definition disintegrated the traditional ties that provided order and meaning throughout human 
history. It is a point she reiterates on numerous occasions, and I include two examples below:  
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Great cities tend to dissolve almost as by chemical process the customs and social ties 
which were nurtured in rural and provincial society, so that the very cement which groups 
together seems to disappear (Second Twenty 291) 
 
The social relationships in a modern city are hastily made and often superficial. Common 
sense, household tradition, the inherited custom the desultory reading by which so much 
of life is directed, the stream of advice constantly poured over the radio, break down the 
restraints long sustained in smaller communities by public opinion, and in the end certain 
areas of life seem to be in a state of dire confusion (Second Twenty 412) 
 
In each of these representative passages, Addams juxtaposes an ideal and a fallen state, with the 
community of the smaller rural groups representing the former and the Modern-Industrial-City as 
the latter. In the country, there was an inherited topography of relationships, worked out over 
centuries, that allowed for appropriate organization of civic action to tackle the recurrent 
problems of democracy. But the city, meanwhile, naturally fragments “the customs and social 
ties which were nurtured in rural and provincial society,” so that “social life is in a state of 
confusion.” Without tradition or custom to guide, urban citizens were left to wander in their 
plight seemingly alone, unable to associate or unite satisfactorily in the face of their new 
destinies, unless an alternative scheme of relationships could be uncovered. Such an alternative 
scheme of relationships is what Addams hoped to achieve through the social ethic. 
 The “social ethic” was a communitarian remedy for the deficiencies of urban conditions 
and relationships. Addams defined the social ethic as an extended sense of obligation and 
identification in antithetical relation to individualism. In fact, Addams believed that one of the 
biggest barriers to the development of new forms of association was American culture’s 
predilection toward individualism. She understood individualism as its own kind of ethic, 
defined essentially as an obligation to the self, the resolve to make sure one’s own needs were 
met and the desire to take pride in one’s personal effort (Democracy 3). Alongside the 
individualist ethic was its partner, the familial ethic, which could be understood a sense of 
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obligation to one’s small circle, the family and close friends, whereby the individual took an 
interest in and responsibility for the welfare of their kin. For Addams, the individualist and 
familial ethics, while distinct, were complementary, working hand in hand to support an ordered 
harmonious society in an agrarian civilization. The social ethic that Addams called for, in 
contrast, was an extension of the familial obligation to one’s civic “community.” It was the call 
to look out for one’s fellow citizens as if they were one’s family, to feel a sense of solidarity and 
mutual responsibility for the welfare of others and to be willing to sacrifice or labor on their 
behalf. The social ethic was devotion to the “common” good, with an enlargement of who and 
what was included in “common.” 
The purpose of Addams’ rhetoric was thus a re-orientation of American values away 
from economic individualism and toward the community values employed in the social ethic. In 
Addams’ account, most communities throughout American history operated on a code of 
morality suited to its smaller scale, the individualist ethic and its counterpart, the familial ethic. 
Individualism was the American morality par excellence, and was responsible for many of the 
advances of the young nation. The individualist code corresponded well to the demands of 
independent farmers and local citizens in a largely agrarian society only needing a narrow 
network of relations to sustain their livelihoods. Conditions, however, had changed, and Addams 
maintained that the inherited individualistic ethic could no longer be said to sufficiently guide 
social relations in the new century. It was not that Addams was against the individualist or 
familial ethics in and of themselves—indeed she praised their utility for building and sustaining 
democratic cultures in America’s agrarian past; however, she was convinced that those ethics 
were incapable of dealing with the growing interconnectivity and shared destiny of industrial 
citizens in the new era of human relationships. The individual and familial ethics inhibited a 
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more robust democratic culture by confining loyalties to limited circles, thereby discouraging 
class solidarity, gender equality, and civic association.  
Therefore, the inability to rectify urban problems, Addams’ surmised, was essentially a 
issue of “ethical maladjustment” where “we are acting upon a code of ethics adapted to 
individual relationships, but not to the larger social relationships to which it is bunglingly 
applied” (Democracy Ethics 221). The urban difficulty was an example of “cultural lag,” a 
miscue between old theory and new practice. Individualism reigned supreme at the very moment 
when collective action was most needed, and citizens’ persistent adherence to the discredited 
ethic was a source of misguidance and stupidity: “To attain individual morality in an age 
demanding social morality, to pride one’s self on the results of personal effort when the time 
demands social adjustment,” Addams lamented.” is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation” 
(Addams, Democracy 3). In response, Addams’ pleaded for a transition away from the 
individualist and familial ethics which dominated in rural life and toward a new “social ethic” of 
extended obligation. By endorsing the “social ethic,” Addams aimed to set civilization right 
again through a reorientation that brought social theory up to date with the modern situation.  
In this light, it becomes evident that Addams’ efforts to reorient values through the social 
ethic were meant as a corrective to an individualism that she thought was valuable historically in 
certain segments of society, but inadequate for workers struggling in the industrial city. 
Individualism must give way to community, meaning the self must be drawn out of isolation and 
back into meaningful human association, with an awareness of the growing connectivity of 
citizens. The social ethic hoped to bind persons together into an extended community, similar in 
feelings of obligation to the familial ethic, but brought to bear on a larger scale and a new 
context. That is, the social ethic bridged the old world and the new by extending obligations from 
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the family to the civic community, broadening the realm of imagined solidarity. It involved the 
active assumption of a sense of responsibility for the welfare of all members of the city, and the 
vigorous implementation of social efforts to improve the condition of the suffering. The social 
ethic would seek as its end social justice. 
Social Justice  
One way of situating Addams’ hope for the social ethic is to view it as an attempt to 
achieve “social justice” in human affairs. As the industrialized city had transformed living 
conditions beyond recognition, so it had caused a breach in harmonious lifestyles of the lowliest 
citizens. Poverty, child-labor, and lack of opportunity were but a few examples of the growing 
inequalities confronting urban citizens. Accordingly, Addams sought not only alleviation of dire 
circumstances, but a social order that lived up the ideal of “social” justice, a concept whereby 
“society” had the obligation to meet the basic needs of its most suffering citizens and find a way 
to level conditions along the principle of fairness. In what was essentially a statement of her own 
God-terms, Addams heartily praised the persuasive warmth of “certain words which belong 
distinctively to our own times; such words as Prevention, Amelioration, and Social Justice.” To 
these she also added “human compassion” and “obligation” (Centennial 86). This 
conglomeration of terms form a statement on the ends of the social ethic—it was an attempt to 
prevent suffering and improve social conditions through human obligations in light of the 
democratic ideals of compassion and justice. The social ethic was a reorientation that highlighted 
the duty of citizens to vouch for the “least of these” through mobilizing the community.  
 Such purposes required citizens to transcend their personal interests and individualist 
motives for the good of the collective. The social morality was one of submitting the self to the 
general interest, with the knowledge that all persons were better off when operating together to 
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recuperate the life of the suffering. Addams desired experimental adjustment through both 
voluntary and state efforts to alleviate misery and make life a little more humane. This required, 
above all, that she convince her era to move beyond individualism and discover a sense of 
human obligation founded in compassion. Only through a motivated people pledged together by 
a sense of duty could the situation be made tolerable. Obligation was the foundation of all social 
progress, the only way to “raise the value and function of each member of the community” 
(Centennial Reader 145). 
Since “social obligation” was the cornerstone phrase of Addams rhetoric, it is wise to ask 
precisely “whom is socially obligated to do what?” An obligation is the counterpart to a right, 
and both terms exist under a similar state of ambiguity. Claims of right and obligation are by 
their nature inherently involved in the work of consultation and direction, edging its adherents 
toward a vision of how the world should function. Rights and obligations are assertions of ought, 
and with them, comes an ethical mandate by which human action is to be organized and 
evaluated. To assert a right, or in Addams’ case, an obligation, is to impute a burden of 
responsibility upon the involved parties, utilizing language and rhetoric to plead, beckon, or 
demand certain persons to take certain actions. If such claims gain adherence, a new ethic 
emerges (in Addams’ case, the “Social Ethic”); if not, there is conflict, symbolic or otherwise, 
between competing moral claims.   
Certainly part of the rhetorical legacy of the concept of “community” in Western society 
concerns the way in which we are “obligated” to work on behalf of community. Here is a 
completely secular variation on the religious “sacrificial” principle of community exemplified by 
the Oneidans. The more abstract and distant our sense of relationship is to mass society, the less 
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immediate are our relations to others and the less we feel compelled or obligated. Yet, in smaller 
groups, our sense of responsiveness and responsibility are greater. 
Addams’ reliance on the tangible and immediate sense of obligation formed in local 
community relations becomes the wellspring of the “social ethic” she seeks to inspire for mass 
society in general, and through her cosmopolitanism, extend to the world community at large. As 
a “motive,” community for Addams orients toward actions and interests that oblige us to work 
for justice and solidarity in human relations. Addams’ progressivism and cosmopolitanism 
illustrate this function of the “community motive” as it might be found more generally in 
American or Western societies. By interpreting Addams’ communal dream, we can observe the 
constitution of a progressive image of community and the tensions its faces in its contradictory.   
A Rhetoric of Cosmopolitan Community  
Going forward, I contend that Addams’ communitarian rhetoric is best labeled 
cosmopolitan because it culminates in an image of world community and universal brotherhood 
that triumphs over American individualism. Although theorists of cosmopolitanism often differ 
on its precise definition, there is general agreement that a defining feature of cosmopolitanism is 
an affirmation of some sort of “global community.” Addams’ rhetoric strives for such an ever-
extending, all-encompassing single community, while simultaneously foregrounding the needs 
and livelihoods of the local neighborhood. Her vision of community is a kind of dual citizenship 
to both the locale and the world. Community begins with the immediately proximate and extends 
to the universal. The farther that community is “extended,” the higher the ethical achievement. 
Community, as principle of human relations, transcends geographic and economic relationships.  
Accordingly, Addams’ effort can be nicely divided along two lines: the move past 
individualism through the reform of local (urban) conditions by extending the familial ethic into 
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the social realm; and the call to attain a “community of nations” by widening the identification 
and obligations of the social ethic to world-wide proportions. For Addams, these two lines of 
community are not conflicting, but in harmonious, complementary relation. The one begets the 
other, until progress has achieved an enlightened community of all humanity.  
This analysis follows Addams’ lead in exploring this two-step relation. First, I look at 
Addams’ vision of local obligations as represented by her efforts at Hull House. Then, I shift to 
her outward move toward pacifism and world community during the First World War.  
Local Community 
 Addams’ cosmopolitan rhetoric begins with an appeal to locale, emphasizing the 
obligations citizens have to their local neighborhoods and immediate relationships in the pursuit 
of justice and social progress. In urban Chicago, Addams advocated a number of measures to 
establish community within urban spaces, including the founding of the Hull House Settlement, 
the development of social clubs, and state intervention into recreation and labor. By so doing, 
Addams suggested a trajectory for the attainment of an ideal social order that began with 
voluntary social clubs, peaked in collective action, and culminated with government intervention. 
Her program called for a culture of fellowship, solidarity, and civic virtue, where community 
served as the primary vehicle for positive democratic change. Community was both a morality 
and a method for guarding the health of a democratic people.   
The Hull House ‘Settlement’ 
Addams’ most significant vehicle for enacting positive change and community in 
Chicago was the “Settlement” she founded called “Hull House.” The idea for the settlement 
spawned from a trip Addams made to London where she visited Toynbee Hall, an organization 
of socially minded citizens dedicated to living among and caring for the city’s poor. Inspired by 
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their efforts, Addams devised a plan for a similar kind of organization in a poor immigrant 
neighborhood in Chicago designed to improve their conditions of the city’s most vulnerable 
citizens. Hull House was decidedly not intended as a philanthropic organization or charity; rather 
it was an open place “settled” by with the aim of serving the local community in any possible 
capacity; it was established with the hope to “add the social function to democracy” (Centennial 
10). Such a mission was necessarily abstract, articulating only the desire to assist those 
struggling in urban spaces; Addams described Hull House as “an experimental effort to aid in the 
solution of the social and industrial problems which are engendered by the modern conditions of 
the great city” (Centennial 13). Situated within her pragmatist commitments and dreary 
assessment of the urban plight, Hull House was meant to be the enactment of the social ethic in 
Chicago, an attempt to experimentally improve living conditions by obtaining a new kind of 
civic relationship appropriate for the industrial world.  
 Although not founded with specific material changes in mind, Hull House was committed 
to a set of guiding principles. The Settlement aimed to be a community and, for Adams, that 
required it possess the following qualities:   
It must be open to conviction and must have a deep and abiding sense of tolerance. It 
must be hospitable and ready for experiment. It should demand from its residents a 
scientific patience in the accumulation of facts and the steady holding of their sympathies 
as one of the best instruments for that accumulation. It must be grounded in a philosophy 
whose foundation is on the solidarity of the human race…They must be content to live 
quietly side by side with their neighbors until they grow into a sense of relationship and 
mutual interests…In short, residents are pledged to devote themselves to the duties of 
good citizenship and to the arousing of social energies which too largely lie dormant in 
every neighborhood given over to industrialism (Centennial 14) 
 
The above might be taken as Addams’ formal pronouncement of her image of the community 
spirit, a spirit that she hoped would become emblematic of Hull House. These progressive values 
laid accent to the questions of difference, unity, and civic responsibility. In professing to live in 
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accordance with such virtues as tolerance, solidarity and duty, Addams advocated a sort of 
patient humanitarian volunteerism, whereby the problems of any within her vicinity were 
accepted as the problems of all. The settlement, as a force for community, took upon itself an 
experimental role as improver of the industrial condition, that took for granted the inclusion of 
every citizen regardless of class, race, or creed. It professed the essential likeness of all persons 
as members of the same human race even in its diversity, and by participation in that common 
condition, assumed a level of obligation for their mutual welfare. Hull House was designed to be 
a place of tolerance and inclusion, where unity was found in diversity. The settlement, in short, 
operationalized Addams’ vision of community as “civic obligation” and “imagined solidarity” in 
order to stimulate progressive adjustment and reform in a diverse urban populous.  
 The genius of the term Settlement as a label for Addams’ enterprise seems to add an 
“artificial” component to Addams’ attempt at community, in so far as settlers are not natives of 
the neighborhood, but are transplanted to settle in it. Settlement implies an intention on behalf of 
the settler and a gathering of prior strangers into new relation, not a community that develops 
“organically” or is inherited from generations rooted in place and tradition. Rather settlement 
highlights change, experiment, hardiness, and adventure. A settler has a vision that, albeit vague 
and idealistic, promises a better future. Like “pioneers” who settled new lands in uncertainty and 
resilience, so would Addams’ community-settlement set out to pioneer new relationships and 
ways of life in urban Chicago.  
 The Settlement metaphor was particularly apt at capturing the newness and experimental 
nature of Addams’ community, especially since her hope for a sense of mutual interest and 
solidarity among citizens was not grounded in homogeneity. Community arose out of a mash of 
cultural experiences and a vacuum of shared local tradition or public spirit. If the social ethic was 
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to manifest and community be achieved, it was to emerge from the unity of peoples of different 
tongue, class, race, and nation. Settlement, by emphasizing the artificiality of this extended view 
of community, illuminates the intentions and difficulties of Addams’ mission, for she hoped to 
harness the “power of cooperation” in the “consciousness of a common destiny” in order to turn 
the “sentiment of universal brotherhood…from an emotion into a motive” (Centennial 25;10). 
Put another way, her community aimed to bring a people lacking shared traditions and 
conventional means of identification together to face their mutual problems and improve their 
collective condition. To do so, Addams turned to the binding power of voluntary social clubs.  
Volunteerism and the Social Club 
Generally, when Addams talked about community and collective action, what she really 
had in mind was the joining or creation of a club, organization, or voluntary association. The 
social club, for Addams, was the primary mechanism by which citizens could get involved in the 
life-blood of their communities and work for positive change. Clubs enriched the cultural lives of 
their communities and made feasible the organization and mobilization of citizens for 
meaningful collective action. Specifically, the voluntary association and social club initiated a 
three-fold process, that began by bringing otherwise separated citizens together and culminated 
in community-based amelioration of the industrial condition. On the matter, Addams writes:  
The social club forms a basis of acquaintance for many people living in other parts of the 
city…they are thus brought into contact, many of them for the first time, with the 
industrial and social problems challenging the moral resources of our contemporary 
life…[they]have increased the number of Chicago citizens who are conversant with 
adverse social conditions and conscious that only by the unceasing devotion of each, 
according to his strength, shall the compulsions and hardships, the stupidities and 
cruelties of life be overcome (Centennial 55) 
 
The path of clubs, for Addams, is one moving from isolation to community, “from culture to 
civic activity” (Second Twenty 96-97). Clubs begin by forming a basis of acquaintance that 
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awaken a sense of identification and social obligation, leading to a conviction of social 
responsibility and a vigorous culture of civic virtue. That civic passion and solidarity ultimately 
manifests in collective action that alleviates urban struggles and improves the conditions 
confronting all. It is worth dwelling longer on this trajectory of the social club, for it reveals not 
only Addams’ plan for progressive mobilization, but also the political presumptions embedded in 
her rhetoric of community.   
Club as Base of Acquaintance  
 The first function of the social club or voluntary association is that of forming the basis of 
acquaintance for citizens. The city suffers not for a lack of people, but only for a lack of 
meaningful relations between them. Persons brush by each other daily in the general mass of 
conglomerated bodies without ever knowing or investing in their compatriots. Even among 
throngs of people, the citizen is essentially alone. Social clubs, however, as community devices, 
offer a remedy. Addams explains that “the value of social clubs broadens out in one’s mind to an 
instrument of companionship through which many may be led from a sense of isolation to one of 
civic responsibility” (Centennial 55). By bringing people together around a common passion or 
purpose, civic and philanthropic organizations connect citizens, often for the first time, drawing 
them out from their estrangement and into comradeship. Such joinings develop a common 
consciousness and awareness that there is, in some sense, mutual sharing of a common lot. It 
does not matter much what the organization is for, though Addams recommended those focused 
on particular social problems or interests, such as poverty, education, or immigration. However, 
even clubs devoted simply to cultural and educational pursuits sufficed to create neighborly 
companionship. In fact, Hull House initiated several organizations devoted to America’s 
“spiritual inheritance as enshrined in poetry, in history, in science, in art, in drama, in music” 
 132 
(Second Twenty 95). The utility of such cultural clubs was to bind citizens together and enrich 
the life of the community. Addams proudly pronounced that “the constant coordination of these 
fructifying specialized studies reacted intimately on the life and character of each community,” 
culminating in a “wave of civic emotion” (Second Twenty 95). When successful, clubs and 
voluntary associations unite a diverse people, serving as platforms that heighten the sense of 
companionship, ultimately actualizing in a felt social obligation and invigorated civic culture.  
Social Responsibility and Civic Virtue 
 The second use of clubs and associations, after acquainting citizens by bringing them to 
an awareness of their shared condition, is the attainment of a sentiment of human solidarity, 
realized in a culture of civic virtue. If “obligations” are the stuff of community, then this is the 
stage where citizens begin to recognize they are members of the same community, marked by 
responsibility for the welfare of their fellows. Not only this, but they also come to feel that their 
individual needs are best met, and their individual selves most fulfilled, as part of the whole. 
When achieved, personal interests become submerged to the collective need, resulting in a 
community culture of devotion to the greater good. At its best, clubs may “build a structure of 
civic virtue” where citizens believe that “individual needs are common needs, that is, public 
needs, and that they can only be legitimately supplied for him when they are supplied for all 
(Democracy 269). When this occurs, and the self is seen in intimate relation to the needs of the 
ever-expanding unity of humankind, the social ethic has been internalized by the citizenry-
turned-community. Improvement of and resolution to collective problems becomes not only 
possible, but inevitable.  
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Reform through Collective Action   
 As clubs serve to connect and rouse identification among citizens, expanding their sense 
of obligation and bringing out a respect for the needs of others, the natural conclusion is the co-
laboring of citizens for positive social change. Together, the community seeks alleviation from 
the burdens of industry, rallying around the needs and demands of the neighbor. As we will see, 
Addams encouraged such reform in labor, recreation, immigration, race relations, local politics, 
women’s equality, education, justice, crime, and poverty. For these ameliorative efforts to 
succeed, Addams’ argued it was crucial for it to come through collective-community effort and 
not individual philanthropy. Addams was not against the generosity of individual charity itself—
as a matter of fact, Hull House was largely supported by such means. Rather, her objection was 
that the philanthropist was still operating on an ethic of individualism while the problems of 
industrial life by their nature required a social ethic; it demanded change arising from the 
community itself. By permitting the collective to work out its own problems, the remedies would 
be long-lasting, better fitted, and more readily accepted.  
 The benevolence of philanthropists, business owners, or other powerful persons could 
still be effective to a degree, Addams admitted, but it was not in line with the shifting contours of 
American democracy. Social clubs and voluntary associations, however, brought community 
passion to reform, with the process of collective action itself contributing to the improvement of 
the common lot. Collective effort was not only a means to an end, it was also an end itself.  
 There were certain difficulties and inefficiencies to associated movements that the 
advocates of individualism were quick to point out. Collective effort was slow, frustrating, and 
splintered, sometimes even considered as a public nuisance by the outside world. But the 
awkwardness was a necessary concession, for social effort not only provided an outlet for 
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obligation and crash-course in civic training, but in the end it guaranteed better results. On the 
matter Addams wrote:  
If, as is many times stated, we are passing from an age of individualism to one of 
association, there is no doubt that for decisive and effective action the individual still has 
the best of it…And yet, if the need of the times demands associative effort, it may easily 
be true that the action which appears ineffective, and yet is carried out upon the more 
highly developed line of associated effort, may represent a finer social quality and have a 
greater social value than the most effective individual action (Democracy 137-138) 
 
Transitioning from a rural to urban society, and by implication from an individualist to social 
ethic, ensures that there will be a bumpy period where inherited discriminations toward 
individual action still seems preferable; the rowdy social ruckus would still appear diffuse and 
unorganized. But given time and patience, Addams asserted, the public would be up to the 
challenge. It may appear ineffective, but community action would prove to be the most 
rewarding and effective means of change: “associated efforts toward social progress, although 
much more awkward and stumbling than that same effort managed by a capable individual, does 
yet enlist deeper forces and evoke higher social capacities” (Democracy 153).   
In summation, the social club, the association, the civic organization, was the backbone 
of Jane Addams’ conception of community. In the realm of ideals and principles, Addams 
imagined a society guided by a spirit of obligation and fellowship, mystically apprehending a 
common will or consciousness in the knowledge that they constituted one human community 
where the needs of one were the needs of all. In the realm of human action, Addams turned to the 
social club as the clearest and most practical avenue for attaining this spirit, believing this base 
of acquaintance could foster companionship and rouse a culture of social obligation and civic 
virtue, ultimately leading to collective social change.  
The social club stands in as a kind of substitute between individual action and 
governmental coercion. In between the isolated altruism of individuals and the external 
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imposition of state agencies, is the community. Clubs, as the clearest sign that community is 
alive and well, enable autonomy, involvement, and true democracy to gain a foothold by making 
sure the people themselves are the active authors of their collective fate. Accordingly, Addams’ 
vision of community, which appeals primarily to the obligation and imagined solidarity senses, 
finds volunteerism as a third critical component. 
Volunteerism  
 Much like Alexis de Tocqueville’s commentary on the American character, Addams 
centralizes the culture of joinings as the mainstay of democratic community. To take part in a 
local club or organization is in some way to answer the call of citizenship. But such activity in 
local affairs can never be forced; it depends upon a culture of involvement, participation and 
volunteerism. It stems from the dual convictions that (a) the best solutions are created by the 
people most immediately effected by the conditions themselves, instead of some external or 
governmental agency and (b) citizens within the realm of consequence will naturally desire to be 
involved in such affairs themselves. Volunteerism says that there is little need for outside 
imposition or coercion—citizens are capable and competent to work out their collective destiny 
themselves. This is, for Addams, the genius of the “American Method—that is, reaching our own 
ends through voluntary action with fair play to all the interests involved” (Second 295). 
Community is autonomous and internally motivated, never coerced. 
 Concomitantly, if there is a dearth of joinings and lack of voluntary associations, there is 
a good chance the culture is sick and decadent. Government or individual philanthropy may be 
able to do something, but what is more needed in such a state is the revitalization of a culture of 
activity and association. And this is precisely the role Addams saw for social clubs. Her aim was 
to set the conditions by which urban life in Chicago might flourish in civic activity, so that 
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meaningful fellowship might be had and citizens would be equipped to adjust and ameliorate the 
industrial ailments. Volunteerism, as a fundamental aspect of Addams’ communitarian vision, 
meant no one could be forced into it; community must arise out of an overflowing of the heart, 
one with compassion for neighbors and a sense of responsibility, spurred by a culture of civic 
virtue. Only then, could progressive reform truly occur, for the small group of motivated citizens 
was the true impetus for change: “every crusade, every beginning of social change, must start 
from small numbers of people convinced of the righteousness of a cause; that the coming 
together of convinced groups is a natural process of growth” (Peace and Bread 225). 
 Addams purported social clubs and the spirit of volunteerism to be a relational 
manifestation of the social ethic and the ideal method of securing democratic progress and 
reform along the principle of social justice; however, this remains in the abstract until given 
specificity with her actual efforts in the social arena. Because Addams’ Chicago efforts at 
industrial amelioration in association with Hull House were too numerous to recount in this 
chapter, I will briefly discuss two of the most prominent reforms to highlight how Addams’ 
rhetoric of community expressed itself in actual organizational measures and responses to socio-
political programs. These include reforms in youth recreation and labor unionizing.  
Youth Recreation 
 One area to which Addams dedicated considerable energy was the condition of the youth 
in Chicago. She was abhorred by what she saw as the modern city’s neglect in providing outlets 
for positive play and recreation. Children, Addams believed, naturally held an “insatiable desire 
for play,” but the city was engaged in a “stupid experiment of organizing work and failing to 
organize play” (Centennial 151). The urban youth were rushed into a monotonous and 
mechanical life of child labor, while their development was stifled and their moral imagination 
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left unkempt. Nevertheless, the insatiable lust for adventure must find an outlet, and in lieu of 
adequate forms of recreation, the youth turned to alternative methods such as child crime and 
cheap “immoral” excitements like the petty theatre (Democratic 51). Children were over-worked 
and overstimulated; rancorous behavior, petty-crime, and law-breaking on the streets, Addams 
argued, were virtually the only recourse available to the youth to feed their ambitions. And 
instead of building upon children’s human imagination through planned recreational facilities, 
the city left their ingenuity unrealized. “The whole apparatus for supplying pleasure,” Addams 
concluded, “is wretchedly inadequate” (Spirit of Youth 15). 
Addams found the sorry state of public recreation especially damning because she 
believed play was a powerful impetus toward civic community. The spirit of youth, she wrote, 
was one naturally characterized by a desire for adventure, a felt sense of obligation, an expanded 
moral imagination, and a vigor for social reform. Not only does play prevent life from becoming 
mechanical, but it could be a great city-wide provocation toward the creation a “cosmopolitan 
community” of diverse and otherwise separated people. Addams explains:  
Play is the great social stimulus, and it is the prime motive which unites children and 
draws them into comradeship. A true democratic relation and ease of acquaintance is 
found among the children in a typical factory community because they more readily 
overcome differences of language, tradition and religion than do adults (Centennial 158) 
 
By investing in recreation, the city spaces and “factory communities” could afford an 
unprecedented opportunity to elicit new forms of unity and comradeship, but it had instead failed 
to meet the needs of urban children. In refusing to cater to its youth, the city was wasting its 
chance to fully apprehend the social ethic and create a new cosmopolitan community of active 
engagement and solidarity. 
To set matters right, Addams began experimenting with different social clubs and 
programs to make Hull House a place where the recreational needs of children could be met 
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within the urban context. With the intent of compensating for the city’s recreational lack, 
Addams came to establish a theatre, musical school, art gallery, library, gymnasium, 
kindergarten, language and reading courses, and a playground at the Hull House complex. The 
voluntary creation and joinings of clubs for child recreation were meant to improve the 
conditions of industrial citizens from the ground up. By providing meaningful outlets for the 
development of youths’ moral imagination, Addams believed their enthusiasm would initiate an 
unstoppable force for positive social change.  
Addams, however, did not stop her efforts with Hull House clubs; she also mobilized 
Chicago citizens to pressure the City Government into taking direct action into the matter. With 
her leadership, a group of citizens contended that it was the city’s responsibility to provide for 
the needs of children and recreation; in the same way that the city organized labor, they argued, 
so should the state take over responsibility for organizing play. After years of community 
pressure, Addams’ playground initiative was taken over by Chicago, becoming a city-wide 
program to create safe places for children to interact and express their adventurous spirit.  
This trajectory is emblematic of how Addams saw community change occurring in the 
local level—it should start with a motivated small group of citizens experimenting together to 
find successful solutions to industrial problems. When they had discovered an adequate scheme 
of adjustment, their efforts should be taken over by government bodies who serve as a permanent 
protector of social programs. Community, in this trajectory, was a move from volunteerism to 
state action for the furtherance of the social good. Addams’ work with youth recreation was in 
keeping with her aims of social justice, extended obligation, and indigenous collective action. A 
second example—her support for workers’ rights and the laboring classes—can serve as a further 
validation of this reading of her trajectory for “community” reform. 
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Labor Unions and the Working Classes 
Perhaps the problem that most concerned Addams was the treacherous conditions of the poor 
and laboring classes. In industrial Chicago, the main source of employment was low-skill factory 
jobs where workers labored in dangerous conditions for long hours and low-wages. Business 
employment of child labor was rampant and these children were often the main bread-winners 
for their families. The laboring classes suffered physically, economically, and psychologically 
from their work, and in turn looked toward the formation of trade unions for the improvement of 
their collective lot.  
 Addams became an unabashed supporter of the workers unions, yet was firmly against 
class warfare between the rich and poor. Her faith was in democracy, believing the issues 
between capitalist owners and laboring classes could be worked out through the instruments of 
association. Nevertheless, Addams found her sympathies drawn to the plight of the workers, and 
sought to rally local citizens to stand by the “weak and the wretched.” 
 Addams determined that one reason factory occupations were unfulfilling was because 
workers were disconnected from the final product of their labor. By being restricted to a sole 
station with a limited sense of responsibility, the individuals were alienated from the majority of 
the process of production, disabling them from feeling a sense of importance within the greater 
scheme of industry “or its connection with the community” (Democracy 213). A worker saw 
little value in their work, and when mixed with the monotony of their automated tasks, had an 
effect that was “deadening to his intellectual and moral life” (Democracy 213). 
 Addams decided progress could be made if the laborers developed a social consciousness 
where they came to see the value of their work within the larger social system: “If a working 
man is to have a conception of his value at all, he must see industry in its unity and entirety; he 
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must have a conception that will include not only himself and his immediate family and the 
community, but the industrial organization as a whole” (Centennial 149). To achieve this, 
Addams turned to education. She advocated a shift in public learning towards the history of 
industry and the position of the laborers within the larger historical and geographical context. 
Such an education would give an “offset from the overspecialization of his daily work” and 
“provide some historic significance of the part he is taking in the life of the community” 
(Centennial 149; Democracy 192). Accordingly, at Hull House, Addams created a labor museum 
and offered night classes that dealt specifically with the social implications of the laboring class.  
 Beyond educational measures, Addams’ concern with the dreary state of the workers led 
her to publicly support to the union movement. Addams promoted unionism as an exemplar of 
the social ethic due to its inculcation of brotherhood, fellowship, and solidarity in order to 
improve the state of the working classes (Centennial 149; 198). Particularly, Addams thought 
unions had reached the pinnacle of morality in their willingness to sacrifice and submerge their 
individual interests to the interests of the community in the name of social duty: “many of them 
see their wives and children suffer, and yet they hold out, for the sake of securing better wages 
for workmen whom they have never seen, for men who are living in another part of the country, 
and who are often another race and religion” (Centennial 210). By privileging the good of those 
they did not know, even those separated by race and creed, the unions had grasped toward the 
cosmopolitan community the city so badly needed.  
For her part, Addams assembled the larger Chicago community to petition the city 
government to intervene on behalf of the workers. And when the unions were faced with 
criticism for failing to achieve their objectives and causing social disturbance, Addams defended 
them as striving to fulfill the obligations that the entire community was responsible for; the 
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public had shirked its duty, she argued, so that “the trades unions alone are obliged to do what 
the community as a whole should undertake. Scenes of disorder and violence are enacted 
because trades unions are not equipped to accomplish what they are undertaking. The state alone 
could accomplish it without disorder” (Democracy 213). Had only the whole community arisen 
to meet their obligations to the laboring classes, the union would not be overburdened and forced 
to resort to such extreme measures.  
In assembling Chicago to support the unions, Addams started with voluntarist methods. 
She opened Hull House to the meetings of workers and labor unions so they could plan an 
organized response. Addams also served as a mediator between the business and working 
interests during the 1910 Garment’s workers strike. But in the end, as with her efforts on youth 
recreation, Addams mobilized the community to petition for government intervention. In 
specific, Addams and her associates championed child labor laws and the government regulation 
of industry: “Child-labor laws” she argued, were a register of “the community’s humanity and 
enlightenment,” while state regulation was the only responsible option for public citizens 
(Centennial 205). It was the duty of the state as the representative of the community, Addams 
maintained, to protect its most vulnerable citizens, ensure adequate working conditions, and 
establish social justice. 
From Voluntary to State Action  
Child recreation and workers’ rights were but two of the myriad areas to which Addams 
employed community forces to improve the life of Chicago citizens. Women’s rights, criminal 
justice reform, race relations, immigration, and public education were other issues where she 
labored to adjust urban conditions to the social ideal. I use the two examples because they 
adequately exemplify how Addams’ progressive rhetoric of community contains a particular 
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vision of how social change should occur in a democratic society. Social action should begin 
with a small group of motivated individuals, work to capture a wider audience, and ultimately 
become solidified into government policy. Such a program for community demands a spirit of 
civic volunteerism and cooperation around shared issues of common concern. It depends upon 
the assumption that change should begin from the grassroots with common citizens that are 
competent and motivated to work out their own problems; and it has as its end an ideal of social 
justice realized in an inclusive community amid diversity. Out of a sense of growing social 
obligation and imagined solidarity, citizens must take responsibility for the welfare of others, 
even strangers with different backgrounds and beliefs, submerging their individual interests for 
those of the common good, until their experiments are taken over by state intervention. 
Unlike more “conservative” conceptions, government action was not in opposition to 
community action; it was the ultimate and logical completion of it, because the state was nothing 
but the representative of the community will. The state was the expression of a “general will” in 
an almost Rousseauian sense, so that Addams did not see a significant chasm between the two 
methods of resolving social problems. To her contemporary critics, this was a central flaw in her 
program, for she took a rosy view of government as a statement of the community’s will, 
overlooking the realistic and confrontational elements of statesmanship. But for our purposes, the 
relationship between the social clubs, collective action, and state intervention in Addams’ 
rhetoric was a statement about community as not a tangible group of people, but a spirit of 
voluntary cooperation, obligation, and imagined solidarity on behalf of social justice and reform. 
For Addams, there was no contradiction in the principle of community between Hull House’s 
voluntary founding of a playground and a state-sponsored initiative to build playgrounds; both 
were ameliorative attempts founded in concern for the welfare of the community.   
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Individual in Progressive Reform   
Clearly Addams’ program and her rhetoric addressed the complex relation of the 
individual to the social group in American society. Addams found the social club to be the 
primary means for bringing isolated citizens together and working toward positive social change. 
Social clubs served as a base of acquaintance that drew individuals from their estrangement and 
into comradery, leading to a sentiment of human solidarity realized in a culture of civic virtue, 
whereby individuals submerge their interests to the collective need and greater good. Inclusion 
and identification results in the co-laboring of citizens for social change and industrial 
amelioration, a kind of intermediary between individual and state action. Addams’ vision of local 
community, as evidenced by her reforms in child recreation and labor unions, followed a 
trajectory from voluntary action to state intervention, with the government absorption of 
responsibilities being the natural and rightful culmination of the community spirit of obligation 
and extended identification.  
 From this exposition of Addams’ progressive rhetoric of community, a few preliminary 
conclusions are possible. Addams’ local-oriented program continues her concern for adjusting 
the new modern realities to first principles. Contextualized within her belief that the modern city 
was broken down because it was operating on an individualist code of morality no longer suited 
to it, and believing that error resulted in a lack of meaningful associations and a violation of 
justice, Addams rhetoric of community should be seen as an effort to fix a damaged social order 
through reorientation. In place of the individualist obligation to the self, she deployed a language 
of obligation to society. Community was the vehicle through which modern realities could be 
adjusted and reset along the progressive path toward justice.   
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Addams’ local labors were designed to counter the dominance of the individualist ethic 
through an ethic of “extended” obligation beyond the family and toward the civic community, 
using the practical means of social clubs and organizations as its stimulant. For this reason, it 
may initially be presumed that Addams’ rhetoric of community was pronouncing an alternative 
to individualism. This was, after all, how Addams sometimes framed the social ethic. From my 
vantage point, however, Addams’ adoption of volunteerism is actually a move to preserve the 
essential heart of individualism by adding the social bond as a complementary base; the choice to 
join, after all, is still left to the individual volition. A person unaffected by pleads of “social 
obligation” is still free to ignore. So rather than understanding Addams’ social ethic as opposed 
to American individualism, it is perhaps better to view it as the salvation of individualism, the 
community-impulse that rescues individualism from its own excess. Social clubs preserve 
individual choice by encouraging adequate social activity and solidarity so as to prevent 
mandated government action. Rather than disqualifying individualism, as Addams sometimes 
suggests, she adjusts it to the industrial condition by imbuing it with social responsibilities. Her 
reorientation was to add a social component to individualism so as to correct and preserve it.   
 Yet the program becomes complicated with Addams’ predilection toward government 
intervention as the desired culmination of the community bond. Addams saw little distinction 
between voluntary and state action, obfuscating the opposite directions from which these two 
“community” interventions flow. One was grassroots-oriented and the other was imposed by 
authority. Addams did not acknowledge this essential difference because government, in her 
rhetoric, was nothing but the instrument of the community’s voice, the actual representative of 
the general will and the result of citizen activism. Democratic institutions were the protector of 
the community’s sensibilities and achievements of social justice. While this was sometimes this 
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case, her conflation of voluntaristic and state action created a “communitarian mask” over what 
is to the author two opposing methods of securing social ends. It is a point that can be drawn out 
by looking to Addams second cosmopolitanism maneuver, the plea for International Community.  
If the above were the end of Addams rhetoric, community could be said to be a relatively 
prescriptive method for resolving social problems through voluntary clubs in the local arena 
along progressive values of tolerance, obligation, and social justice; however, Addams continued 
her program with a second critical Cosmopolitan step to attain World Community. Addams’ 
ability to use the trope of community to move from the social level to the world level illustrates 
the rhetorical utility and transcendent quality of the god-term. Since this dissertation is interested 
in the rhetorical fecundity of “community,” we can see how the community enables a further 
extrapolation of immediate human relations to a larger social program of world obligation.  
International Community 
 Beyond her work with industrial amelioration in her immediate Chicago “community” 
and a brief stint in National politics, Jane Addams set her sights on a higher—and after the 
outbreak of World War I, more pressing—moral achievement: International Community. The 
1910s saw international accord disintegrate amidst the brutalities of global conflict. As ardent 
nationalism arose on nearly all fronts to support the war effort, Addams staked a controversial 
pacifist position. Her commitments to democracy, justice, and community prevented avid 
participation in the war frenzy, isolating her from her fellow citizens and tarnishing her hard-
earned reputation.  
The later years of Addams’ life were spent wrestling with this press opprobrium and her 
ideological distance from the majority of her compatriots. In the face of growing national unity at 
the behest of a common foe, Addams envisioned an alternative unity founded it what was 
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universally held in common. She turned to the “primitive” motive of feeding the hungry as a 
more fundamental drive than the fury of war, believing that compassion and humanitarianism 
was as universal as fear and anger. The summation of her rhetoric called for a New 
Internationalism, a global accord characterized by peace, justice, cooperation, and fellowship. 
Rather than nationalism, Addams sought a wider purview for the passions and loyalty of citizens, 
pleading for an ultimate extension of the social obligation and shared identity to global 
proportions. Addams envisioned a cosmopolitan international community of complete inclusion.  
World War and the Pacifist Position  
 In the summer of 1914 war erupted between nations, engulfing the world in global 
conflict with a scale of death and destruction unprecedented to that time in history. President 
Woodrow Wilson, reelected in 1916 on the platform “he kept us out of war,” brought the United 
States into the conflict the very next year. Jane Addams, who had campaigned on behalf of 
Wilson, was dismayed by the turn of events. It was not lost on her that those same industrial 
conditions she vigorously labored to improve were largely responsible for the massive 
destruction rocking the globe. Addams could not endorse the war because she believed it to be 
avoidable; and while she supported the progressive principles and democratic idealism of 
Wilson’s fourteen points, she iterated that “democratic ends could not be attained through the 
technique of war” (Peace and Bread 60).  
Addams’ objected to the war as a matter of principle and exigence: war was a tragic loss 
of human life that drew upon the cruder elements of human motives, and war could not achieve 
the objectives it set out to attain. Addams saw war as a kind of sin or regression of human 
motives that went against the gradual progress of civilization toward rationality, cooperation, and 
democracy. The great conflict had caused a rupture in the upward move of history, bringing back 
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the “primitive” motives of tribalism and prejudice in an age otherwise increasingly prone to an 
enlarged human morality. That passion was now funneled toward nationalism, militarism, and 
limited loyalties. For Addams, the return to the crude beginnings of the race was bringing forth 
unimaginable human suffering, rekindling an obsolete and inadequate method for dealing with 
human affairs to the ruin of countless lives. War was a violation of the myth and value of modern 
“progress,” a catastrophe to highest moral achievements of universal brotherhood. In response, 
Addams pleaded with her fellow citizens to adopt an enlarged consciousness of human loyalty 
for the pursuit of peace. Her rhetoric of community was meant to combat the limited allegiance 
of nationalism on behalf of a progressive international ethic of “global community.” It was a 
reorientation away from violence, war, and conflict and toward peace, collaboration, and 
humanitarianism.  
The war was often defended by its proponents as a pathway to peace, progress, justice, 
and democracy—the “war to end all wars”—but Addams knew that slogan had been used 
throughout history to motivate recruits to support the cause while failing to deliver on its 
promise: for Addams’ fundamental conviction was that war does not spread democracy, it only 
destroys it (Centennial 273). Those who were proclaiming that the war could achieve a new state 
of justice and progress were fooling themselves, because “Social advance depends as much upon 
the process through which it is secured as upon the result itself” (Peace 4). There could be no 
progress through hatred and violence. Rather fellowship and justice must come through 
community: “justice between men and nations can only be achieved through understanding and 
fellowship, and that a finely tempered sense of justice, which alone is of any service in modern 
civilization, cannot possibly be secure in the storm and stress of war” (Peace and Bread 4).  
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In sum, Addams’ portrayed the war as a reversion from “progressive” motives of human 
cooperation and fellowship toward more tribalistic and primitive behavior. It was a rebuke to the 
best achievements of most recent century. The war, Addams contended, was caused by the 
failure to achieve a sense of world identification and international obligation; a curtailed sense of 
national loyalty predominated at the expense of a more inclusive and extended allegiance. In 
contrast to those hoping to achieve democratic ends, neither progress, justice, or democracy 
could be spread through the techniques of war. They required an entirely different set of human 
motives found in the peace and collaboration of “community.” 
The Nurturing of Human Life (Peace and Bread) 
 Addams progressive values and community convictions naturally led her to adopt a 
pacifist position in regards to the war; but as she soon found out by the scorn of her 
contemporaries, pacifism was not an easy position to hold. Pacifism was lampooned by the press 
as cowardly, unpatriotic, and an irresponsible embrace of isolationism, and its advocates were 
commonly dismissed as weak, naïve, idealistic, or treasonous. Addams took deep issue with such 
characterizations. Seclusion and isolation were the antitheses of Addams’ communitarian 
rhetoric in the local-urban arena, and she could not stand such a charge in world affairs; for her, 
pacifism was an attempt to achieve the same ameliorative goals of social improvement on the 
world stage, which required not violent conflict, but a peaceful and cooperative “wider life of 
coordinated political activity” (Peace and Bread 112). The difficulty confronting Addams 
became how to take a position condemned by her peers and show it to be an ethical achievement; 
how to get citizens to envision an alternative pattern of human behavior in world affairs. The 
situation thus required a work of rhetorical reframing, which Addams enacted through her 
communitarian grammar by redefining Pacifism as the “active nurturing of human life.”  
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 Addams’ reframing of pacifism began by countering the dominant narrative that pacifism 
was isolationist. Pacifists, she argued, were not neglecting their responsibilities to the world 
stage, but fulfilling their duties by edging humanity toward the higher achievements of peace and 
justice in “International Community.” To advocate for peace was more than to plead for an end 
to hostilities; rather pacifism meant actively working to improve the condition of all members of 
the human race. It involved a shift in emphasis from domination to community as the method of 
resolving world problems, focusing on collaborative efforts toward alleviating the condition of 
the suffering in International Affairs. By forsaking violence, American pacifists were not 
forfeiting their influence on the world stage as its critics alleged, but actually assuming a position 
of leadership by attaining a “wider life of coordinated political activity.” Addams defended this 
“activist” conception of pacifism by arguing that: 
a dynamic peace is found in that new internationalism promoted by the men of all nations 
who are determined upon the abolition of degrading poverty, disease and ignorance, with 
their resulting inefficiency and tragedy. I believed that peace was not merely an absence 
of war but the nurture of human life, and that in time this nurture would do away with 
war as a natural process (Second Twenty 35) 
 
For Addams, the active destruction of life through war should be replaced by a commitment to 
“nurturing” of human life. In accordance with the “nurturing motive,” a pacifist perspective 
endorsed an “International Community” uniting around common humanitarian causes to 
eradicate war. In this way, pacifists would not be shirking their responsibilities to their fellows, 
but fulfilling them by looking toward the universal human needs—food, shelter, and health.  
 The substitution of nurture for isolation as the antithesis to violence was Jane Addams’ 
critical rhetorical maneuver. Doing so symbolically transformed pacifism from a passive to an 
active program, one not simply against something (war), but for something (improved human 
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living standards)—peace was not the absence of violence, it was collaboration and fellowship for 
a common cause. That is, peace was International Community realized.  
In juxtaposing nurture with violence, Addams’ reorientation set up a contrast between 
two motives, both of which she saw as “primitive” resources for inciting human behavior. By 
placing pacifism, and the cognate terms justice, cooperation and fellowship within the “Nurture” 
camp, Addams asserted the primacy of community-building, life-giving virtues over those of 
combat and war. The ascending language of peace and nurture could then be said to be a 
legitimate and natural way of approaching international discord. For, however intrinsic and 
natural violence was to the human experience, the instinct to nurture was equally as primitive 
and natural to the human condition, and could thus serve as a countering force to war. In her 
rhetorical frame, war-violence and peace-nurture were two competing impulses, with praise-
worthy impulse being that of communal harmony. Addams formulated a switch a from a 
terminology of war to peace, violence to nurture, atavism to community. The best way forward 
was to capitalize on the act most directly implicated by the nurture metaphor: feeding the hungry.  
Addams wrote that “Peace and Bread has become inseparably connected in my mind,” 
and that “Through an effort to feed hungry people, a new and powerful force might be unloosed 
in the world and would have to be reckoned with as a factor in international affairs” (Centennial 
283; Second Twenty 144). That force was a sense of human fellowship and collaboration around 
a universal cause for the improvement of the collective lot. Addams realized that the epidemic of 
world hunger was of far too great a magnitude for simple philanthropy, local organization, or 
even national effort; feeding the hungry required no less that a united global effort, virtually 
equal to that of world war, but directed toward benevolent purposes. “Peace and Bread” became 
Addams’ slogan for the program of contesting war and building world unity through the 
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international effort to help those in need. The effort to feed the hungry was a natural extension of 
the pacifist aim to “nurture human life” across the globe. If harnessed correctly, Addams 
believed humanitarian causes, which were the natural outlet for familial compassion, could 
supplant the war motives and work toward a cosmopolitan World Community. 
The appeal to peace and bread can be understood as an appeal to fundamentals, a kind of 
“lowest common denominator” of human motives that all persons of the world would share. 
Peace, and not war, was the natural state of human activity, and the primitive urge to nurture was 
more engrained then the inclination toward violence. She asserted a shared universal premise of 
human compassion that could foster a progressive unity against child hunger, a union treated on 
“an international basis, the nations working together whole-heartedly to fulfill a world 
obligation” (Peace and Bread 208). That, above anything, was the aim of Addams’ enthusiasm 
for “peace and bread”—the directing of human energies toward the possibility of International 
Community. Community was the glue holding together her various appeals for peace and 
humanitarianism. Her rhetoric followed the same progressive community logic of local affairs: 
surely if your neighbor was hungry you would feed them. In the same way, why not have 
compassion and feed your fellow “neighbors” in the global community? 
Internationalism 
Both Addams’ defense of pacifism and call for humanitarian action on world hunger 
were subsidiary to her larger hope for a politics of Internationalism (Newer Ideals; New 
Conscience). Throughout the duration and conclusion of the war, Addams used all the resources 
at her disposal to plead for a program of Internationalism whereby all the nations of the world 
would come together and work out their differences to avoid war, establish justice, and initiate a 
long-lasting peace. If all the efforts that went into the great war could be redirected toward the 
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humanitarian needs of the world, she assured, there would be no reason the poor could not be fed 
and international accord be established. It was, Addams, believed, the duty of her time to 
inaugurate an international assembly where every nation was represented and had its interests 
heard. The ultimate end of Addams’ progressive rhetoric was the creation of an all-encompassing 
“Community of Nations.” 
 The greatest deterrent to such an internationalism was the curtailed sense of loyalty 
among citizens, especially that found in nationalism. Just as the familial ethic inhibited the 
development of a social ethic, so a firm national obligation prevented a sense of obligation 
toward the international community. Addams cautioned that, “their sense of duty thus specialized 
and limited, is dangerous because it refers only to a small group of men and excludes the 
penetrating sense of the fundamental unity and interdependence of society. They lost the 
challenge to a wider and more human relationship—the lure of fuller fellowship” (Second 
Twenty 155). A too narrow sense of community, while eliciting socially usefully behaviors 
within its domain, actually causes injustice and antagonism toward those left outside the fold. As 
society grew increasingly interdependent to the point of international implication, there was a 
corresponding need for a more extensive community sentiment and sense of world obligation. 
“The wider movement of civilization,” Addams argued, “is against limited loyalties” and toward 
“a new courage, more generous association, more freedom of expression and at the same time 
more candid and intimate relationships” (Second Twenty 156). International community, for 
Addams was the natural culmination of the widening move of history, beyond national 
boundaries and into the “cooperation of all nations” (Peace and Bread 3). Cosmopolitanism, 
with the peoples of all countries partaking in one human community, could enter the world into 
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an era of humanitarian social ends without a common enemy. Citizens of the world would come 
to acknowledge they are members of “the same human family” (Peace 6). 
 Practically speaking, the manifestation of “world community” that Addams most ardently 
supported looked similar to her advocacy of community at the local level: organizations working 
for positive social change. The major difference between the two programs was that “world 
organizations” were not necessarily made up of citizens voluntarily working toward 
improvements in their locales, but of governments and nations meeting to accomplish similar 
ends. There is thus a transition in the emphasis of Addams’ communitarian vision from 
voluntaristic non-state action toward world government.  
Above all, Addams staunchly defended proposals for a formal “International 
Government” as the desired culmination of world community. She thought it “unspeakably 
stupid that the nations should fail to create an international organization,” because the great 
world crisis for all its tragedy, brought forth an opportunity to create a new international 
government capable of making the appropriate political and economic changes to avoid future 
disaster (Centennial 281). Naturally, at wars end, Addams looked to the League of Nations as the 
great hope for world community:  
One turned instinctively to the newly creation League of Nations. Could it have 
considered this multitude of starving children as its concrete problem, feeding them 
might have been the quickest way to restore the divided European nations to human and 
kindly relationship. Was all this devastation the result of hypernationalism and might not 
the very recognition of a human obligation irrespective of national boundaries from the 
natural beginning of better international relationships (Peace and Bread 173) 
 
The League of Nations, as she conceived of its purpose, brought together the connected 
threads of Addams’ progressive rhetoric of community: an effort toward the alleviation of 
modern suffering, feeding the hungry as a primitive motive for global unity, the move beyond 
nationalism and toward world community, an awareness of the shared condition of all peoples, 
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and an overseeing government body tasked with the responsibility for establishing peace, justice, 
and fellowship. A universal guardian of human welfare, as the League of Nations purported to 
be, would be the ultimate culmination of Addams’ communitarian care ethic; for it would 
necessitate a complete world unity without a common enemy, a new motive founded in 
humanitarianism, compassion, and obligation to all persons. In fact, Addams’ defense of 
“International Community” was founded in the same logic of progressive reform itself—the hope 
that if people are brought together, they will be responsive and responsible for each other, and 
work together through “community action” to achieve reform in state policy and human activity.  
Inclusion through the Extension of Obligation 
 In review, the second step of Addams’ cosmopolitan rhetoric was toward a world 
community founded in what was universally held in common. She employed the familiar 
vocabulary of community to contest the Great War, which she saw as primarily a failure of 
human ethics. The war was a rupture in the progressive curve of history that brought back 
restricted tribalistic motives an age otherwise prone to an enlarged conception of human 
obligation. Social justice and world progress, Addams argued, could not be attained through the 
instruments of war, but only through an extended International Community characterized by 
fellowship, understanding, collaboration and peaceful conflict resolution. 
It can be said that Addams international rhetoric was a moral challenge to its auditors 
toward universality, for ‘progress’ defined as complete inclusion, community without borders, 
outsiders, or a common enemy. It is the abandonment of war for peace and fellowship; the 
collaboration of citizens toward improvement of living conditions and amelioration of human 
suffering; the forsaking of self and family for an idea called “society.” 
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 As with her local-oriented rhetoric, “community” was best understood as a sense of 
obligation and imagined solidarity operationalized for adjusting and improving the material 
conditions of citizens. Both culminate in a state-sponsored organization sentinel that oversees the 
attainments of human welfare. The significant differences between them were that Addams call 
for internationalism was more clearly defined in opposition to a social force—the world war—
and less concerned with the voluntary notion of organizational change. Her enemy was no longer 
the restricted sense of individualist and family obligation, but the restricted sense of national 
obligation. However, in both cases, Addams relies on the same essential maneuver toward 
greater inclusion. The motives and vocabulary of community were fruitful and malleable enough 
to be invoked in progressive platforms of vastly different scopes.  
This, then, is the emblematic rhetorical move of Jane Addams—the extension of 
obligation to an ever-larger number of people through an imagined solidarity of the entire human 
race. In her work with Chicago and Hull House toward amelioration of the industrial condition, 
Addams pleaded for a social ethic which expanded the familial obligation to the social ream of 
civic relationships; in her advocacy of pacifism, she used the same line of appeal, calling for a 
broadening of “human brotherhood” beyond the limited loyalty of nation and toward 
international community. In both instances, the progressive impulse gains its impetus through a 
move toward universal inclusion. Jane Addams’ progressive rhetoric is the perfect antithesis to 
provincial, sectional, or partial conceptions of community, because her complete community is 
the identification of all with all, with a concomitant duty to seek the welfare of every person; or, 
as she succinctly captures it herself, community means “to come into friendly relationships with 
ever larger and larger groups, and to live constantly a more extended life” (Centennial 321). In 
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every case when confronted with a choice between partial and universal loyalties, Addams 
advocates the side of universality. That was her rhetoric’s defining feature. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has captured what can be called Addams’ two rhetorical “reorientations” of 
the American mind; in the face of changing social circumstances, Addams worked to attain a 
socially conscious vocabulary of civic obligation and solidarity as a corrective to the language of 
individualism; in the face of global conflict, Addams attempted to reorient the world away from 
violent-war motives and national loyalties in trade for pacifist and humanitarian motives of 
global cooperation. In both cases, community was the vehicle for democratic change in adjusting 
modern life to the ideals of justice, tolerance, harmony, fellowship, and civic collaboration. 
Addams’ rhetoric relied upon the appeal to community as the “extension of obligation” to 
enlarge citizens’ imaginations about who was included in “us.” In so doing, her rhetoric endorsed 
a cosmopolitan ethic, whereby the further the sense of obligation is extended, the higher the 
moral achievement. While endorsing a dual citizenship to both the locale and the world, the 
ultimate aim was universal community understood as the identification of all with all, manifest in 
collaborative organizational efforts toward humanitarianism and social justice.  
It is appropriate, by way conclusion, to return to the research questions guiding this 
dissertation on what kind of work gets done with community? What actions/values does it 
sanction? And how does it navigate the relation between self and society, providing meaning and 
order to the American orientation? “Community,” in Addams’ rhetoric accomplishes the 
discursive work of re-framing and re-orienting the American public toward a value system in 
competition with individualist ethics and provincial loyalties. Addams’ invoked community to 
endorse progressive values of inclusion, tolerance, unity in diversity, obligation, and social 
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justice. To seek community meant to experiment with social improvements, especially 
improvements that helped those most in need. Accordingly, community sanctioned actions that 
invoked humanitarian ends, such as the joining of social clubs, the strikes of worker’s unions, 
benevolent state intervention through programs of social welfare, and the formation of a global 
governing body.   
 In the way of navigating the self with society to reset the social order, community for 
Addams was compensatory to the losses inherent to modern industry and urbanization. 
Community did not mean an escape or return to old forms of life, but the development of 
alternative forms of relationships appropriate to urban realities. Community was also a corrective 
to individualism, but one that served to preserve individualism’s essential core. For Addams, to 
seek community meant to bring citizens to an awareness of their shared destinies and mutual 
obligation in order to mobilize citizen to improve of their collective lot. Community was both 
ends and means, a method for social change and state of unity where individuals could find their 
rightful place. A rebalanced social order would be one where relationships were characterized by 
compassion, civic virtue, and a zeal for social reform. 
What then can be said to be at the heart of a progressive conception of community? In 
sum, the progressive conception of community displayed in Addams’ rhetoric was a future-
oriented program of adjustment, with community serving as a vehicle for democratic change. 
Community was an ethic of inclusion and extended obligation that aimed toward an imagined 
solidarity of all people as citizens of one cosmopolitan community.  
 In so far as Addams’ program is representative of progressive urges, it reveals the ethical 
underpinnings of liberal community to be one concerned with the predominance of individualist 
and nationalist assumptions. Progressive community attempts to correct the excesses of 
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individualism so as to create a social order more favorable to association and justice. It points to 
the possibility of a more inclusive and cooperative society characterized by solidarity and 
obligation. This progressive conception of community is not so much a thing as a morality, that 
aims for motives of humanitarianism, fellowship, and problem-solving through collaboration.   
 In such a progressive take on community, voluntary associations take on a central role. 
The accessibility and limited functions of clubs permit them to serve as platforms from which to 
enter the civic arena, sites where citizens learn how to express their political voices and come to 
find that their destinies are linked with their compatriots. Within an individualist system that by 
its nature grants autonomy and breaks down totalized unities, voluntary associations provide the 
critical outlet for curtailing the radical separation of individuals pursuing their own interests.  
 Yet the progressive rhetoric of community that is dependent upon voluntary association is 
goaded by a paradox over state intervention. Because democracy requires civic participation, the 
club provides an outlet for directly democratic action on behalf of citizens working to resolve 
issues of common concern; but in so far as the state subsumes those responsibilities as the natural 
culmination of civic activism, it also ironically renders them increasingly unneeded. The further 
the state encroaches upon the role of the club, the less power the club has to change conditions 
themselves, and the less incentive there is for citizens to establish such contingent solidarities. 
What is encouraged by such assumption of responsibility is a passive citizenry and an expanded 
government. These two forms of “community,” if the critic accepts Addams’ grouping, are at 
odds when both seek to become the primary vehicle of social change. One stems from the 
bottom-up while the other flows from the top–down. While Addams’ theory of government 
suggests that the state is the expression of the community’s will, even granting this assumption, 
it becomes hard to overlook the complexities and harsh realisms of governing that Addams 
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ignores. Addams’ rhetorical equivalence of voluntarism and state intervention as vehicles for 
positive social change rests upon a theory of government that strikes modern readers as idealistic 
and naïve. The dialectic between volunteerism and state intervention is a conflict that Addams’ 
use of community masks. It would therefore seem that the progressive who adheres to Addams’ 
conception of community must find a way of reconciling the desire for direct democracy with the 
advocacy of state institutions as benevolent guardians of social welfare.  
 The cosmopolitan is similarly faced with the difficulty of rallying support for “world 
community,” while smaller attachments—to family, friends, city, or nation—appear more 
natural, and certainly are more prevalent. The progressive cosmopolite such as Addams believes 
a more inclusive, extended, and totalized community is the preferable ethic and deploys the 
language of community on its behalf. This attempt at International Community in the League of 
Nations, as well as the United Nations, is founded in a kind of progressive logic that presumes if 
people (or nations) are brought together in “communal relations,” they will develop a sense of 
responsibility for each other. This movement from local to global, from community action to 
state policy, is in fact the model of progressive reform itself. Nevertheless, it seems likely this 
misses or underestimates the difficulties of apprehending an abstract concept of world 
community when the immediately proximate relationships breed more concrete and intense 
commitments. It may be that the cosmopolitan rhetoric of community conflates two very 
different forms of loyalty as belonging to the same “stuff,” building its moral system on a 
presumption of likeness for two processes which are better understood as dissimilar. Perhaps the 
fiction of world community, pragmatically, is less easily realized than those of nation, family, 
and individual. This does not mean the cosmopolitan must give up their moral standard of 
inclusion and acceptance, but it does magnify the difficulties present to the rhetorical endeavor. 
 160 
By choosing the language of community for such a task, Addams found a moral vocabulary 
attuned to her progressive values; but the very malleability of it also put it in competition with 
the power of more provincial and partial deployments of the same language. A provincial 
rhetoric of community, as a near perfect antithesis to the cosmopolitan one, will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOUTHERN AGRARIANISM AND THE PROVINCIAL COMMUNITY 
 “For, in conclusion, this much is clear: If a community, or a section, or a race, or an age, is 
groaning under industrialism, and well aware that it is an evil dispensation, it must find the way 
to throw it off. To think that this cannot be done is pusillanimous. And of the whole community, 
section, race, or age thinks it cannot be done, then it has simply lost its political genius and 
doomed itself to impotence” (I’ll Take My Stand lii) 
 
In 1930 twelve men, all in some manner associated with Vanderbilt University, convened 
to discuss the growing predominance of modern industrialism and its deleterious effects on the 
American social order. The writers, who called themselves the Southern Agrarians (1920s-
1930s), were dismayed by the state of affairs, and decided to stake a defense of the traditional 
way of life found in the United States South, believing it represented an ideal order of humane 
social relations. What emerged from their shared convictions was the manifesto, I’ll Take My 
Stand (1930), a virulent critique of modern society and passionate vindication of Southern 
communities. In it, the Agrarians called for a return to the small agricultural economy of rural 
America as the best means for preserving the traditions, values and customs of the South.  
The twelve contributors to the volume—Donald Davidson,  John Gould Fletcher, Henry 
Blue Kline, Lyle Lanier, Andrew Nelson Lyle, Herman Clarence Nixon, Frank Lawrence 
Owsley, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, John Donald Wade, Robert Penn Warren, and Stark 
Young—were men who differed considerably in matters of expertise and ideology, but they 
united around one common conviction: the South, for all its failings, was an image of 
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community, and it needed to be preserved from the disorder of the industrial system. They 
therefore turned to language of community to defend and endorse the Southern tradition.  
Upon publication, I’ll Take My Stand received a surprisingly wide circulation, eliciting 
both sympathetic affirmation and vehement condemnation by its readers. Its critics denounced it 
as nostalgic and reactionary plea for a mythical past, while its supporters commended it as a 
piercing appraisal of modern deficiencies and an endorsement of Western humanism. In its 
historical moment, the Agrarian program was polarizing and its image of community highly 
contested. Yet the legacy of the Agrarians and I’ll Take My Stand has long outlived its 
immediate context—historians credit the Southern Agrarians with garnering momentum for the 
conservative cause, serving as a kind of intellectual precursor to the traditionalist wing of 
modern American conservatism (Murphy; Nash). Since its publication, I’ll Take My Stand has 
never been out of print. For these reasons, the rhetoric of the Agrarians can serve admirably as a 
case study of the rhetoric of community as its occurs in a traditionalist discourse.   
In this chapter, I consider the Agrarian manifesto I’ll Take My Stand as a rhetorical text 
and statement of community values. I argue that the Agrarians employed a provincial rhetoric of 
community to transform the social failures of American industrialism and the moral failures of 
Southern identity. Community, for the Agrarians, occurred in an inherited tradition and social 
order which enabled a stable and humanistic culture to provide a home for the individual. In light 
of its historic sins, they submitted the South could be redeemed by its community virtues. I also 
argue that the Agrarians’ shared endorsement of community concealed their conflicting positions 
on racial inclusion and justice, and this conflict significantly undermined their program.  
To make this case, I contextualize the Agrarians’ historical circumstances, showing how 
their rhetoric of community was crafted to contest the rhetoric of industrial progress. I then 
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elucidate the characteristics of their provincial ideal of community, drawing attention to its 
construction as specifically South virtue. Finally, I discuss the Agrarians’ conflicting positions 
on the question of justice for African-Americans within the community, and close with a 
commentary on the implications of this analysis.  
Contesting the Rhetoric of Industry and Progress 
The twelve authors of I’ll Take My Stand chose to frame their program as one against 
Industrialism and in defense of Agrarianism, writing: “all tend to support a Southern way of life 
against what may be called the American or prevailing way; and all as much as agree that the 
best terms in which to represent the distinction are contained in the phrase, Agrarian versus 
Industrial” (I’ll Take xli). As evidenced by their self-proclaimed defensive position, the 
Agrarians were incensed as much by that they stood against as what they stood for. 
“Industrialism,” as their chosen terminological nemesis, was diffuse and imprecise, 
encapsulating a host of trends the Agrarians found undesirable, including progressivism, 
mechanization, abstraction, and adulation of the applied sciences. Industrialism served the role of 
summarizing Devil-term for a series of modern evils to be resisted at every turn.  
The selection of “Agrarianism” as the term of the South and “Industrialism” as that of 
American society writ large formed a fundamental binary at the heart of their rhetoric. As the 
explicitly offered point of contestation, the Agrarians defined Industrialism as “the economic 
organization of the collective American Society. It means the decision of society to invest its 
economic resources in the applied sciences” (I’ll Take xliii). The problem with industrialism was 
that it had over-capitalized on the mechanical prowess of the applied sciences to the point where 
its power had “become extravagant and uncritical; it has enslaved our human energies to a 
degree now clearly felt to be burdensome” (I’ll Take xliii). For the Agrarians, the unquestioned 
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industrial reign of the machine had ushered in a destitute society void of leisure, purpose, and 
human attachments. Labor had become monotonous, unfulfilling, and insecure; over-production, 
unemployment, inequality and economic instability was the norm. The inevitable result was the 
centralization of political and economic power, with a concomitant loss of individual liberty and 
communal autonomy. Industrialism was creating persons without names or place, unrooted 
masses lacking status and driven only by the pursuit of profit. In such a state where citizens are 
removed from nature, aesthetic and religious sensibilities inevitably decay.  
Amid the number of objections to industrialism and the rhetoric of progress, the 
Agrarians’ central complaint was the encroachment on the Southern way of life as they 
understood it. Industrialism, they believed, threatened to uproot, delegitimize, and eliminate their 
inherited social order. Business and technology were running amok and colonizing organic ways 
of life, leaving in their place an artificial and liminal habitation. The Agrarians therefore 
announced their mission as one of preserving the good in the past—the local community and 
traditional inheritance—from the destructive path of industrialism within the context of Southern 
life and culture. Industrialism was assigned the character of outside invader of indigenous 
practices, and the rhetorical move of the Agrarians was to accordingly position themselves as a 
beleaguered bloc fighting for the survival of their community. 
The Agrarian angst reached a fever pitch when a political program called the New South 
garnered widespread social support. The New South was a reform-oriented movement which 
implored Southerners to abandon their traditional economic reliance on agriculture and embrace 
modernization through integration with American industrialism. Writer Henry Grady, who first 
coined the phrase “New South” and was considered the movements spokesman, pronounced that 
the “South was Dead” and must be rebuilt by aligning itself with Northern capitalists. The New 
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South’s focus on economic development, in addition to FDR’s New Deal policies, saw farming 
mechanize into large-scale agricultural businesses, leading to a rapid migration of Southerners to 
cities for employment as cheap labor.  
The Agrarians were disconcerted by this development and attempted to stem the tide by 
staking a defense of independent farmers. For whatever inroads industrialization and 
progressivism was making on the rest of the country, its march into Southern territory, for the 
Agrarians, amounted to an invasion and declaration of war. The issue was one of lifestyle and 
values, but also the identity of Southerners. Ransom summarized the matter as follows: “The 
question at issue is whether the South will permit herself to be so industrialized so as to lose 
entirely her historic identity, and to remove the last substantial barrier that has stood in the way 
of American progressivism” (Ransom 22). To embrace the progressivism of the New South 
would be to give up the traditions and lifestyles the Agrarians believed integral to Southern 
Identity. The rest of the nation do as it will; let the South remain an anti-industrial agrarian 
community. 
Yet they were discouraged by the relative acquiescence given to manufacturing, warning: 
“Of late, however, there is the melancholy fact that the South itself has wavered a little and 
shown signs of wanting to join up behind the common American industrial ideal. It is against this 
tendency that this book is written” (I’ll Take xlii). The people, they feared, were being seduced 
by the shallow achievements of technology and wealth, trading the simple but meaningful 
pleasures for a life of aimlessness and instability.  
The Agrarians did not oppose technology or capitalism as such, but rather the theory 
underlying its application into the social order (Lanier). This theory of industrialism was the 
philosophy of “progress,” a doctrine they decried for championing change for change’s sake. 
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Leading Agrarian John Crowe Ransom compared the progressive mentality to purposeless 
“pioneering,” the waging of a war on nature to make profit without concern for what was being 
lost. The South was, for Ransom and the Agrarians, the last bulwark preventing industrial 
progressivists from annihilating the natural, inherited good life of regional communities. 
Within this context the Agrarians’ aimed toward a rhetorical transformation. As they 
looked around, they saw that the resources for defending agrarianism were at a notable 
disadvantage. The rhetoric of industrial progress, drawing upon scientific, technological, and 
mechanical achievements, was the governing narrative, and to call for a program of reaction or 
preservation was to go against the general social enthusiasm for reformation. Lyle Lanier sized 
up the rhetorical difficulty as follows:  
Modern industrialism has found the use of ‘progress,’ as a super-slogan. Very efficacious 
as a public anaesthetic. The magic word…progress is perhaps the most widely advertised 
commodity offered for general consumption in our high powered century, a sort of 
universal social enzyme whose presence is essential to the ready assimilation of other 
commodities, material and intellectual, generated by the machine age. A steady barrage 
of propaganda issues through newspapers, magazines, radios, billboards, and other 
agencies for controlling public opinion, to the effect that progress must be maintained. It 
requires little sagacity to discover that progress usually turns out to mean business, or 
else refers to some activity which serves to ally the qualms of the business conscience. 
General sanction of industrial exploitation of the individual is grounded in the firm belief 
on the part of the generality of people that the endless production and consumption of 
material goods means ‘prosperity,’ ‘a high standard of living,’ ‘progress,’ or any one 
among several other catchwords (Lanier 123) 
 
As much as a complaint as a diagnosis, the Agrarians realized that progress, as the promise of 
prosperity and advancement, held a great social sway, and any assault on such discourse must 
overcome a rhetorically subordinate position. The mission for traditionalists was to dismantle the 
rhetoric of progress and replace it with a conservative alternative, because the “super-slogan” 
progress, left unchecked, would serve to trample Southern ways of life. Responding to this 
threat, I’ll Take My Stand was framed as a tract of resistance, a rallying cry of a culture fading 
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against the overwhelming force of history. In searching for a competing discursive framework to 
complement their program, the Agrarians decided upon the language community; industrialism’s 
rhetoric of progress would be met with an agrarian rhetoric of community.   
Negotiating Southern Identity  
 There was a second rhetorical endeavor as well. As much as the twelve men were 
concerned with the preservation of agrarian communities in the face of American industrialism, 
their rhetoric was concerned equally with white Southern identity in light of the South’s 
disrepute and moral failings on race and slavery. The Agrarians felt a strong affinity with their 
regional past, but also an acute awareness of its racial evils. So, while they desired to contest the 
changing American landscape by appeal to the tradition they inherited, the Agrarians were also 
cognizant of the state of reproof to which the South had fallen for its historic sins. Perhaps the 
problem was best articulated by Allen Tate in his Poem, “Brief Message”: 
This, Warren, is our trouble now:  
Not even fools could disavow 
Three Centuries of piety 
Grown bare as a cottonwood tree 
(A timber seldom drawn and sawn 
And chiefly used to hang men on), 
So face with calm that heritage  
And earn contempt before the age.  
(57) 
 
Tate’s poem can be read as a dramatization of the rhetorical problem confronting the Southern 
Agrarians: to appeal to the Southern legacy as a statement of desirable community relations 
while also realistically confronting the sins of the past and the disapproval of their 
contemporaries. A further look into the subtleties of the poem can reveal the rhetorical context of 
the Southern Agrarian movement and the hurdles they faced in proffering a qualified defense of 
Southern identity in the Twentieth century.  
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 Like the Southern Agrarian movement as a whole, Tate’s note begins by highlighting the 
shared condition of Southerners, with an intimate appeal to his friend and fellow Agrarian Robert 
Penn Warren. The condition these friends share is the common “trouble” they must confront. As 
inheritors of the Southern tradition, their difficulty was that it would be blasphemous and beyond 
foolish (i.e. “not even fools could disavow”) to reject their heritage outright; it was “three 
centuries” worth of “piety,” that despite its shortcomings, was an established set of morals, 
customs, and outlooks that constituted “a way of life” to be received with honor. For all its 
weakness, it was their responsibility to preserve their inheritance. Yet, Tate writes, the piety had 
“grown bare” like a “cottonwood tree.” A tree, as a father-like image analogous to the Southern 
tradition, represents the longstanding structure and enduring weight of the past. But a 
cottonwood tree is not a timber of particular utility; it is a wood that offers few solutions to 
contemporary problems, not unlike the Old South itself. 
Furthermore, the cottonwood tree enters the image of the South’s original sin—slavery, 
and the horrific practices of Black lynchings. To be a Southern white meant to encounter the 
evils of the South’s systems, the tainting of its culture with a history of racism and brutal 
treatment of Blacks. If the Agrarians could not “disavow” their inheritance, neither could they 
proclaim its virtue. Any discussion, therefore, of the virtue of community as it was found in their 
region would have to answer for its oppression of African-Americans.   
 Tate’s poem concludes with the somber declaration, “So face with calm that heritage and 
earn contempt before the age.” Stuck in this state of tension because of the South’s shame and 
repeated moral failure, the Agrarians felt nonetheless that the region had something to offer and 
be defended, and so they must venture to face that heritage to find its source of redemption. The 
drift of American civilization, it had become clear, was turning against the customs of the South; 
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but the Agrarians ventured to look into the past for inspiration, and that put them in a state of 
separation from the common outlook of their age. They could respond with either defiance or 
resignation. I’ll Take My Stand was an attempt to navigate this bind.  
 It could be said, by way of summary, that the emergence of the Southern Agrarians and 
their manifesto I’ll Take My Stand, occurred in the realm of two failures: the failure of the 
American industrial system to provide for a desirable order of social relations, and the moral 
failure of their Southern tradition which led to its modern disrepute. The Agrarians found 
salvation from both failures in the idea of community—community was the redemptive virtue of 
the South and the corrective to the rampant industrialism threatening to erode agrarian lifestyles.  
 The ensuing section analyzes the Agrarians’ rhetorical transformation of these failures by 
claiming the language of community for the Southern tradition. In contrast to the rhetoric of 
industrial progress, the Agrarians appealed to a militant provincial ideal of community where an 
inherited way of life enabled an autonomous association of individuals to find their place and 
live localist lives of stability, liberty, order, and purpose. I will also show how the Agrarians’ 
shared support for Southern “community” served to mask their vehement disagreement on the 
question of racial justice, a discrepancy that would fracture and undermine their project.  
The Provincial Community 
The Industrial Violation of Community  
The opposition between two forms of life—Industrial and Agrarian—formed the crux of 
the debate between what it meant to be a homely provincial community and a ruthless, rootless 
society. There was, strictly speaking, for the Agrarians, no possibility of community among 
urban industrial spaces, and when they did invoke the term “community” in association with 
such lifestyles, it was only to draw attention to the incongruity between the communal ideal and 
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the nauseating reality. John Crowe Ransom, for example, captured the sentiment of I’ll Take My 
Stand when he indicted “certain Northern industrial communities as horrible examples of a way 
of life we detest—not failing to point out the human catastrophe which occurs when a Southern 
village or rural communities becomes the cheap labor of a miserable factory system” (Ransom 
23). Industrialism did proffer a way of life, he wrote, but it was one the Agrarian sensibility 
found horrific, hardly warranting the label of “community” in any significant way, except that it 
involved a large conglomeration of people in a singular space. Industrialism was, in fact, a 
straightforward disruption of true provincial community as it manifested in agrarianism, 
threatening to all but eliminate it from the face of the Earth.  
At base, the Agrarians cast industrialism, and its various allies of progress, science, 
materialism, and state centralization as violators of the principles of community. On nearly every 
account, its social life was portrayed as deficient, where not totally abhorrent. The modern 
person was rootless, anxious, unstable and isolated, as they were forced to give up their land and 
independence for a precarious dependency on machines and manufacturing. Industrial citizens 
did not control the means of their own labor and subsistence, but were forced into an economic 
system that exploited their labor, where the only option was between working poverty or 
unemployment. Further, they claimed the artificial habitation of the city was at war with nature, 
and left its citizens in a state of arrested adolescence, where they could not pursue the 
meaningful and humanistic portions of life such as religion, the arts, and human fellowship. The 
beauties of individualism and particularity had given way to aimlessness, mass consumption, 
fractured identity, and alienation from the past.  
For the Agrarians, if a community was a place of order, freedom, fellowship, and 
purpose, the industrial reign of the machine was its antithesis. What industrialism did in effect 
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was take a distinct and free people and turn them into a mass. Such masses may be close in 
physical proximity but are completely isolated in function. Bereft of genuine relationships or 
social purpose, citizens faced only ceaseless labor and moral collapse. There could be little by 
the way of artistic or spiritual satisfaction. In a word, industrialism for the Agrarians meant 
“communication without communion” (Warren, Reader 304). They claimed a meaningful life in 
such circumstances was all but impossible. 
As disturbing as the Agrarians found this state of affairs, if constricted to its own realm, 
they thought the two ways of life might live in a relatively peaceful coexistence. But 
industrialism was not satisfied with a partial existence; to survive, it must spread, and that meant 
marching into livelihoods where it was not welcome. The fear was that this decadent social order 
which corrupted human character was making significant inroads into the remaining worlds of 
community—the South and like-minded cultures still holding to a “humanistic” conception of 
social life.  
In lieu of its growing power and influence, the Agrarians adopted a militant framing of 
industrialism as a conqueror and foreign invader of communal homelands. Lytle used the phrase 
“industrial imperialism” while Ransom wrote that it would best be “represented to the Southern 
people as—what it undoubtedly is for the most part—a foreign invasion of Southern soil” (Lytle 
244; Ransom 23). When an alien army occupies a country, the anticipated response of a patriotic 
people is to rise to the occasion and defend their home-land; why then, they thought, would 
agrarian communities permit such an invasion by industrial forces into their districts? In the 
same way as war, the Agrarians beckoned for a motive of militancy, where the community 
“asserts and defends” the natural human functions of living (Lytle). The provincial narrative was 
that a communal way of life was in danger and in need of preservation from a majority trend bent 
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on dissolving it. Accordingly, the Agrarians positioned themselves as an embattled remnant 
coming together to fight for their homes against overwhelming odds. Their rhetoric assumed a 
siege mentality that pitted the natural harmony of agrarian community against the disorder and 
aimlessness of industrial society. 
The situation rhetorically named was one of battle, and if agrarianism was to subsist, it 
must ready itself for combat. Such a frame, was not simply one of fear and local patriotism, but 
one of tribalistic boundary work, making sharp and violent demarcations between “us” and 
“them.” The invasion frame also drew echoes to the still prevalent “lost cause” ideology, which 
saw the union army as “Northern Aggressors” in the Civil War. And yet, while advocating for 
the South, the Agrarians tempered their boundaries by crafting their appeal as one directed 
toward any community friendly to an agrarian, humanistic lifestyle. They called for an alliance 
of all “minority communities opposed to industrialism,” and were willing to pledge allegiance to 
a “national agrarian movement” should one arise (I’ll Take xliii). Their tribalistic defense was 
thereby softened by a sense of pragmatic solidarity with potential cultural allies. The true enemy, 
they insisted, was industrialism, and it must be resisted to preserve agrarian communities 
everywhere.  
In attempting to ward off the advances of industrialism, the Agrarians considered 
numerous methods, such as the possibility of embracing party politics: “Should the agrarian 
forces try to capture the Democratic party, which historically is so closely affiliated with the 
defense of individualism, the small community, the state, the South?” (li). And yet, the Agrarians 
were pessimistic that such bodies would adequately look out for the general interest of the “small 
community.” They therefore decided upon a more radical proposition: a total rebuke of the 
industrial economy and a deliberate reorganization of the economy around independent farmers. 
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Lytle explained, “the answer lies in a return to a society where agriculture is practiced by most of 
the people,” recommending that “the large surplus of chronically unemployed should be induced 
by all possible means to return to agriculture” (Lanier 203; 152). That is, the answer to industrial 
woes was the complete return to provincial communities.  
That these were radical reactionary measures, the Agrarians did not deny—Allen Tate 
explicitly advocated such a revolutionary reaction, writing “Reaction is the most radical of 
programs; it aims at cutting away the overgrowth and getting back to the roots. A forward-
looking radicalism is a contradiction; it aims at rearranging the foliage” (Tate, “Remarks” 175). 
This, in a word, was the heart of the Agrarians’ rhetoric of community: to cast away the sources 
of social disorder and return to communal purity. The demand to recover agrarian provinces was 
a jeremiad, a plea to return to basics and fundamentals in order to reclaim a lost and fading sate 
of communal harmony.  
Only through such radical and resolute defiance could industrialism’s momentum be 
halted. The South, they submitted, for all its failings, was the nation’s best restraint on such 
materialistic motives (Nixon 198). It was decided that the best recourse for saving the social 
order was a militant defense of provincial communities—said John Crowe Ransom: 
“Industrialism is an insidious spirit, full of false promises and generally fatal to 
establishments…Only a community of tough conservative habit can master it” (Ransom 16). 
That tough-minded conservative community was the core of the Agrarians’ political program—a 
defiant people clinging to their provincialism from the advances of the industrial mass.    
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Provincial Community as the Agrarian Alternative 
 Disenchanted with the modern scene and the presuppositions of progress, the Agrarians 
marked an insolent tone in defense of the South through the language of localist and regional 
self-determination:  
Nobody now proposes for the South, or for any other community in this country, an 
independent political destiny. That idea is thought to have finished in 1865. But how far 
shall the South surrender its moral, social, and economic autonomy to the victorious 
principle of Union. That question remains open. The South is a minority section that has 
hitherto been jealous of its minority right to live its own kind of life. The South scarcely 
hopes to determine the other sections, but it does propose to determine itself, within the 
utmost limits of legal action (I’ll Take xlii) 
 
Against “infiltration” by the outside forces of industrial entrepreneurs, the Agrarians asserted the 
right of autonomous communities to live their own kind of life, and in so doing employed a 
rhetoric of community that was thoroughly provincial. The endorsement of the provincial 
community, for the Agrarians, was the integral move in what they saw as their battle for survival 
against the annihilation of agrarian values and social practices. Such a community, in appealing 
toward a militant “minority section” determined to live by their own code, represented a counter-
statement to the “progressive” impulse toward change and the rationalist’s predilection toward 
abstraction. Community is marked by union, yes, but also by division, and the Agrarians 
advocacy of provincialism draws attention to the role of difference in forming collective 
character.  
Unlike cosmopolitanism’s search for a community of complete inclusion, provincialism 
depends to a degree on exclusion, being defined not only by what it is, but what it is not. 
Provincialism should not, however, be taken as purely a program of negation; the provincial 
community is one rooted in an inherited way of life, looking not toward rational abstraction, but 
the traditions accumulated over generations to provide a stable, satisfactory, humanistic social 
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organism. Such a community is necessarily limited in size and scope, for it depends upon the 
sense of rootedness and permanence found in close attachments to land and blood. To flaunt 
provincialism is to trumpet the virtues of particularity and local flavor over the flattening effects 
of centralization and massification accompanying modernity. A provincial community, then, is 
one that finds its character through the peculiar genius and customs that distinguish it as an 
autonomous and self-directed unity.  
To some degree, regionalism, localism, sectionalism, parochialism, and totemism all fall 
under the cloak of provincialism, as they share an accent on the manner in which narrow 
affiliations or shared practices of meaning inform cultural identity. The emphasis is not upon the 
nationally or generally held, but on the locally distinct. Provincialism prefers particularity to 
universality.  
The provincial community might then be said to exhibit something of a “tribalistic” 
impulse, in so far as it displays an inclination toward intense group loyalty and reverence for kin, 
ancestry, tradition, and myth, as well as an acute awareness of the threat posed by “outsiders” to 
its avowed way of life. Tribalism involves a notable desire for cultural purity through the 
preservation of shared customs, rituals, conventions, beliefs, and values from intrusion or 
subversion. Penetration into the community is met with alarm and resistance, sometimes rage, in 
the name of safeguarding the social order.  
This tribalistic description is not meant as a form of censor, as Agrarian John Gould 
Fletcher himself mused on the tribalistic foundations of all communities and agrarian ones were 
no different (Fletcher 100). There is in fact a certain type of provincialism amounting to little 
more than blind collective egoism, manifest in narrow and unthinking devotion to one’s section. 
And it is true that provincial ideals of community may display a greater inclination towards 
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exclusion, and in extreme cases, violence. But a proper provincialism is no bad thing; it is an 
ethical system built on fellowship, comradery, and obligation with an eye toward intimate human 
companionship between persons that share a common history. It is community on a smaller, 
particularistic level that is acutely aware of its boundaries and differentiation from surrounding 
cultures.   
It was toward such a provincial ethic of community that the Agrarians turned for setting 
right the social order and preserving the Southern inheritance. Herman Clarence Nixon declared 
that “the South must cultivate its provincial soul and not sell it for a mess of industrial pottage” 
(Nixon 199). In looking to Europe for inspiration, John Crowe Ransom spoke highly of “self-
sufficient, backward-looking, intensely provincial communities,” commending their affability 
with nature, fixed roots, comfortable institutions, modest affluence, and generational perpetuity 
(Ransom 12). Stark Young likewise recommended provincialism as a sense of place and identity 
that provides life with direction, making it a state of mind amenable for defending a communal 
home (Young 344). Together, the Agrarians settled on provincialism as the communitarian 
program that could stymie the advancement of industrialism into unwelcome territory.  
It is important to note that the Agrarians were sure to define provincialism so that it was 
not only an autonomous system of values and way of life, but an ostensibly agrarian one. 
Andrew Nelson Lytle explicitly conducted such an association when he wrote that the heart of 
provincialism “prefers religion to science, handcrafts to technology, the inertia of the fields to the 
acceleration of industry, and leisure to nervous prostration” (Lytle 235). Here, the continuation 
of the dualism between industrial and agrarian frameworks functions to associate the ideal of a 
provincial community with the particular legacy of the South and its religious, aesthetic, and 
soil-based culture.  
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The provincial communities of the South, in the Agrarians discourse, were directly 
opposed to economic modernization and the industrial values espoused by the rhetoric of 
progress. Provincial communities thus held within them a rebuke to the larger American culture, 
promising an alternative lifestyle where the precarity and exhaustion of industry was replaced 
with a light and easy life of the land, where aesthetic and spiritual dynamism mixed with 
meaningful toil and human communion in a stable, tried-and-tested social order past down from 
generations. Such Southern communities, they argued, were guardians of individual freedom, 
bringing together liberty and order into a social organism where every person could find their 
place in peaceful accord with the dictates of nature.  
My thesis is that the Agrarians, in navigating the moral failures of Southern history and 
the ethical outrages of American industrialism, embraced provincial “community” as the antidote 
to modern problems and the redemption of the Southern tradition. Community served to 
rhetorically transform failures into a possibility of restoration for both the American social order 
and Southern identity. Embracing provincialism meant making amends for the past and restoring 
the balance between freedom and order, liberty and authority, past and future, self and society. I 
here work to more fully illuminate the traditionalist characteristics of provincial community as it 
was constructed by the Agrarians to contest the modernization of the South and the rhetoric of 
industrial progress, paying particular attention the way “community” permits rhetorical 
transformation of the failures of Southern identity. For the Agrarians, provincial communities 
were the ideal kind of social organism, defined in opposition to the order of industrialism which 
consistently violated the principles of the good life. The agrarian alternative involved an 
inherited tradition and way of life, founded on a culture of the soil, that initiated a particularist 
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humanism which safeguarded the freedoms of the individual and the autonomy of the local 
community.  
Inherited Way of Life  
For the Agrarians, the first mark of community was a satisfaction with the inherited order 
of things. The provincial soul is received from one’s ancestors and the land, whose very distance 
from the larger civilization bestows it with its rich parochial character. Only within the confines 
of an inherited tradition can a satisfactory, stable, and meaningful life be lived. It is the tradition 
that bestows a sense of order and purpose to the lives of the individual and community.  
By framing the ideal social order as an inheritance, the Agrarians highlighted a kind of 
continuity with the past that imputes to its recipients a the responsibility to protect it. It considers 
existing values and ways of life as something that has been worked out over generations and 
therefore worthy of respect and preservation, even as it must be amended in the face of new 
circumstances. Change can come, but it must not come lightly; only out of a sense of fear and 
trembling, awe and admiration, should a people depart from the way of their ancestors. 
Accordingly, the burden of proof falls to those suggesting change or departure from convention. 
For this reason, arguments from mere abstraction must be met with suspicion when they 
advocate the radical disruption of social practices or stark breaks from the past. For the 
Agrarians, reasoning does not occur in a vacuum, but must occur within the community’s 
traditions and customs, keeping an eye to the practical necessities required for a stable life. The 
framing of community as an inheritance placed the emphasis on permanence and preservation, 
not on change and reformation, and imputed its inheritors with the obligation to defend it. 
Disdain for the communal inheritance, the Agrarians believed, was why industrialism had 
gone so far astray: it radically departed from convention because it questioned the existence of 
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social institutions based on secular rationalist principles. Lyle Lanier denounced how, 
“Institutions and customs were no longer regarded as self-justifying; they were subject to critical 
rational analysis…In general there was a tendency toward emancipation from the past, an 
attempt to settle the problems of man’s nature and destiny in a purely abstract fashion and apart 
from the ‘vital force of historical reality’” (Lanier 129). Yet Lanier warned, “logical cogency is 
no criterion of empirical practicability in the realm of social reorganization” (Lanier 129; 141). 
Existing institutions were to be considered self-justifying because they had organically evolved 
to provide a modest and satisfactory efficacy for its people. The evaluation of a tradition from 
rational principles coming outside of it is not only ill-advised, but when used as justification for 
forsaking the tradition, ushers in unstable state of constant change and chaotic upheaval, 
upending the order of things for an infinite series of adjustments. The result was a life without 
purpose or direction.  
A proper respect for the social order, meanwhile, begins with an appreciation for the 
order of things as they are, and does not reject a tradition simply because it is goaded by 
shortcomings. It seeks instead to make amends for its failings, but always within the confines of 
the inheritance, and making sure to preserve the tradition’s essential core. 
Such a conception of communal guardianship was easily amenable to the Agrarians for 
justifying a qualified defense of the Southern tradition amid its shortcomings. John Crowe 
Ransom commended the South’s agrarian lifestyles in these terms, writing that, “They have 
elected to live their comparatively easy and routine lives in accordance with the tradition which 
they inherited, and they have consequently enjoyed a leisure, a security, and an intellectual 
freedom that were never the portion of pioneers” (Ransom 4). By continuing in the way of their 
ancestors, the Agrarians contended, Southern community members attained a certain safeguarded 
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quality of life that could never be known in the industrial scene. While the culture of South was 
flawed and that needed to be addressed, it should not be forsaken, because its established 
communities provided citizens with a source of permanence amid a time of change. The constant 
pursuit of innovation, change and wealth comes with a price: such a society risks losing all that 
was so slowly gained over generations—a humble life, yes, but one with a tested practicality and 
steadiness. A provincial community is thus “a way of life which had been considered and 
authorized,” meant to endure permanently, rather than the provisional nature of industrial 
reforms (Ransom 13).  
This social ease within a communal inheritance required, not only a glance to the future, 
but a long and appreciative look toward the past (Ransom 13). A people who had lost a sense of 
their past had lost their identity. Such was the lot of the industrialists and progressivists who 
were so enthusiastic about technological advancements that they had lost the connection between 
a people and their land. It is only when a people operate within a scheme of social practices 
grounded in remembrance that they can subsist in meaningful relation and order. When this does 
not occur and there is a dislocation of identity, the natural reaction is one of nostalgia, which for 
the Agrarians was a reminder of the good being lost, a warning to slow the tides of change and 
preserve the tradition being forsaken. Ransom explained: 
Nostalgia is a kind of growing-pain, physically speaking. It occurs to our sorrow when 
we have decided that it is time for us, marching to some magnificent destiny, to abandon 
an old home, an old provincial setting, or an old way of living to which we had become 
habituated. It is the complaint of human nature in its vegetative aspect, when it is plucked 
up by roots from the place of its origin and transplanted in foreign soil, or even left 
dangling in the air. And it must be nothing else but nostalgia, the instinctive objection to 
being transplanted, that chiefly prevents the deracination of human communities and their 
complete geographical dispersion as the casualties of an insatiable wanderlust 
 (Ransom 6) 
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Nostalgia serves as a chief impulse of human nature toward preserving and protecting “human 
communities” from destruction. For the Agrarians, it was human nature to be rooted and fixed in 
a place and tradition with one’s fellows, and nostalgia represents the soul crying out when such 
needs are violated. To do harm to nostalgia, to dismiss it as a romanticization of a life that never 
was, is to ignore the human need for continuity and the cautions against abandoning an inherited 
way of life.  
It was through these terms that the authors of I’ll Take My Stand defended and 
recommended the agrarian life, and by implication, the cultural history of the South. 
Industrialists, rationalists, and progressivists all promised a life of prosperity, but the Agrarians 
argued it was a shallow life filled with empty promises; the agrarian South, despite its many 
flaws, offered an example of a true culture for other citizens desiring a way out of the brunt of 
industry. The South was a real community, which meant it first was an inherited tradition 
providing a life of order and stability. Amid a time of change, widespread nostalgia was the 
evidence that the good in the past was being lost; and it was the duty of Southerners to come to 
their community’s defense and safeguard the way of life that had been built up over generations. 
The answer to modern problems lied within the Southern tradition itself.  
Culture of the Soil 
 The second mark of a provincial community was its close attachment to the land, 
manifest in a rooted life of the soil. The essential conviction of Agrarianism was that “the culture 
of the soil is the best and most sensitive of vocations” (I’ll Take li). This culture entailed not only 
an agrarian economy, but a concomitant spiritual culture attuned to the dictates of nature.  
In the Agrarian portrayal, a life of independent farming knows nothing of the disruption 
and artificiality of industry, for it involves participation in humanity’s eternal toil with nature. 
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The labor is hard and difficult, but it is meaningful and rewarding. The farmer takes part in “the 
most ancient and the most humane of all the modes of human livelihood,” earning their living 
and autonomy through a wrestle with the land (Ransom 18-19). Yet the farmer’s relationship to 
the soil is one of respect and reverence, while the industrialists wage an “unrelenting war” on 
nature (Ransom 7). What farmers gain through their toil is their independence and spiritual 
development, the humanistic satisfaction that comes with a life well lived.  
While the Agrarians admitted that farmers would never reach the same level of economic 
prosperity as the most successful entrepreneurs, that was no knock against them. It was to the 
credit of Southern provincial communities that they preferred a fixed life of the soil to the 
imaginary wealth of bankers and industrialists. Agrarians citizens were content with a modest 
living, so long as it provided basic subsistence and allowed participation in a humanistic form of 
life. As Andrew Lytle put it, “A farm is not a place to grow wealthy; it is a place to grow corn” 
(Lytle 205). Community members prize quality of life over an abundance of capital, especially 
when they possess the most tangible of all possessions—land. 
For the Agrarians, land was most valuable possession because it guaranteed peace with 
nature, social stability, and individual freedom. Land was a kind of “social anchor” that 
discouraged restless mobility because it established a degree of permanence and continuity 
between person and place. This rootedness connected individuals with their ancestors and 
cultural inheritance, creating a base for enduring fellowship and communal humanism. 
Land was also the protector of individual autonomy, for the person who owned land had 
security in an independent means of subsistence that could not be taken away. The progressive 
industrialists, in calling for farmers to embrace mechanization and urbanization, were offering a 
sour deal which served to confiscate that individual autonomy. Lytle warned, “In exchange for 
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the bric-a-brac culture of progress he stands to lose his land, and losing that, his independence” 
(Lytle 205). The “floating populace” of industrial centers had nothing, but land within a regional 
community enabled one to find a life of satisfaction and independence among a similarly free 
people who associated in genuine fellowship within a tradition of shared values. Land ownership 
formed a kind of common identity, but one that was racialized and classed.  
The spiritual and aesthetic benefits of land were not to be overlooked either, for the 
contemplative labor and preservation of individual liberty of agrarianism permitted the 
development of a robust philosophical culture of spiritual fulfillment and communitarian 
humanism. The citizen of a provincial community, the Agrarians proclaimed, “identifies with a 
spot of ground, and this ground carries a good deal of meaning; it defines itself for him as 
nature…and so his life acquires its philosophical and even its cosmic consciousness. (Ransom 
19-20). In the traditionalist rhetoric of community, the land is representative of the communal 
inheritance itself, an integral marker of the people, and a cause for reflection on the eternality of 
nature and the qualities of a good life. The farmer in close contact with the land “concludes a 
truce with nature and he and nature seem to live on terms of mutual respect and amity, and his 
loving arts, religions, and philosophies come spontaneously into being: these are the blessings of 
peace” (Ransom 7). Permanency and concord with the dictates of human nature were bestowed 
only to those who lived a life of the soil. Within such a system of reverence and reflection, a 
humanistic local culture intuitively follows.  
Humanism and Particularity  
This introduces the third defining characteristic of provincial community: a genuine 
humanistic culture founded on localism and particularity. Such a humanism strikes a cordial 
balance between labor and leisure, providing ample opportunity for the flourishing of art, 
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religion, manners, and education. What emerges from such a culture are free, spiritually and 
aesthetically cultivated individuals living in the company of fellow citizens who share in a 
common way of life.  
A humanistic social order, for the Agrarians, required operation within an inherited order 
with close ties to the land. Humanism “is not an abstract system, but a culture, the whole way in 
which we live, act, think, and feel. It is a kind of imaginatively balanced life lived out in a 
definite social tradition” (I’ll Take xlviii). The Agrarians argued that a humanistic culture could 
never be implanted or imposed by the adoption of abstract principles into an otherwise vacuous 
culture, as the supporters of industry attempted to do. Instead, humanism must emerge from a 
particular social tradition or provincial community received from the past and evolved over time. 
The good life is one which has been established over generations and is given its character from 
its history and particularism. It had managed to secure a satisfactory habitation by gradually 
working out a cordial relation between labor and leisure through the local arts.  
For the Agrarians, the South, despites it’s obvious shortcomings, partook in such a 
“deeply founded way of life,” and therefore offered a model of cultural balance for those 
discouraged by the barrenness of industry (I’ll Take xlviii). They believed that the mechanized 
labor of modern citizens at its core was abhorrent and aimless: “his labor is hard, its temp is 
fierce, and his employment is insecure” (I’ll Take xliv). While the Agrarians acknowledged that 
good labor must be effective—something industry could claim—labor must also be an enjoyable 
undertaking (I’ll Take xliv). In this regard, industrialists failed miserably. The condition of 
industrialism necessitated an addiction to work and loss of vocation; but agrarian communities, 
like those of the South, had steadily evolved a homely balance between leisure and labor. On this 
note John Crowe Ransom wrote, “There are a good many faults to be found with the old South, 
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but hardly the fault of being intemperately addicted to work and to gross material prosperity. The 
South never conceded that the whole duty of man was to increase material production” (Ransom 
12). Community citizens instead found the qualitative and aesthetic virtues worthy of devotion. 
So, while Southern provincial community farmers retained a noted dedication to work, they 
possessed an equally esteemed devotion to the life of leisure and the mind.  
In specific, the Agrarians lauded the regional and particularist cultural experiences of 
provincial traditions for enabling shared participation in a communal order. John Crowe Ransom 
dubbed them “arts of living” and “community arts, in which every class of society could 
participate after its kind” (Ransom 12). The romantic arts which flourished in Southern agrarian 
communities—such as conversation, manners, hunting, fishing, oratory, poetry, and preaching—
provided not only a leisurely outlet for entertainment, but also a sense of regional identity and 
solidarity where everyone could contribute to the social order and find their place (Ransom 12; 
Lytle 211; Young 346). Pragmatically, the arts established a common set of social 
discriminations and shared judgments that facilitate fluid action by members of the community. 
Allen Tate referred to this as the public development of “Taste”—“reliance on custom, breeding, 
ingrained moral decision” (“Remarks” 17). By holding confidence in the shared standards of 
taste rather than insisting on abstract and independent moral reasoning, communities made way 
for easy and harmonious decision making by the provincial body.   
Within this realm of taste, communal history, and shared worldview enters the role of 
education. The end of education is to fit a person for life as a productive member of their 
provincial community by training students to be intellectually capable of learning about any 
subject they wished and applying it to human affairs. Mere exposure to information on its own 
does little good to a person when it is not situated within their actual surroundings. It is better 
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that a student be brought up in the ways of the community and instructed in a kind of local civic 
patriotism. “The purpose of education,” explains John Gould Fletcher, “is to produce balanced 
character—the man of the world in the true sense. Who is also the man with spiritual roots in his 
own community in the local sense,” (Fletcher 111). That is, students should be brought up in 
communal norms, tastes, and expectations, so that they are cultivated into a sense of place, 
identity, and loyalty to their province. Education, like religion and the arts, was a source of local 
color and community pride, serving to bind the unity together in a humanistic culture that 
safeguarded order, harmony and freedom. Holding this shared reservoir of experience and 
discrimination, the people could truly come to know each other.  
It is only in such communities, for the Agrarians, that genuine human fellowship is 
possible, where the self can find its proper relation to society. A provincial, humanistic culture in 
which citizens ascribe to a shared set of aesthetic and social preferences encourages voluntary 
gatherings and joyful companionship in a way not possible in industrial society (Lytle 231). A 
meaningful way of life must not only be lived in a thriving cultural tradition, but in close 
association with likeminded fellows. This authentic human intimacy requires a physical 
grounding and consistent contact through face to face communication:  
The only association or communication of any psychological import is that of face-to-
face interaction among individuals, and it appears that instead of more association of this 
sort in the corporate age there is actually less of it…This real association exists, for the 
generality of people, only in the agrarian community and in villages and towns which are 
its adjuncts. It depends upon a stable population, upon long acquaintances, since human 
beings do not bear spigots by which ‘fraternity’ can be drawn off for the asking (Lanier 
145-146) 
 
True human companionship cannot be sustained based off convenience, happenstance, strategy, 
or other trivial pursuits; a person finds association only in smaller communities amid long-
enduring personal acquaintances. Within industrial circles, relationships are always goaded by 
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ambition and business; even when the mass of individuals attempt to act in concordance and 
unity, they are absent of any genuine communion. As Lanier puts it, “The two thousand patrons 
of a modern movie palace engage in no real communication or interaction, and consequently 
could scarcely be said to participate in an aggregate emotional life” (Lanier 145-146). But in the 
provincial life of agrarian communities, like those of the South, the neighborhood gathers for 
old-time socials and traditional forms of fellowship and comradery. They are present with each 
other physically and spiritually. Relationships are not built on convenience but on custom, 
cultivated over years of acquaintance and stability. A person has a name and is known; like their 
ancestors, generations grow old side by side on the same plots of land, linked by blood, kin and 
friendship. 
Individualism  
In this way, community-based art, religion, education, taste, and fellowship were 
functional contributions to individual and collective judgment. The virtue of provincial 
communities, like those found in the agrarian South, was that they enabled citizens to live along 
pre-set guidelines, not intruding on individual liberty, but granting freedom within a defined 
social tradition. Social custom becomes the patron of communal autonomy, preventing any need 
for outside intervention. Within this society, the individual can operate freely without disrupting 
the order, all the while contributing to the communal well-being. Stark Young explains this 
correlation when discussing the social-consequences of provincial arts: “Manners and sincerity 
are matters understood only with reference to a state of society that assumes a group welfare and 
point of view rather than individual whims, a flow among a group of human beings, a life to 
which each single human being contributes and in which he lives” (Young 346). By operating 
within the unique provincial traditions and customs, the whole-body benefits because the 
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regional sensibilities have been built and cultivated so as to put the interest of the community 
first. The individual has direction to his or her affairs, but their “whim” is directed toward 
socially productive ends. There is, in sum, public benefit to individual action.  
For the Agrarians, these customs and traditions, far from violating the individual’s 
freedom, actually guarantees it. The provincial community, in preserving stability and a 
relationship with the past in a world of change, protects indigenous customs and practices from 
dilution and interference by outside forces. By so doing, provincialism enables an autonomous 
self-directed subset of human relations to develop organically with a balance of liberty and order. 
The individual finds their home, their place of ultimate satisfaction, in the company of persons 
with shared values, traditions, and sensibilities. Community in the Agrarian taxonomy was not an 
antagonist to the philosophy of individualism, but its fulfillment 
There was for the Agrarians, strictly speaking, no such thing as society or collective 
behavior as it had been portrayed by progressives and industrialists (Lanier 144). “Society” was 
an abstraction and rhetorical device used to do violence to the needs of actual persons. Any 
alleged benefit to society which did not manifest in tangible remunerations for actual individuals 
was for all intents and purposes non-existent: 
They tell us—and we are ready to believe—that collectively we are possessed of 
enormous wealth and that this in itself is compensation for whatever has been lost. But 
when we, as individuals, set out to find and enjoy this wealth, it becomes elusive and its 
goods escape us. We then reflect, no matter how great it may be collectively, if 
individually we do not profit by it, we have lost by the exchange (Lytle 201) 
 
For the Agrarians, the prosperity of bankers and entrepreneurs was imaginary, and no claim to 
the “wealth” bestowed by progress could change the fact that few actual individuals saw little if 
any of the supposed riches; as “society” benefitted, real persons were worse off. So, when the 
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Agrarians heard appeals by industrialists for sacrifice and allegiance to “social progress” and 
“social welfare,” they were appalled. There was no such thing as society:  
Men are prepared to sacrifice for their private dignity and happiness to an abstract social 
ideal, without asking whether the social ideal produces the welfare of any individual man 
whatsoever. But this is absurd. The responsibility of men is for their own welfare and that 
of their neighbors; not for the hypothetical welfare of some fabulous creature called 
society (I’ll Take l) 
 
For the Agrarians, there could be no responsibility to society or social welfare. Every person 
does have an obligation, but it is not to society; it is to individuals and the members of one’s own 
community. That is it. A citizen must look after their kin and tribe, but cannot be held 
responsible for the welfare of so-called society. 
For this to happen, they argued, it was imperative that the provincial community be left 
alone, and given the right to determine itself through the voluntary effort of its own citizens (I’ll 
Take xliii). The small association was sufficient to handle its own affairs, and when government 
tried to intervene, or foreign influences interfered in local affairs, the integrity of the community 
was at risk. This was more than a claim to “state’s rights,” though such a line of appeal was long 
familiar to Southerners, where it was employed frequently before and after the Civil War to 
justify the region’s secession and dependence on slave labor. But the claim of the right of 
provincial communities to determine their own way of life by the Agrarians was also an assertion 
of social and philosophical individualism, the conviction that issues pertaining to a particular 
locale were best worked out by the citizens who actually live there. Communal mores and 
customs were the prerogative of the individuals most invested in them, and while insiders might 
dispute among themselves the proper direction of community affairs, meddling from outside 
forces, whether from economic markets or state action, was a violation of the right of the 
community people to self-determination and self-government.  
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In the same way, the community has no right to meddle needlessly in the life of its 
individual citizens. The agrarian farmer or community member is autonomous and self-
sufficient, associating out of the need and desire for companionship, but not to be dominated by 
the dictates of their fellows. The humanistic culture and the life of the land guide the individual 
into a particular image of the good life and establishes a standard for how one ought to see the 
world, but this is never to be compulsory. While the community provides a framework for the 
individual, the person is free to act and follow their convictions wherever they may lead.  
 For the Agrarians, this relation between the self and the society was not a contradiction, 
because freedom does not occur in a vacuum; a person’s choices are always curtailed by the 
available choices, and a communally inherited tradition serves to incline the individual toward an 
authorized understanding of the good. It is only within the confines of a shared way of life that a 
meaningful individualism possible. The community is the home for the individual, the site where 
freedom and order are united, allowing everyone discover their sense of place and belonging. 
 What the Agrarians endorsed through its appeal to “provincial community” amounted to 
a kind of social-bond individualism where individuals control their own destiny, but find their 
identity and ultimate fulfillment within a solidified social system, an inherited community of 
value that serves as the shared scene of action (Weaver, In Defense). Individualism was the 
natural order of things, but it was not the isolated individual living alone and freed from all 
constraints that constituted the proper relation of self to society; it was the voluntary coming 
together of autonomous citizens to take part in a shared way of life. A person’s first obligation 
was to seek after their own welfare and that of their family, but that responsibility depended 
upon a stable social order, with a thriving aesthetic and religious experience, cultivated in a 
humanistic culture and way of life. And it was the community that ultimately gave meaning and 
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fulfillment to that life, extending the individual a home free from repressive regulation where 
they could control their own destinies.  
 In sum, these were the virtues of the provincial community: it operated within an 
inherited tradition that gave order and meaning to society, preserving continuity with the past 
and inculcating an appreciation of the gradually developed way of life. Such communities were 
closely attached to the soil and land, displaying a sense of rootedness, permanence, and stability 
that establishes a humanistic culture. The communal life is one that has struck a balance between 
labor and leisure, believing both to be integral to a meaningful existence. As a humanistic culture 
defined by its particularity, the community generates the spiritual and aesthetic sensibilities 
necessary for the good life while also providing a shared set of values and tastes. These 
sensibilities permit the community to operate autonomously without outside intervention, 
consequently protecting the right of the individual to live their own kind of life. The community, 
in turn, provides a home so that the individual can find a sense of place and belonging. These 
provincial virtues, for the Agrarians, were also the paramount virtues of the South. 
The South as Provincial Community  
 
 The provincial sense of community was proposed as the ideal social order for American 
society, and as a counter image to the progressivist rhetoric of industrialism. The Agrarians 
actively endorsed “community” as a traditionalist political program in order to rally citizens to 
take up arms against modernization, preserving the kind of life that had been lived for 
generations and was fundamental to the history of human experience. Their analysis and 
portrayal of the two diverging forms of life aimed to give ammunition to agrarian communities 
everywhere experiencing the deterioration of their traditions. At the heart of this rhetoric is the 
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conservative lament for what has been lost—and this loss came to be symbolized and most 
visible in the loss of material community relations.  
 Equally as central to the Agrarians’ purpose as catalyzing resistance to the industrial 
economic organization was their participation in Southern identity work. For whatever hopes the 
Agrarians may have realistically held for the future of a purely agrarian economy, the rhetorical 
reclamation of a praise-worthy Southern identity was of further importance to their mission, or at 
the very least, was the more effective element of their enterprise. There has been disagreement 
among researchers of the movement over the degree to which the Agrarians’ demands for an 
agricultural economic reorganization should be understood as the true objective of I’ll Take My 
Stand. The predominant perspective now understands the Agrarians as really making a statement 
about Southern identity and values rather than actually calling for the abandonment of industrial 
techniques. Decades after the book’s publication, several of the Agrarians themselves adopted 
this view. Seen in this way, the portrait of the provincial community as an alternative to 
industrialism is best interpreted as the route through which the Agrarians attempted to 
rhetorically negotiate Southern identity in lieu of its disreputable state. The provincial 
community was a mythic statement about what the South represented, a communitarian virtue 
that subsisted through the region’s many failures.   
When the Agrarians wrote about persevering within a communal inheritance, they were 
speaking of their own sense of obligation to Southern communities, an obligation they fulfilled 
by casting the Southern tradition in the most praiseworthy light they could find—the dignity 
embodied in the language of community. The South, in its state of reproof dating back from the 
Civil War, needed redemption from its failures, and while it was tainted with its racial legacy, its 
promise as a site of provincial communal relations offered a possibility of transformation. As the 
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modern world cried out in misery from the maladjustment of industrial relations, the South’s 
agrarian order could be granted legitimacy as the last hope for a meaningful alternative to 
dehumanization and social chaos. The terms of local community—leisure and land, order and 
freedom, continuity and harmony—presented a stark and appealing image in a social world 
speedily transforming beyond recognition. The romantic language of provincial coherence where 
everyone had a place and purpose could be readily applied to agricultural lifestyles of the South. 
While such a perfect image of community never existed in the South, or anywhere else for that 
matter, the ideal served its primary rhetorical purpose—that of reconstructing Southern identity 
within the dueling demands of past and future, or in Allen Tate’s phraseology facing “with calm 
that heritage” and earning “contempt before the age.”  
In the rhetoric of the Agrarians, the source of the South’s failure became also the source 
of its redemption—its backward-looking provincialism, insistent regionalism, and tribalistic 
inclinations were precisely what the contemporary world needed to set the social order right 
again. The South had always been maligned as backwards-looking and reactionary, but it turned 
out, so the Agrarians claimed, that its resistance to change was wiser than supposed, for it 
preserved a semblance of the good life while the rest of the nation marched on into mass hysteria 
and moral chaos. Amid the failures of industry, South found validation for its community-
centrism.  
Nevertheless, the Agrarians’ glorification of Southern community concealed as much as 
it revealed about the qualities of provincial life. There were reasons, after all, why agrarianism 
was fading into oblivion and Southerners were increasingly open to the advancement of 
mechanization and manufacturing economies into their midst. The fact was that farmers were 
overwhelming poor and dependent on the yield of their crops, a yield which could easily be 
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ruined by forces as fickle as inclement weather or changes in market demands. For all the 
Agrarians’ trumpeting of the sense of purpose that came from tilling the land, mechanization 
eased what was a physically exhausting form of labor so time could be devoted to other pursuits.  
The Agrarians’ portrayal of the “invasion of industry” also concealed the fact that 
Southerners were willingly leaving their farms for economic and social opportunities in urban 
settings. While manufacturing jobs may have been a monotonous and under-paying, the drift of 
civilians to those occupations could hardly be said to have been coerced. It was the intentional 
decision of citizens to leave behind their social inheritance in search of greener pastures. While 
there was something tragic about this depleting of traditional lifestyles, the sheer number of 
urban migrants indicates that Southerners believed the advantage was worth the cost. This reality 
was something that the Agrarians largely missed or ignored.  
 But most troubling of all was that the Agrarians’ portrayal of Southern community made 
at best an inadequate account of the role of racial hierarchy within its social order. If 
“community” was the redemptive virtue of the South for its failures, then it is troublesome that 
their depiction of community made few remunerations for the region’s great failure—the 
continued injustices those communities enacted against African-Americans. While the Agrarians 
primarily had in mind the small independent farmer as their ideal when praising Southern 
communities, so much of what they held dear—the culture of leisure and humanism, regional 
autonomy, intense awareness of difference, and deference given to tradition and custom—was 
either predicated on the disenfranchisement of Blacks or undermined by the refusal to grant those 
same privileges equally. So much of what the Agrarians praised was not available to African-
American populations, and was in many cases was dependent upon their subjugation, even after 
the formal end to the institution of Slavery, as Jim Crow laws effectively served to continue 
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Black suppression and exclusion. The fact that the Agrarians hardly dealt with this aspect of the 
Southern inheritance in their depiction of provincial community functioned practically to ignore 
and erase the oppression of Blacks.  
It should be said that several of Agrarians were not blind to this fact and did attempt to 
wrestle with the question of racial justice. Yet the concept of Southern “community” was 
ambiguous enough to hide the stark differences among them over how the failings of Southern 
racism ought to be addressed and what the legacy of racial hierarchy meant for the possibility of 
reclaiming a provincial ideal. In fact, it was the divided attitudes toward racial justice which 
largely led to the undoing of the Agrarians’ enterprise. Before closing the chapter, it essential to 
look more in depth at the role “community” played in concealing the racial dynamics of Agrarian 
philosophy. 
The Racial Fissures of Agrarian Community  
 The twelve Agrarians came together through a common advocacy of “community” as the 
paramount virtue of Southern culture, understood as a free and ordered way of life, authorized by 
generations, that provided individuals with a sense of place and belonging. The Agrarians agreed 
that the modern situation required the strengthening and preservation of such communities, as 
they afforded the best alternative to the rampant scientism, materialism, consumerism, and 
dislocation of industrialism. 
Yet the purpose which served to unite the Agrarians also in turn divided them—their 
shared endorsement of agrarian community masked their vehement disagreements on the 
question of who belonged to the Southern communal inheritance. When advocating a return to 
agrarian community, and portraying an idealized vision of the Southern past, the inevitable 
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question was how do African-American figure into such a community? On this point, the 
Agrarians were split. 
I have said that the Agrarians, perhaps with the intent of keeping a show of unity, largely 
left this question unaddressed. As a whole, I’ll Take My Stand rarely took up the questions of 
racial justice for or inclusion of African-Americans in Southern community, and when the 
Agrarians looked at the Old South for inspiration, Black oppression was often left out of the 
account. A large part of the Agrarian portrayal of Southern community left the plight of African-
Americans invisible.  
However, the manifesto was not bereft of abhorrent statements about Backs, nor 
repugnant attempts to minimalize the brutality of the slave-system. John Crowe Ransom 
acknowledged that slavery was monstrous in theory, but suggested it was not as cruel in practice 
(Ransom 14). Owsley, in the most virulent of the essays, denied slavery was the cause of the 
Civil War, framing it in terms of local autonomy and agrarianism versus industrialism, and 
speaking of African-American in appalling terms (Owsley 99). Donald Davidson was a brash 
defender of segregation, and even flirted with White Supremacy. In each case, the endorsement 
of “community” by these particular Agrarians functioned to justify racial hierarchy or downplay 
the severity of the section’s racial evils. If community was the virtue through which to make 
amends for the South’s failings, its racism was not met with much remorse or acknowledgement 
from certain Agrarians. 
Other Agrarians, however, condemned Southern racism head-on, and sought for a form 
of community that involved inclusion of and justice for African-Americans. Stark Young 
admitted that while the Agrarian life was founded on the land, it was also predicated on the 
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ownership of slaves (Young 336). Yet it was Robert Penn Warren who most thoroughly wrestled 
with how the Southern community might be attained so as to make for racial justice.  
Warren wrote that, as a principle of community, “If the Southern white man feels that the 
agrarian life has a certain irreplaceable value in his society, and if he hopes to maintain its 
integrity in the face of industrialism or its dignity in the face of agricultural depression, he must 
find a place for the negro in his scheme” (Warren, “Briar” 263). Defense of the Agrarian way of 
life, for Warren, was contingent upon the well-being of Black citizens and a sense of common 
rural consciousness among the races (262-263). And since the manufacturing labor of 
industrialism exploited both poor white and Black, they might attain a shared solidarity and anti-
industrial sentiment; accordingly, the rural community lifestyle would make for the “most 
satisfactory relationship of the races” (264). Above all, for Warren, if Southern community was 
going to persist it must provide for the inclusion, justice, and affluence of African-Americans in 
that scheme. 
At first this conviction led Warrant to a qualified defense of segregation, which he 
originally saw as the best means for African-American prosperity, but he later evolved into a 
steadfast supporter of integration and Civil Rights. Warren recanted his views on segregation and 
adopted a firm belief in racial integration, interviewing several of the key Civil Rights figures 
such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X (Warren, Segregation). This did not sit well with 
certain other Agrarians such as Donald Davidson, who found Warren’s ideas so progressive that 
he contested their inclusion in I’ll Take My Stand.  
This dispute between Davidson and Warren is a telling indicator of the racial fissure 
within Agrarianism hidden by shared appeals to community; both claimed to be exponents of the 
Southern inheritance, but that led them to starkly different ends. Historian Paul Murphy explains 
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that, “In the 1950s and 1960s, Davidson played a leading role in the attempt to preserve the 
system of segregation. Warren took his stand against it. Loyalty to the southern past and the 
ambiguous lessons of Agrarianism led both men in very different directions” (Murphy 10). 
Community for one meant racial hierarchy and segregation, while for another it met avidly 
supporting the Civil Rights movement and seeking justice for fellow African-American citizens.  
It is clear then that the Agrarians’ shared appeals to community temporarily served to 
mask their opposing ideologies, but ultimately, their conflicting positions on the racial identity of 
Southern community hastened the splintering of the movement. As Donald Davidson, 
representing the worst of the Agrarians program, became an ardent segregationist and even 
defender of white supremacy, Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, and Robert Penn Warren each 
disavowed their commitment to Agrarianism, motivated in large part by their dismay and 
abhorrence to Davidson’s racial politics. Allen Tate traded his commitment to the Southern past 
for a kind of urban literary cosmopolitanism; Robert Penn Warren became actively involved in 
the cause of integration and Civil Rights; Tate, Ransom, and Warren each redirected their energy 
for the South toward the burgeoning literary movement New Criticism—an aesthetic and poetic 
alterative to the Agrarian tradition. New Criticism, which focused on the structure and meaning 
of literary texts, offered a grounding in the aesthetic, spiritual and inherited values of the West 
that the Agrarians sought in the Southern tradition. As New Criticism became a staple of 
twentieth century literary criticism and poetic theory in the Academy, it effectively replaced 
Agrarian community with a literary alternative.   
Historian Paul Murphy has insightfully observed that, “At the heart of Agrarianism was 
the question not only of where do I stand, but also, who belongs?” (Rebuke 10). On this matter, 
the Agrarians could not offer a unified answer. The fact was that racism and not just community, 
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was a part of the Southern inheritance, but this was not universally acknowledged, and even 
those who did could come to no consensus on the proper steps for making amends for that evil. 
The fiery call to resist industry and embrace “community” concealed this fact.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have traced the traditionalist rhetoric of community the Southern 
Agrarians, demonstrating how they used provincial and localist language to construct and 
redeem the Southern tradition and contest the rhetoric of industrial progress. The research 
questions directing this study inquire into the discursive work community accomplishes by 
endorsing certain values and actions, including and excluding certain peoples, uniting and 
masking differences, and navigating the dialectic between self and society.  
The objective of the Agrarians was to preserve the good of the Southern tradition from 
the invasive and destructive forces of industrialism and modernism, as well as to negotiate 
Southern identity in light of its disrepute state and racial moral failings. This was accomplished 
by appealing to a provincial ideal of community that framed industrialists and progressives as 
invaders of an autonomous social order. The provincial ideal of community entailed a tribalistic 
sense of intense loyalty to a particular lifestyle and an acute awareness of boundaries. A 
community, for the Agrarians, was an inherited way of life, built up over generations, that 
established an organic and secure social order. Provincial communities were enduring and 
permanent organisms rooted in the land, that displayed a humanistic culture of particularity and 
local flavor; its citizens enjoyed a balance of labor and leisure, finding spiritual and aesthetic 
fulfillment in the customs of the community and intimacy with nature. The rights and freedoms 
of the individual were protected by the autonomy of the community, and the individual found 
their place within it.  
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These virtues of the provincial community were the very attributes that the Agrarians 
attributed to the Southern tradition. Not only did the Agrarians endorse community so as to 
present a more preferable alterative to the growing industrial lifestyle, but they did so to redeem 
Southern identity from its subordination as a backward, condemned state. The redemption of 
Southern identity occurred by claiming the dignity and prestige of the language of community 
for the agrarian values of the South and for Agrarians, rhetorically transforming the region from 
a transgressor to a heroic and messianic remnant.  
Yet the Agrarians’ shared advocacy of community as the virtue of Southern culture 
concealed the fact that they were starkly divided on the character of that community as it 
pertained to the question of racial inclusion and justice. Much of their portrayal of Southern 
community left the plight of Blacks ignored, effectively erasing the historic oppression of 
African-Americans. The Agrarians split attitudes was represented by the opposing trajectories of 
Donald Davidson and Robert Penn Warrant; the ideal of Southern provincial community led 
Davidson toward segregation, while it gradually led Warren to embrace the Civil Rights 
movement. Appeals to community masked these differences for a time, but the division was 
ultimately too great and contributed to the fracturing of the Agrarian unity.  
Although there were clear and substantial fissures within the Agrarian movement, their 
shared appeal to community was a call to defiance and resistance to modern industrial defense. 
Community worked to drum up enthusiasm and anti-modern sentiments among those identifying 
with the South. Community functioned as an affirmative device for a beleaguered Southern 
identity, imputing its inheritors with not only a sense of regional pride, but a sense of 
custodianship and guardianship of the tradition. Appeals to community were the imputations of 
identification and obligation to Southerners to defend their rural roots from dissolution.  
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The core of the traditionalist rhetoric of community, in summation, was a move to protect 
and preserve a good. Community was conservatory, a mechanism for eliciting identification with 
a threatened cause, and the mandate to prevent its change, alteration, or termination. 
Provincialism was a tribalistic war-like frame that in accenting particularity, also drew attention 
to the aggressive forces undermining of who we are. In this role, the move to community is one 
to resist change, buckle-down, and return to basic principles, protecting the essential core of who 
we are as a people. There is nostalgia and romanticizing in this traditionalist move, but it invoked 
is one with a clear rhetorical purpose—to define who and what the community is at a time when 
it might become something else. Community, in this usage, is a motive of conservation.  
It appears, then, that the crux of this traditionalist conception of community is a past-
oriented program that seeks to preserve the constructive elements of a social tradition. 
Community is an ordered and organic way of life where the individual finds their freedom and 
place amid stable human relationships. There is a tribalistic sense of limited loyalty and 
awareness of outsiders and boundaries, and an emphasis on the possible loss of the community. 
The traditionalist community is not an abstract principle or vehicle for change, but a grounded 
locale, an association of those sharing values and beliefs in an autonomous tradition that resists 
outside interference.  
 The Southern Agrarian reliance on community to advance its cultural and moral values 
may seem to represent only the quaint offerings of twelve authors in early Twentieth Century.  
Yet the Southern Agrarians were powerful spokespersons for the Conservative movement in the 
United States, and their doctrinal way of summarizing what was “lost” in the South, and America 
generally, provided a spearhead for conservativism and resistance to progressive change that 
reverberates in politics through the 1950s, 1960s and yet today. Neo-Agrarian Richard Weaver 
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played a pivotal role in bringing and translating Agrarian ideas of community into the national 
consciousness with his book Ideas Have Consequences, and contributed greatly to the 
development of the “traditionalist” wing of twentieth century conservatism (Nash). Further, 
common support for the Agrarian idea of an autonomous community free from government 
interference aided the formation of a crucial alliance between “traditionalist” and “free market” 
thinkers. Shared support for the autonomous local community helped fuse previously 
oppositional philosophies and permitted conservatism to develop into a powerful political bloc.  
The “exclusive” and past-oriented character of the Agrarian attempt to anchor their 
rhetoric in “community” can well be contrasted during those important years with the “inclusive” 
and future-looking rhetoric of community in the progressive movement—the cosmopolitanism of 
Jane Addams forms a near perfect antithesis, while Martin Luther King Jr.’s notion of the 
“beloved Community” that would give us a model of society where all would be included and 
find equal footing, affords a kind of sequel and response.  In a sense, there was a rhetorical 
contest between these two notions of community: one that found the family, tribal, and regional 
roots of the small autonomous community as the protector and preserver of individualism and 
Southern entitlement; and one that found the unifying and transcendent potential of community 
as an abstract ideal and social model that would counter and dissolve precisely these excesses of 
individualism and restricted communal boundaries.  
The Southern Agrarian doctrine helps to capture the kinds of practices and pieties that 
can be sponsored by the invocation or designation of “community.”  That is, we can invoke 
“community” not as a way to elevate and transport individuals into identification and service 
with general others, as seems to be its utility with progressive rhetoric, but as a way of marking a 
sub-group as an autonomous group of individuals that share some common and exclusive 
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membership or culture to be celebrated and preserved. In common and general practice, 
“community” might be found doing both at once: to be a member of the fan, quilting, or medical 
“communities” at once distinguishes one as having individualized identification or membership 
attributes, but also creates a social bond with others and some obligation or motivation to work 
on behalf of the group.  However, the ambiguity lurking in the concept of community can be 
used to create division as well when it is seen as the basis for defending territory and identity 
which empowers the individual against the anomie of mass society and those who are different 
or in competition.   
In either case, what we find is that the rhetorical connotations and implications of the 
symbols and values of community, like most rhetorical terms and especially “god-terms,” 
contain within them the ambiguities and contradictions to both create and to transcend divisions.  
In both cases community is a term of identity and identification, and it necessarily can either 
unify or divide depending on the social dialectic (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives; Aune, Burke’s 
Palimpsest). What we can observe in the cases of American progressivism and Southern 
Agrarianism is the function of “community” to navigate and mediate the tensions between “self” 
and “society” that are characteristic of American society and its formation through the 
Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first centuries (Bellah, et. al; Etzioni; Lasch, Lippmann; 
Nisbet; Payne; Putnam; Rheingold Riesman, Schlesinger; Sennett). This navigation of self-
society, as well as past-future, and spiritual-material are topics I return to in the conclusion 
discussion of this thesis. 
For traditionalists, as conveyed by Southern Agrarian philosophy, the relationship 
between self and society is made right by a kind of social-bond individualism, where the 
community provides the individual with protection so they can seek their own needs and live 
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independent lives; but the community also bestows the individual with a collective home, and it 
is within this communion and obligation to fellow members that they find a sense of belonging 
and purpose. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
My purpose in this dissertation has been to arrive at an understanding of community that 
is at once critical and appreciative. I have therefore aimed to illuminate what kind of rhetorical 
work gets done with community, paying particular attention to the actions it sanctions, the values 
it endorses, the people it includes/excludes, the motives it weaves, and the conflicts is masks. My 
primary interest has been in discovering what “community” reveals about the modern 
orientation, and how it is constructed by various groups to provide meaning and order for 
citizens navigating the relationship between self and society. Although the foregoing case studies 
have been historical in basis, it does not take much imagination to see their relevance to the 
Twenty-first Century. This concluding chapter therefore serves to discuss the findings of the 
dissertation and demonstrate its applications to contemporary discourse. 
In Chapter One, I explored the ubiquity and centrality of “community” as a rhetorical 
term, proposing to investigate the persuasive and symbolic functions of rhetorics of community 
in the American context. Consequently, I traced “community’s” rhetorical history in the modern 
West, showing its importance as a concept of democratic theory and a source of modern sense-
making. Community, I argued, provides symbolic compensations and consolations for the 
material transformations of mass society and the dominance of the individualist orientation by 
directing citizens towards reparative actions and alternative schemes of value in accordance with 
the way community is constructed in relation to the modern world.  
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In Chapter Two, I reviewed the prevailing approaches to the study of community in 
Communication Studies, demonstrating the inattention of such perspectives to community’s 
function as a rhetorical device. I then drew upon the work Kenneth Burke to outline a rhetorical 
approach to the study of community as a god-term and key to a motivational vocabulary. I 
discussed the implications of such a framework for understanding community, and offered a 
corresponding taxonomy of the five general “senses” of community to which rhetors appeal. I 
concluded the section with seven hypotheses about the inclinations of community rhetorics. 
Chapter Three looked at the discourse of John Humphrey Noyes and the Utopian 
Movement as a rhetoric that appeals to a rationalist and “communalist” conception of 
community. I showed how Noyes employed community as a spiritual value, guide, or template to 
be applied to the society in order to correct the “selfish” material values of industrialism. 
Community effectively served to bridge the orientations of faith and science, provide the 
material culture with a spiritual ideal, and direct citizens toward a platform of social change in 
alignment with moral motives. The heart of community ethics was sacrifice to a higher good.  
The cosmopolitan rhetoric of Jane Addams is the subject of Chapter Four, where I cast 
her efforts as exemplifying a “progressive” doctrine of community. For Addams, community was 
a vehicle for democratic change where citizens voluntarily worked together to improve and 
ameliorate their shared conditions. Community was invoked to contest war, individualism, and 
exclusion, and advocate for a kind of comprehensive cosmopolitan community, where a 
sentiment of shared solidarity and joint obligation enabled citizens to collaborate for the welfare 
of the human race. 
In Chapter Five, I analyzed the “traditionalist” rhetoric of the Southern Agrarians and 
their ideal of a provincial community. The Agrarians, I argued, appealed to community to 
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challenge the values of modern industrialism and restore Southern identity in the context of its 
historical failures. Their image of provincial community unified freedom and order in an 
autonomous local organism characterized by cultural particularity. Appeals to “community” 
were defiant and defensive resolutions to preserve an authorized and inherited way of life where 
the individual could act independently while finding a stable home in the presence of a definite 
social tradition.  
In concluding the dissertation I would revisit the hypotheses offered at the onset of the 
project and weigh them against the evidence accumulated over the analytical chapters. In 
Chapter Two, I offered seven theses restated here in summarized form:  
1.) Community serves as a god-term in American discourse, inviting identification, 
transcending partisan divides and endorsing an ethic of sacrifice for the collective good.  
2.) Community is compensatory for the losses of modernity, and is offered as a ‘spiritual’ 
corrective to the deficiencies of the materialist paradigm of economic individualism.   
3.) Community accomplishes the rhetorical work of navigating the self-society dialectic, 
looking to restore the social order and find the ideal conditions for moral social 
relationships. 
4.) Rhetorics of community weave a historical vision of past and future to contextualize the 
present, relying upon myth to situate their own historical moment and call for a program 
of restoration.  
5.) Communalist rhetorics tend to take community as an abstract set of values and spiritual 
principles to be applied to the social order.  
6.) Progressive rhetorics tend to frame community as a vehicle of democratic change for 
adjusting and improving modern living conditions.  
7.) Traditionalist rhetorics tend to portray community as an autonomous and ordered way of 
life that serves as a home to the individual.  
 
We can divide these seven theses into three groups, the first discussing community’s status as 
god-term, the second set pertaining to the general discursive relationship between community 
and modernity, and the third concerning three significant formulations of the communal ideal. 
Community as God-term 
 The first thesis I have maintained throughout this dissertation concerns “community’s” 
function as a god-term in American social and political discourse. I contend that community has 
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come to represent one of the highest aspirations of modern society; to invoke community as a 
goal or value is meant to transcend partisan division and generate consensus and motivation. In 
general, working on behalf of “community” is accepted as an inherently positive act, and one 
which conveys moral and redemptive purposes for both the individual and the social order.  
 Part of community’s allure as a modern ideal relates to its association with a sense of loss 
or lack in need of recovery and restoration. The paradox of community, with which I opened this 
dissertation, is that everyone wants it, but no one seems to have it. This paradox has been borne 
out in the analytical chapters, where Noyes, Addams and the Agrarians all sought to “recover” 
community in a modern world which had forsaken it. I suggest that this sense of loss and its 
corresponding mandate of recovery is in fact a constitutive element of the community itself, as 
the term functions as a spiritual value which could never be achieved in actuality, but only “in 
principle.” Community, as a god-term, represents an aspiration or prayer on behalf of modern 
rhetors to fix, reset, or redeem modern life by sacrificing on behalf of a higher ideal, and as such 
could never be attained. Rather, to plead, create, preserve, or restore community is to act in pious 
conformity with the tropes of modern American discourse.  
Similarly, to label some organization or collective of people a “community” is to bring it 
into existence, to give it a symbolic identity as a collective. Rhetorics of community are 
constitutive, in that the invocation of community invites its auditors into a sense of identification, 
obligation, and shared identity which enables collaborative action for the reformation or 
preservation of some perceived social good. From this perspective, all communities are 
“imagined,” and created by discourse to accomplish specific goals and purposes. And since 
community is a god-term, calling a community into existence not only establishes a sense of 
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“we”-ness, but it shines the “we” in a most favorable light. Community eulogizes its object, 
constructing a collective identity to be accepted and praised (or have its loss mourned).  
I have also shown that the inherent moral value of community competes with the 
predominance of the individualist ethic, providing an alternative ordering of values and 
correcting for modern excess (as the Oneidans illustrate in the extreme). Rather than self-interest, 
community posits sacrifice on behalf of others to be the highest good, and in this displays a 
spiritual and salvational quality which it inherits in from its modern political and religious 
history—and community continues to function as a god-term for sociologists, philosophers, and 
political practitioners, as displayed by the succeeding laments every few years in academic, 
popular, and political literature (Bellah et al; Blanchot; Bookchin; Caney; Etzioni, Spirit; Frazer; 
Glendon; Macintyre; Putnam; Nisbet, Quest; Rieff; Sennett; Taylor, Ethics; Walzer; Weaver, 
Ideas; Wuthnow). This narrative of community’s inherent value and redemptive purposes being 
lost to society is a key trope in the process of modern-sense making, as it permits citizens to 
understand and act upon their place in the modern world and work toward a better alignment of 
self and society. This general relationship between community and modernity is the substance of 
the following three theses.   
Community and Modernity   
The second set of theses are concerned with the relationship between community and 
modernity, specifically with community as a discursive frame for making sense of and correcting 
the modern predilection for individualism. Community is “compensatory” in the sense that it 
annotates the failures of modernism’s essentially secular and economic paradigm and seeks to 
correct it by way of an alternative ordering of values. In Chapters One and Two, we saw how 
historically the concept of community presented an image of organic harmony being lost to 
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“mass society,” and correspondingly became associated with a way of life which had been 
conquered by industrialism. Henceforth, the language of community served as a kind of 
antithesis or inverse to “society,” a specter gliding over the modern soul’s shoulder, beckoning 
the world to examine itself and recognize what it lost in its idealization of individualism and 
economic rationality. As god-term and motivational vocabulary, community was offered as the 
remedy for a host of modern problems, especially that of easing the tensions of three dialectics: 
the relation of past to future, spirituality to materiality, and self to society. These dialectical 
tensions represent discursive and symbolic ways of understanding and talking about perceived 
conflicts that lead to dislocation and failure in identity (Payne). 
Past and Future  
Community operates as a “history-making” device which situates the modern scene of 
action as one lacking the organic life of close relationships and moral associations. That is, 
appeals to community navigate the relationship between the inherited past and the desired future 
by connecting them in a present call to action. In every rhetoric of community, there is a value-
laden construction of history that gives meaning and warrant to an endorsed program promising 
to provide permanence amid a time of change.  
For John Humphrey Noyes, the past involved a perfect communion of all persons in a 
natural state, but that harmony had been lost to sin and the institutions of “selfishness.” If the 
proper actions of purification and communalization were taken in the present, the future could 
become a place of reclaimed community. Thus, past and future were reconciled by Noyes in a 
utopic narrative and program of radical communism.  
Similarly, for Jane Addams, the present was in disarray because recent changes had 
upended the social order. In the historical arrangement of rural life, she claimed, there was an 
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organic and robust life of association, but the modern city had eradicated this hearty life of 
community. Rather than reclaiming a lost form of association, what was needed was a new form 
of community amenable to modern times capable of improving and ameliorating the industrial 
condition. Past and Future found hope and continuity in community. 
Finally, the Southern Agrarians saw the present as a threat to inherited traditions, rural 
identity, and the future of genuine community. The past, with its customs and hereditary wisdom, 
held the promise for the ideal social order. The only future worth living was one grounded in this 
past, and it was the duty of present citizens to preserve that communal inheritance. Community 
was received from the past, and citizens must preserve it for future generations.   
These are but three examples of the way in which community constructs past and future 
in the modern mind to situate the present and call for reparative actions. In general, community 
serves as a rhetorical expedient for navigating the travails of modern life, providing 
compensations and correctives to the perceived failures of mass society. As a kind of correcting 
agent, community creates narrative continuity for rhetors dramatizing present circumstances. 
And since community is by its nature a thing that is lacking (i.e. the ‘myth of community), 
rhetors necessarily propose a program for its reclamation. Community, in this regard, is 
historically restorative.  
Spiritual and Material  
Community is also redemptive. It engages in a critical commentary on the materialist 
orientation of individualism, pointing to where it is morally deficient and offering a 
corresponding path toward spiritual revitalization. In Chapters One and Two, we saw that 
community accumulated spiritual overtones as a kind of secularization of the religious impulse, 
and in practice, functioned as something very much like a civil religion. Broadly speaking, 
 212 
community meets the modern need for a transcendent value to judge and discipline self-
interested and material motives. Common identification with community, supplemented with 
spiritual and integrative rewards, offers a sufficient motive to compel social change and 
reformation. Put another way, in modern discourse, community works out the tension between 
spiritual and material goods by redirecting attention toward the side of spirituality.   
This function was most clear in the case of the Oneida, yet, the rhetorics of Jane Addams 
and the Southern Agrarians were also demonstrably concerned with finding some higher 
transcendent force that could give value and meaning to modern systems. Noyes united religious 
and scientific rationalities into a common endorsement of the god-term community. In this role, 
community condemned the material practices and values of industrial capitalism for lacking 
moral vigor, gesturing towards an alternative social order that reflected spiritual virtues of 
individual sacrifice for the common good.  
In the case of Addams, community transcended the individualist and familial ethics by 
articulating a participatory civic ethic of solidarity and extended obligation. Community also 
transcended national loyalties by endorsing a global-scale civil religion of peace. For the 
Southern Agrarians, the industrial world was the antithesis of religion and aesthetics, and no 
spiritual values could be found there. Instead, the only humanistic life was that of the agrarian 
community, where the culture of the soil provided the perfect balance between labor and leisure, 
spirituality and materiality. The inherited tradition communal traditions were the guardians of 
spiritual values against the menace of industrial society.  
In socio-political discourse, community redeems or complements material concerns with 
a transcendent call for more humanistic relationships, beckoning citizens to discover better 
versions of themselves by embracing a purified motive directed toward the needs of others. The 
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specific relation between spirituality and materiality will vary depending on the specific 
philosophical presumptions and political predilections of the rhetor, as they do in the foregoing 
examples, but in general, community is particularly concerned with modern adjustments of this 
spiritual-material tension. This fact can go a long way in explaining the persisting “spiritual” 
resonance of the god-term community as an ideal demanding sacrifice in present day. 
Self and Society 
This ties to a final and most prominent task of community: the attempt to realize a proper 
relation between the modern self and larger society. Rhetorics of community are inherently 
normative discourses that negotiate the place of the individual as a member of the collective, 
asking what obligations that individual possesses and to whom they are directed. Community 
advises on what constitutes the best scheme of social relations, where a person can find a life of 
mutual meaning, and how to secure an ideal world of freedom and belonging.  
In the rhetoric of John Noyes, the self finds its ultimate meaning in social relationships 
modeled on the family, where the self is subsumed by the social organism. Individuals achieve 
their ultimate happiness and highest moral attainments in submitting their wills to the interests 
and dictates of an intimately-pledged body. For Jane Addams, the self only knows itself by its 
relationship to others, and is made whole when in the presence of like-minded persons working 
together for the collective good. Society should be the scene of action of the individual, where 
persons of disparate experience and identity meet and collaborate to improve the conditions of 
all. With the Southern Agrarians, “society,” is but an abstraction; the self finds meaningful 
relation only with the small associations characteristic of local communities. There is no 
obligation to this thing called ‘”society,” but only the obligation to family and neighbors. The 
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individual is independent and self-sufficient, but takes a concern for, and finds a home in, the 
presence of a communal tradition.  
The communalist, progressive, and traditional examples noted here are perhaps the most 
prominent American methods of resolving the relation between self and society, but as with the 
other dialectics, there can be considerable variation among particular rhetors about what 
constitutes this ideal relation and what actions must be taken to attain it. As a general rule, 
however, rhetorics of community are especially concerned with the modern negotiation of self 
and social directedness, providing answers to how citizens ought to associate and organize, and 
what their duties are to the “other.” Such reordering of the relation of self and society is among 
the foremost rhetorical work accomplished by rhetorics of community.  
 In sum, I submit that community takes up three primary tensions or failures of the 
modern world to be corrected: the relation of past to future; of spiritual values to material goods; 
and of self to society. Rhetorics of community aim to rebalance, reorder, and realign the modern 
social order by way of appeal to society’s negative image, community; such rhetorics promise to 
fix or right the imbalance through a program which compensates, consoles, and/or corrects 
imbalances in spiritual/material goods, breaks in the continuity of past and future, and the 
estrangement of self and society. Overall, community acts as a rhetorical device for navigating 
the travails of modern life, providing both compensations and consolations for losses that seem 
apparent with the advent of mass society and directing us toward reparative actions. And in this, 
community is concerned the failures alleged to exist in the very structure of the modern world.  
The Logic of Community (Community and Failure) 
There is an underlying logic to rhetorics of community, in so far as they enact formulaic 
responses to perceived problems as prescribed by the general constitution of community 
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discourse. Community rhetorics, we could say, operate in a realm of “failure,”—namely, the 
failures of modern life—where community works to correct, redeem, or transform the 
inadequacies off modern society.  
David Payne has written that there is a “motivational logic” to discourses of failure, 
whereby both the identification of failure and the method of its resolution are rhetorical 
enterprises (Coping xi). When a situation is designated as a “failure” it calls for the enactment of 
a corresponding treatment to mitigate or redeem the inadequacy. Failure is “an agreeable 
interpretation of particular circumstances” because it frames the situation in such a way that there 
are symbolic remedies at our disposal for redeeming the failure (Payne 5). That is, while a failure 
is not a “good” thing, constructing and naming a situation a failure makes possible a program of 
restoration that can bring us back to health. Such discourses draw upon a set of “topoi” or 
recurring motifs which attributes blame, and therefore pinpoints the source of restorative action 
as resting on, one of the three dialectical pairs mentioned earlier: self-society, past-future, 
spiritual-material. By making amends for the imbalances among these dialectical pairs, the 
failure is then said to be turned into profit.  
I contend that the rhetoric of community follows a logic of failure, whereby the very 
invocation of “community” implies the existence of some sort of failure of the modern world to 
be righted by following the dictates of communal piety. Since community is defined by its lack 
or absence, its summons implies a failure—and in the logic of community, that failure exists 
within its dialectical opposite: society.  
The menace of the three case studies analyzed in this dissertation was “industrialism,” but 
it would be more accurate to say the discursive rage was directed at industrial “society.” As 
shown in the introductory chapter, and borne out through the analytical chapters, community and 
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society function as a dialectical pair. Historically, they were defined in symmetry, the one 
possessing the attributes the other lacked, and in the Western mythic account, the destruction of 
community by society became the standard interpretation of the modern condition. Accordingly, 
in rhetorics of community, society is constructed as the “failing” organism in need of remedy, 
and community is positioned as the curative.   
 Following the logic of modern failure, any existing or symbolically created inadequacy 
highlighted by the rhetor can be chalked up to a “failure” of “modern society,” to be corrected by 
the adoption of community values. The point can be drawn out by reflecting on the way 
individuals in informal conversations, newspaper editorials, and graduate seminars attribute 
blame for some perceived ill or undesirable entity to “society.” We hear people lament how 
“society has failed its workers,” “society is undermining the family,” and “society refuses to 
accept me for who I am.” Anyone who has taught an undergraduate course knows the first 
response of students to a question of why individuals act as they do is that “society teaches them 
to.” Functionally, “society” serves as a catchall term for the attribution of guilt and blame, so that 
when something goes wrong, we locate this failure in the fabric of society itself. Any particular 
instance of failure may be generalized out to a larger modern “social” condition in need of a 
universalized rhetorical curative (Payne). 
Of course, such appeals explain very little about the direct cause of the particular actions 
or failures, but they do point to the nature of “society” as a shorthand term for encapsulating a 
situation of failure. In the modern lexicon, society becomes the failing agent, and the 
corresponding agent of repair is another generality: the universal solvent of “community.” 
Community and society form a dialectical couple, whereby the faults of the one are mitigated by 
the potentialities of the other. Thus, we could say that to submit “community” as the remedy of 
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“social” ills, is to act in pious conformity with our inherited symbolic linkages, as captured by 
the representative cases of John Noyes, Jane Addams, and the Southern Agrarians. The logic of 
community involves a rhetorical maneuver of discovering or creating a social failure and fixing it 
with an appeal to identification with a program of remedy dressed in the communal garb.   
Generally, the failure is located as belonging to a social dimension captured under one of 
the topoi of spiritual-material, self-society, past-future. In the first instance, a failure in the 
material order calls for a corrective of community as spiritual virtue; in the second, a failure in 
the relation of the self to society demands a communitarian reordering of obligations of self to 
others; and in the last, a break in continuity between past and future requires community to 
establish a sense of meaning and redemptive history. Coincidently, the organization of this 
dissertation has reflected these three topoi. While all the case studies dealt in some manner with 
each dialectic, John Humphrey Noyes was especially concerned with spiritual-material, Addams 
with self-society, the Agrarians with past-future. But perhaps this is not merely a coincidence; 
there may be inclinations within the three philosophies analyzed in this dissertation which direct 
attention to certain topoi of social failures. This is a possibility that can be explored by 
considering my theses on the nature of communalist, progressive, and traditionalist community.  
Three Ideals of Community 
My second set of theses pertain to the major political and philosophical ideals of 
community in the American context, namely the communalist, progressivist and traditionalist 
perspectives. While they share a common acceptance of community as god-term, they display 
different “social recipes” or “pieties” of what constitutes that ideal. Hence, at the onset of this 
project, I offered three theses concerning the major tenets of their programs: communalist 
rhetorics take community as an abstract/spiritual value to be rationally applied to social 
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institutions; progressive rhetorics frame community as a vehicle for adjusting and improving the 
living conditions of citizens; traditionalist rhetorics portray community as an autonomous and 
ordered way of life which provides a home for individuals.  
The “communist” or “utopian communalist” conception of community as I have 
articulated it is especially concerned with securing spiritual and moral values in a material world 
perceived to discourage or inhibit their attainment. In this pious formulation, the “self-directed” 
orientation of modernity operates in violation of the higher principles of communal equality, 
justice and self-sacrifice. The best way to resolve the discrepancy of transcendent value and 
material practice, then, is through the reform of institutions, remaking the social order in 
accordance with communal principles so as to infuse it with spiritual vitality and secure 
conditions where moral action is possible. In this pious formula, community is a kind of 
universal solvent for the problems of the economic world, a correction to the individualist and 
capitalist assumptions portrayed as breeding socially harmful behavior. Community performs the 
role of organizing concept, promising to initiate a superior scene of action, and by extension, a 
superior individual motivation. This utopic template, in taking an extreme concern for spiritual 
and transcendent principles, aims toward the purification of motives by installing an other-
oriented ethic which takes sacrifice and submission to the collective good as the pinnacle of 
moral action.  
The progressive formula is not altogether different, though it departs in numerous and 
substantial ways. As I have interpreted it, the progressivist ideal of community stresses 
pragmatic adjustments and reforms in order to make society a more humane place, with 
community serving as the vehicle for democratic social change. The progressivist emphasizes 
universality and inclusion, hoping to foster a sense of interdependence or shared solidarity and 
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obligation among citizens through joint action. Community, as voluntary association, mobilizes 
the people into an active and acquainted body, where citizens co-labor to make a positive 
difference in the lives of their fellows. And though the progressivist community seeks to correct 
the individualist and economic paradigms, unlike the communalists, they do not wish to 
overthrow or withdraw from it; rather, progressivist community actually preserves and enables 
the reign of the economic orientation by making it more tolerable and temporizing its excesses. 
In actuality, the progressive advocacy of community as method of democratic reform has as its 
aim the humanization of the existing social order.  
What constitutes the traditionalist communal recipe is an ordered an autonomous way of 
life lived out in a definite social tradition. A community is an inheritance, a tried and tested 
organism and set of discriminations to be conserved against the outside forces which threaten it. 
In a community, freedom and order are unified, and individuals act autonomously according to 
their own volition in the midst of a robust provincialism. The particularity of communal life 
grants the tradition its identity and aesthetic richness, and citizens can find a balance between 
labor and leisure, spiritual and material concerns. The resultant sense of rootedness and 
admiration for the past enables continuity through the maintenance of identity amid changing 
circumstances. In such a scheme, the essential heart of individualism is embraced—not the 
individualism to live isolated lives, but a social-bond individualism where persons seek first the 
welfare of the self and kin, but find their home in the life and customs of the community.  
In their own way, each of these templates or “social recipes” of community were 
assembled as attempts to grapple with the perceived failings of modern life, and the 
consequences of the individualist orientation’s triumphs over communal virtues. Each 
perspective may be goaded by their own contradictions, but the problems they identify and the 
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manner in which they attempt to answer them speak to the battles we still wage today. Rhetorics 
of community are about nothing less than the eternal quarrels over democratic theory, ethics, 
human nature, how to live and what constitutes the good life, how the individual can find 
meaning, the ideal state of human relationships, and the proper role of voluntary and state action 
in these aspirations. The various platforms I have articulated come to disparate conclusions on 
these matters, and such differences will have implications for the way we order and act upon the 
modern world; nevertheless, it is worth first recognizing their commonality in voicing a similar 
set of concerns about the relation of past-future, spiritual-material, self-society.  
 Yet for whatever they share in common, “community” must also be taken as a site of 
contestation, with a hidden conflict brewing beneath the shared endorsement of the god-term. 
The more cosmopolitan and provincial templates clash over what constitutes ethical action and 
the ideal social order. For example, in Addams’ progressive rhetoric, government action was the 
fulfillment and culmination of community; yet for the Agrarian traditionalists, state action was 
the very violation of it. With the Oneida communists, community meant sacrificing the will and 
possessions of the individual on behalf of the collective interest; yet community for the 
Agrarians meant respecting and protecting the autonomy of individuals to seek their own 
welfare. As Noyes considered community as a spiritual principle from which to remake society 
by the way of sectarian withdrawal, Addams understood it as a practical means for improving 
and engaging with society as it was. For Addams, the heart of community was a move toward 
ultimate inclusion of all persons; but for Agrarianism, community was only meaningful in small-
scale settings when the unit was defined by its difference from the outside world.  
A critical understanding of community appeals must involve an awareness of the 
incompatible elements of these competing doctrines falling under the same linguistic heading. 
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Robert Bellah and his associates argued that the vocabulary of community or “collectivity” 
serves as a “second language” to Americans, pushing them to reconsider and mitigate the 
predominate language of “individualism” (Habits). Bellah was undoubtedly right in his 
contention that community is our second tongue, but he steers wrong in supposing that it 
constitutes one coherent or unified language; rather, this study shows us that there are numerous 
communitarian tongues simultaneously vying for our adherence.  
 Yet alertness to the implicitly contested nature of community ought not place us on a 
partisan path toward discrediting those formulas with which we find ourselves skeptical. While 
individuals may hold a preference for a “traditionalist” or “progressivist” ideal, few of us retain 
enough consistency to avoid falling into the discursive trap of “slipping” in our referents. And 
from my perspective, definitional consistency is not the purpose of appeals to community 
anyway; for whatever conflicts it masks or differences it conceals, community also unites, and in 
so doing enables human cooperation and the coordination of joint enterprises. No single ideal of 
community is intrinsically bad, and we should recognize the inclinations of community discourse 
without developing a cynical “trained incapacity” against such appeals. Or put another way, it 
would be irresponsible for the critic of “community” to dismiss all appeals in its name simply 
because we have identified certain patterns of discourse and found they are at a crossroads of 
purpose. Community operates at the level of grand discursive schemes for working out modern 
identity, but it also functions at the localized level of pragmatic necessity, and any particular 
enactment of community must be judged on its own merits for the causes/values/actions it 
endorses in the specific instance under scrutiny.   
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Rhetorical Posturings and Ad Hoc Appeals 
This reality leads to a necessary distinction between the general recurring ideals or 
templates of community in socio-political discourse, and what might be called more pragmatic 
“ad hoc” appeals. One participates in a “grand scheme” for navigating the dialectics of modern 
life, while the other is more or less contingent to localized aims. The “philosophies of 
community,” as captured by communalist rationalism, progressive cosmopolitanism, and 
traditionalist provincialism, are refined suppositions about what it means to be modern and the 
nature of the good life; they speak to which values citizens should aspire and how society should 
be corrected so as to attain a moral ordering of human relationships. Meanwhile, ad hoc appeals, 
which we might call “Rhetorical posturings,” are more informal pious ways of constructing 
community in the moment to guide human action in specific crises. Framing community as 
something to be attained, mobilized, or preserved need not reflect a consistent or general 
worldview; rather, appeals to community may be little more than offhand namings meant to 
enact certain attitudes and strategies of resolution. In such cases, community is an 
improvisationally named motive for sizing up the situation and our relation to it.  
 I think it fair to suggest that, in general, the three distinct ideals of community loosely 
correspond to three related “rhetorical posturings.” John Noyes, in putting forth a rationalist and 
communist conception of community, postures community as a call to live up transcendent 
principles; Jane Addams and her progressive cosmopolitanism posture community as a call to 
mobilize for a social change; and the Southern Agrarians, with their traditionalist provincialism, 
posture community as a call to preserve an inherited good. These three posturings could be taken 
as not only representing the general thrust of the communalist, progressive, and traditionalist 
 223 
philosophies, but as capturing the primary maneuvers and identifications available to citizens for 
navigating their own particular circumstances by way of communal petition.   
While a predilection for one rhetorical posturing may and often does indicate a general 
philosophical alignment with the corresponding philosophy of community, in practical use these 
posturings can be functionally interchangeable. That is, community is malleable, and the manner 
in which it is framed changes due to the particular purposes at hand. Nothing prevents the same 
individual from drawing upon the vocabulary of community to defend a particular way of life in 
one instance, and then switching to an appeal toward community where citizens associate for the 
improvement of their collective lot in another.  
 Such discrepancy is not simply a bait-and-switch on behalf of the rhetor, but an honest 
attempt to use the linguistic equipment available for making sense of and resolving everyday 
events. Among a vast set of symbolic resources, the choice of the “community” frame composes 
the “situation” in such a way so as to accent certain scenic failures and call forth a corresponding 
remedy of living up to, mobilizing for, or preserving community. As it stands, in our day to day 
lives, most of us do not have refined philosophies of community as do the rhetoricians in the 
foregoing case studies. Rather, we invoke community in an ad hoc manner to tackle the issues 
pertaining to our immediate circumstances without concerning ourselves for the larger socio-
political implications of our selection of a particular “grand scheme” communitarian formula.  
The point might be made by taking a micro-rhetorical illustration from the author’s own 
participation in a small organization called The Graduate Communication Association (GCA). 
GCA is a body dedicated to enhancing the “community” among graduate students in 
Communication Studies at the University of South Florida. As an active member who has served 
as treasurer and co-president of the organization, I have witnessed each of the communitarian 
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“posturings” over the past few years. During association meetings while I was co-president, 
GCA members spent considerable time discussing the perception of a growing “lack of 
community” amid the organization and department. Accordingly, we expended significant effort 
brainstorming ideas and policies which could be implemented to help us again feel that the 
organization attained a semblance of community. In so doing, GCA appealed to the “rationalist” 
posturing of community, where our organizational order needed to be strategically remade so 
that it could live up to the image of community. 
At another point, the members of GCA wanted to support the efforts of the labor union 
representing graduate students on assistantship. GCA members started speaking of “our duty as a 
community” to improve the working conditions of all graduate students, and students began 
assembling through meetings, protests, and socials to garner support for the union. What these 
appeals to community amounted to was a “progressive” posturing of community as an 
associative vehicle for democratic change.  
In a final instance, when the department conducted interviews for a number of open 
faculty positions, GCA members met privately to discuss each candidate’s “fit” with the 
department. Throughout the discussion, the conversation revolved around whether prospective 
candidates were compatible with our “USF community” and the way “we do things here.” The 
possible addition of “outsiders” to our community was a kind of threat to established customs 
and identities which forced us GCA members to define who we were as a body. It made us 
acutely aware of our boundaries, and we sought to protect the essential heart of our community 
from dissolution. This was a “traditionalist” posturing, where community was appealed to in 
order to preserve an inherited good.    
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While the preceding examples are admittedly small-scale, they draw attention to the 
spontaneous manner in which community appeals are internalized and deployed daily in the 
vernacular talk of citizens. Us members of GCA were not conducting anything as grand as a 
negotiation of “what it means to be modern,” but we were drawing upon the available language 
of community to deliberate about who we wanted to be, the values we held dear, and how we 
should act in response to specific events.  
The example of GCA is telling because it is in many ways unremarkable—it simply 
involves persons working together to solve mutual problems by recourse to a privileged 
vocabulary amenable to our purposes. The fact that the nature of community is imprecise and 
ambiguous makes it all the more useful; pragmatically, the slippage between “philosophies” of 
community in these instances is of little consequence, as the various “posturings” serve 
effectively enough to foster identification and collaborative action.  
A refined critical perspective, then, must be careful to distinguish between the general 
“philosophies of community” from the more ad hoc “rhetorical posturings of community” 
loosely associated with them. There is, I have tried to show, a correlation between the two—the 
progressive philosophy of cosmopolitanism naturally extends to the posturing of democratic 
mobilization, while the traditionalist philosophy of provincialism correlates to the posturing of 
protection and preservation. Yet they are non-exclusive, and can be unlinked from each other by 
any individual. Since language is essentially social, and our symbolic resources evolve and arise 
from the history of group relationships, any individual enactment of community rhetoric must 
invariably draw upon the pieties or inherited “group weightings” of the historical cases, even as 
the individual may aim to “transcend” that group weighting.  
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Therefore, in so far as we look at these as “rhetorical posturings” we might see 
community as a rhetorical resource or toolkit available for rhetors of any social or political 
commitment who benefit from the ambiguity, slippages, and utopic legacy of the term. They may 
switch seamlessly between appeals to “preserve a good” such as local autonomy, while 
immediately shifting to a demand for civic association and collaboration to make a positive 
change in the national community. From this perspective, community is about finding the 
appropriate symbolic equipment and deploying it as needed for particular and contingent 
purposes. When seen this way, none of these posturings, are intrinsically bad or undesirable, but 
they are all intrinsically normative, as to make a claim to community is to make a claim of who 
we want to be and how we should act.  
Yet, in so far as we highlight the “philosophies of community,” we are led to a certain set 
of conclusions about American attitudes toward modern economic and individualist rationalities, 
and we can contrast competing views of what constitutes desirable social relations and moral 
activity. Community, at this “grand schematic level,” reveals the formative attempts of differing 
schools of thought to negotiate modern identity by seeking a proper relation between self and 
society, spiritual and material values, past and future orientations.  
The Universal and Particular 
 If we take Jane Addams and the Southern Agrarians as “representative anecdotes” for a 
certain kind of progressivism and traditionalism, we can see a fissure in their shared endorsement 
of community with implications for contemporary politics. This fissure, I submit, is primarily a 
confrontation between logics of universality and particularity.   
 The progressive commitments are particularly concerned with improving modern 
conditions and attaining a superior degree of justice. Community functions as a participatory and 
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associativee means of adjustment and reform, ultimately resulting in State action. But the moral 
core of progressivism is cosmopolitan and universalist—the community of all people despite 
their difference. It embraces a modernist logic of universality where community is essentially a 
sense of imagined solidarity and social obligation spurred by voluntary association, where the 
ethical mandate is the extension of this obligation to larger and larger realms.  
 The traditionalist perspective is incompatible with these aims as it is founded in a logic of 
particularity. The problem with modernity is that it is too universalist, as it colonizes and 
blankets the world in bland massification, stomping out the traditions and differences which give 
life meaning and order. Community, in this scheme, is essentially a limited solidarity and 
obligation circulating around a sense of locale. The rhetorical utility of community is in 
articulating a provincial identity and protecting it from dilution. Accordingly, the moral core of 
traditionalism is particularity, the obligation to protect one’s people and way of life, because it is 
the only place where an individual can find a life of meaning and vitality. The abstractions of 
“society” or “world community” are nonsensical and lack substance, as the only feasible 
community is among a people who do life together and share a tradition in common.  
 The fissure between progressivism and traditionalism thus appears to be a rivalry of 
moral claims between universality and particularity, inclusion and exclusion, cosmopolitanism 
and provincialism. Their conflict comes down to a question of which ethic and identification is a 
preferable aspiration for ordering acting in the world. The choice among them will have 
repercussions for the political views and policies one supports. For example, it is unsurprising 
when a traditionalist warns against state encroachment upon the activity of “local communities” 
or grows weary when an international body such as the United Nations purports to represent the 
“world community.” It is likewise unsurprising when a progressivist praises these same events as 
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fulfilling the spirit of community, because these contrasting evaluations flow naturally from their 
respective universalist and particularist logics. Their notions of community are at a crossroads, 
and we must expect their politics to be similarly conflicting.  
And yet, the charismatic nature of community involves a strange comingling of 
progressive and conservative causes—liberals too value local community and conservatives 
surely support extended solidarities such as the national community. So, while we must highlight 
their diverging ideals in principle, we can also appreciate community as a device for bridging 
their perspectives and enabling transformation. Both formulations of community are concerned 
with the consequences of individualism and economic rationality, and both essentially work to 
preserve that system by humanizing it. Surely there are as many cosmopolitanisms and 
provincialisms as there are rhetorics of community, and like appeals to community, the 
responsible critic must inquire into the specifics before an evaluation can be rendered. There may 
be numerous collaborative enterprises that those typically adhering to opposing ethics may find 
appealing. And it is equally likely that there are rhetorics which borrow elements from both 
philosophies. Overall, however, it is useful to generalize and conclude that the diverging logics 
of progressivism and traditionalism are aligned with universalist and particularist logics, 
understanding that those opposing ethics are at the core of political disagreement about social 
ordering, state intervention, civic identity, and the nature of the good.  
Contemporary Manifestations  
With these conclusions in mind, we might extend our analysis and tangentially survey 
other seminal American rhetorics of community chronologically following those analyzed in this 
dissertation to contextualize the present moment. For example, we could consider the 1960s and 
the Civil Rights Movement as a rhetoric of community. In seeking justice and racial integration 
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for African Americans through non-violent protest, Martin Luther King Jr. continually appealed 
to an ideal image of the “beloved community”: 
the aftermath of non-violence is the creation of the beloved community; the aftermath of 
non-violence is redemption and reconciliation. This is a method that seeks to transform 
and to redeem, and win the friendship of the opponent, and make it possible for men to 
live together as brothers in a community, and not continually live with bitterness and 
friction (“Justice Without Violence,” April 3, 1957) 
 
King’s portrait of the redemptive powers of community drew upon elements of utopic-
spiritualization and progressive reform while transforming those ideals to be especially 
concerned with questions of racial justice and reconciliation. “Community” functioned in King’s 
appeals to justify non-violent civic mobilization petitioning the state for legislative redress, and 
to provide a utopic visualization of what ethical human relationships could look like when all 
persons were identified as “brothers in community.”  
The renaissance of conservatism following World War II and culminating with the 
presidency of Ronald Reagan likewise found the concept of community amenable to the creation 
of a powerful political alliance. In the first half of the twentieth century, the conservative 
movement was fractured between disparate groups, especially libertarians and traditionalists, 
who shared little more than a dissatisfaction with the pieties of mainline liberalism. As efforts 
were made to bring these factions together in a program aptly called “fusionism,” community 
offered traditionalist and libertarians a realm of common ground; both could agree that American 
society needed to protect self-governing “communities” from state interference (Nash, 
Conservative). Writers such as Richard Weaver explicitly brought the Agrarian philosophy of 
community into the movement, while coterminous thinkers as Russel Kirk and Robert Nisbet 
further advocated a traditionalist support of local difference (Weaver, Ideas; Kirk, Conservative 
Mind; Nisbet, Quest). When mixed with the market sensibilities of William Buckley, Frank 
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Meyer, and other libertarian thinkers, the new conservatism formed a mighty political bloc held 
together in large part by a concern over the dissolution of community, with community 
understood as the vigorous life of associative action and local autonomy—an autonomy that was 
undermined by state intervention and economic meddling in municipal affairs. The rhetoric of 
the New Conservatism amended the traditionalist perspective, which was originally skeptical of 
free market logic, by making the cause of community an ally of economic liberty.  
The outburst of political communitarianism in the 1970s and 1980s was largely a 
response to the economic and social doctrines of Reaganism. Sociologists such as Robert Bellah, 
Amatai Etzioni, and even Robert Putnam worked to reclaim a more “progressive” vision of 
community to contest a renewed deference the individualist and economic paradigm (Bellah et. 
al, Habits; Etzioni, Spirit; Putnam, Bowling). For the communitarians, the decreasing 
participation in local clubs, political organizations, and other forms of voluntary association was 
a sign of a decaying public culture. Accordingly, they pleaded with Americans to fight this brand 
of individualism by joining local organizations and recovering the communitarian sensibilities of 
civic virtue and obligation. 
The list of other contemporary examples could be extended almost endlessly—appeals to 
internet communities as a new form of belonging and democratic citizenship; defenses of 
indigenous peoples and the freedom of their communities to live their own way of life; social 
movements on behalf of the gay community and their right to marriage; laments over the decline 
of manufacturing and coal mining communities and the call for their revitalization; 
environmentalist petitions to the world community to take a shared responsibility for protecting 
the planet’s resources; concerns over gentrification and its effect on local communities; alarm at 
the lessening autonomy of national communities and the outcry to withdrawal from international 
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pacts; popular culture and the endless portrayals of disaster that result in the formation of utopic 
apocalyptic communities; and so on.  
These historical moments, and others not mentioned, require more in-depth analyses than 
can be given here. Further investigation into such discourses might attain something of a 
rhetorical genealogy that shows critical moments of “community’s” history in the American 
context, and draw out more implications for its role as a discursive phenomenon in relation to 
modern society. I have aimed to stay clear of claims to causality or continuity, opting instead to 
work out a vocabulary for situating and analyzing community rhetoric; nevertheless, language is 
a social phenomenon, and a rhetor must draw upon the wealth of accumulated associations, 
linkages and “pieties” that have come before. I therefore believe such a rhetorical genealogy 
would be possible and insightful. This dissertation, and the vocabulary it has refined and 
conclusions it has drawn, can aid in such a project because it offers a theory of the general 
functions, philosophies, and characteristics of community as a god-term in American life. 
 Before closing, it is worth considering where John Noyes and the ideal of utopian 
communism stand in all of this. It may initially appear that the radical program of the Oneida 
Community has no direct contemporary correlative. The utopian movement of which Noyes was 
a part flourished in a unique historical moment where many citizens saw communes as the best 
path for securing a life of order and value. Directly, there are few examples of contemporary 
individuals holding such a position, although the continued existence of Mennonite communities 
may be offered as a somewhat sustained and parallel case. Furthermore, Communism and 
Socialism more generally, including that stemming from Marxist logics, no longer holds a 
central place in the modern mind, and few consider communism a robust or desirable political 
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alternative. Nevertheless, I submit that traces of the Noyesian variant of community persist in a 
variety of locations, some of them unexpected.  
 As for the surviving threads of socialism, although typically flowing from a different 
source, they display a similar logic to that of Noyes’ Bible Communism. Marxists and neo-
Marxists, for example, are particularly concerned with the injustices perpetuated by capitalist 
systems and institutions of private property, and likewise believe true “moral” values can only be 
secured in an alternative system characterized by an ethic sharing or “communism.” Like Noyes, 
they aim to contest the ethic of individualism and endorse one emphasizing responsibility for the 
welfare of others, and they assert that this can be attained by rationally designing and 
implementing apparatuses more aligned with communal precepts. There is certainly a utopic or 
“religious” element to such philosophies—explicitly in Marx who promises a “withering of the 
nation state,” but also implicitly in the spiritual vigor with which the communist perspective 
reduces all to a knowable and inevitable purpose of history in a struggle between good and evil 
(see, Niebuhr, Irony). Yet there are substantial differences, as Marxists and socialists purport to 
be “secularly” minded, and consider the institution of social redemption to be the nation state 
rather than the voluntary communal withdrawal. Similarly, in such philosophies the communist 
principle is limited primarily to the economic realm, whereas Noyes rationally extended 
communism or “communalism” into the private familial realms. In some ways, Marx was less 
radical, and less rationally consistent, then Noyes.  
 But perhaps the more prominent legacy of the Noyesian perspective is the civic-spiritual 
overtones of community that endure in American discourse until this day. Roughly contemporary 
with Noyes and the larger utopian movement were philosophical and secular attempts to derive 
meaning and value from the community impulse, without some of the religious doctrinal 
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apparatus connected to it, in what I have called a secularization of the religious impulse. Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Mary Baker Eddy, William James, Josiah Royce, and 
even John Dewey could be taken as participating in the formulation of a secularized civil religion 
of community as a democratic virtue, and this holds true in my analyses of pragmatist Jane 
Addams and conservative humanist Southern Agrarians (Emerson, Transcendentalist; Thoreau, 
Walden; James, Varieties; Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty; Dewey, A Common Faith). Such civic-
religious elements are clear in the explicitly religious rhetorics of Reinhold Niebuhr and Martin 
Luther King, and surely the reoccurring sociological laments for the loss of community in the 
discourses of Richard Sennett, Robert Nisbet, Robert Bellah, Robert Putnam, Amati Etzioni 
reflect the religious-like piety of community as a higher virtue meant to redeem and correct 
society (and here we can see the spiritual resonance of community clearly hitting upon the 
“progressive” rhetoric of community, which I have considered separate for purposes of 
analysis).7 The Noyesian “communalist’ image of community was a kind of embodiment of both 
the progressivist and traditionalist orientations in that it displayed elements of preserving 
traditional values and aligning individuals with progress. In this, community served as the god-
term and organizational concept. The lingering association of community as an intrinsic good 
and sacrificial motive is present in both progressive and traditionalist perspectives, and that 
perhaps is the greatest legacy of the utopian “spiritual” uses of community. Community unites all 
parties by offering a transcendent value beyond the superficialities of economic relationships, 
                                                 
7 See Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics; King Jr., Where 
Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community; Sennet, Fall of Public Man; Nisbet, The Quest for 
Community; Bellah, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community; Etzioni, 
The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Age.  
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connecting conservative and liberal alike in its spiritual call to serve one’s fellows and find a life 
of meaning, harmony, and order in civic identification. 
The Rhetoric of Community  
This dissertation began by remarking on the commonplace trope of lamenting the “loss” 
of community in modern life. We can now see that such lamentations have been occurring 
continuously for at least the past one hundred and fifty years, and likely for a long time 
preceding. The reason appears to be that the idea of loss (and therefore failure) is constitutive of 
the concept of community itself, as modern society’s failure to obtain an adequate degree of 
“community” demands political motivation to recover it. The seeming ubiquity of the term 
community and its status as an ambiguous and inherently positive idea indicates, that in the 
realm of community, we are dealing with a spiritualized god-term for ordering and evaluating 
actions. Community is morally normative, and it endorses of an ethic of sacrifice to the greater 
good as an offset to more atomistic ways of ordering lives.  
 While I have attempted to investigate what kind of work gets done with “community” 
and discover what the concept reveals about modern practices of sense-making, I have strived to 
avoid a cynical or “debunking” perspective. My analysis and commentary has followed a 
principle of charity, whereby the aim was to come to an understanding of community appeals 
that is both critical and appreciative. I therefore caution against a sentiment that suggests we 
resist community rhetorics wherever they appear. While one can imagine a host of undesirable 
causes to which the term can be lent, there is also quite a bit of good done in its name. As 
citizens, we must use language to plead our case and coordinate action among our fellows, and I 
see no reason why “community” should be omitted from our terminology of motives. I only 
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suggest that we attain a level of alertness as to the inclinations of such discourse and develop a 
more refined critical sensibility for evaluating contemporary claims to community.  
In this vein, I advocate that the three ideals of community analyzed in this dissertation be 
approached with a degree of moral agnosticism. Community invites identification with a 
common identity, and it is in the construction of these identifications and their normative 
implications that community is contested. All three perspectives are goaded by their own 
contradictions, and when examined closely, “slip” into unearned territory and bleed into other 
schools of thought—the process whereby progressives find themselves in unexpected cahoots 
with traditionalists, and vice verses. While their communal formulas differ substantially, and this 
is not without consequence, no single template should be denounced or censored as such; critics 
may find themselves in greater sympathy with a particular perspective, but praise or blame is 
best designated only to its enactment in particular cases. Nevertheless, I believe my treatments of 
the universalist and particularist ethics align with the underlying presumption of contemporary 
American liberalism and conservatism in principle, and can therefore say something meaningful 
about the conflict of our own political moment. This is yet to be demonstrated in critical research 
and should be pursued it in future works. 
 My analysis of community might also bring a sense of contrition to communication 
researchers and other persons advocating community as a democratic ideal. While I have 
cautioned against the extreme cynicism of dismissing or debunking appeals to community, I have 
also given reason for restraining optimism towards community’s compensatory promise, since it 
is goaded by a certain irony which goes beyond observations of its contested and ambiguous 
character. The dialectical sense of community as coming together and coming apart, as 
negotiating inherent contradictions in our interpretive worlds, I submit, is ongoing and never 
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resolved. This is the “rhetorical situation” of community. The progressivists who strive for 
community without exclusion, and the traditionalists who only find community meaningful when 
it is curtailed and limited, ultimately find their efforts undermined by the irony that every merger 
involves a division, every unity beckons another “apart-ness,” and every transcendent must 
“come down” and be muddled in the contingencies of history. Order implies disorder, covenant-
making suggests covenant-breaking, congregation demands segregation, and inclusion seemingly 
necessitates exclusion (Burke, Grammar; Butchart).  
Cosmopolitan globalism may be an empty and meaningless promise, and provincialism 
may involve euphemizing violences and exclusions, but the attempt to escape either fate 
inevitably falls back upon itself and begins the cycle anew. An attentiveness to these ironies 
should lead to a humble awareness of how community is undone by the very sources which give 
it value. The rhetorical and Burkean approach I have suggested acknowledges this irony, and 
seeks to identify when community’s moral claims tear at the seams, not to censor community, 
but to understand its functions and dialectics more clearly so that citizens may pursue their 
visions of the good with a critical, humble, and knowing glance.  
From an awareness of community’s contested and ironic nature, we might begin 
rethinking our own uses of community and what they reveal about how we formulate the ideal 
relationship between self-society, spiritual-material, past-future. We might see questions of 
participation, inclusion, identification, collectivity, and political organization as reoccurring 
topics a democratic people must debate to determine their political identity. And amid much 
uncertainty and turmoil, we might even find cause for a tempered optimism in knowing that the 
idea of community persists as a possible restorative measure for redeeming a fallen social world.  
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